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i 
SYNOPSIS 
This study examines the process of the distribution 
of residential land in Greater Khartoum, Sudan, and 
inquires into the processes which constrain the access 
of the urban population to residential plots. The main 
objective is to analyse the constraints which bear upon 
the implementation of urban housing policy, and to develop 
an adequate explanation of their sources and underlying 
mechanisms. 
The study employs a broad framework of analysis that 
combines a structural analysis of the political economy 
with an institutional ana~ysia p~.policy and organisational 
' \ ~· 
process. It will be argued that the limitations inherent 
in the urban housing policy in Sudan can be explained in 
terms of the prevailing policy planning model and the under-
lying structural constraints which arise from the nature of 
the political economy. 
The study consists of seven chapters. Chapter One 
provides an overview of perspectives of policy implementation 
in the Third World. The relevance of some of these perspect-
ives to an approach that relates policy problems to social 
structure will be considered. 
ii 
Chapter Two presents an exposition of the Sudanese 
economy and highlights the question of how dominant 
economic interests influence public policy. 
Chapter Three addresses the links between social 
structure and public policy by analysing the prevalent 
model of policy planning in Sudan. It will be argued 
that there is a correspondence between the social content 
of the policy model and the interests of dominant economic 
classes identified in Chapter Two. 
Chapter Four focuses on the effect of the policy model 
on urban social policy. Two policy areas will be examined:-
the policy of regional development and its impact on housing 
problems in the capital; and the policy of urban land 
development. 
Chapter Five investigates the concrete limits on access 
to residential land at the level of housing agencies. Their 
organisational patterns, rules of allocation and operational 
processes will be examined. 
Chapter Six narrows the focus on the limits on access 
by examining the upgrading process in one of the capital's 
illegal settlements. 
Chapter Seven concludes the argument on the source and 
the incidence of constraints on policy implementation. We 
will synthesise the processes underlying the constraints 
iii 
identified in the preceding chapters, and advance a broad 
explanation of the nature and the incidence of these 
constraints. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the Sudan emerged into independence in 1956, 
expectations of speedy development were running high. The 
state occupied a central place in the economy and was, 
therefore, seen as a pace-setter in the race for economic 
and social progress. Now, after almost three decades of 
independence the state is in deep economic and financial 
crisis; many areas of the country are famine-stricken and 
over four million are estimated to be starving in mid-1985. 
This state of affairs lends critical enquiry into public 
policies and implementation strategies, uncontested signifi-
cance and extreme urgency. 
The objective of this study is to examine the constraints 
on the implementation of urban housing policy in the Sudan, 
and construct an adequate explanation of the sources and 
underlying mechanisms of problems of public policy. The 
specific focus of the study is the process of the distribution 
of residential land in Greater Khartoum and the causes of 
constraints on the access of urban population to residential 
plots. 
The significance of this research topic arises in rela-
tion to two main considerations: 
First, most approaches to policy implementation in the 
Third World, namely those in the discipline of public admin-
istration, are predicated upon the assumption that the state 
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is a neutral institution, which is above class and group 
conflict. It follows from this assumption that policy 
process is an essentially technical matter and is socially 
neutral in its impact on the public. 1 
However, there is now an increasing appreciation in 
social and political theory that the notion of a neutral 
state is untenable and therefore indefensible. This change 
in the understanding of the state calls into question the 
adequacy of prevalent explanations of policy implementation. 
The notion of a socially neutral policy process cannot be 
sustained. Implementation analysis is, therefore, confronted 
with the task of developing adequate explanations that take 
note of the change in the concept of the state and which are 
capable of accurately describing the policy process. 
The second justification for this research is the pro-
gressive increase in the role and size of the state in con-
temporary society, and particularly in developing countries. 
The state in the Sudan, a s in many post-colonial societies, 
has become widely involved in economy and society. 
"In addition to the customary regulatory and public 
service functions of government, the state operates 
or controls the greater part of the modern s ector 
production. There are more than 60 public corporations 
in agriculture, transport, industry and commerce .•. 
so that total employment in public s ervice .•. repre-
sents well over 5 per cent of the total l abour f orce , 
broadly defined, and more than half of modern-sector 
employment - and the numbers have ~uadrupled since 
independence". (ILO, 1976, p.147). 
1. A full exposition of this point and the following one ~ill 
be conducted in Chapter 1 Sections 1 .2 a nd 1.3 respect1vely. 
2. The government sector employs about 84 % of the labour force 
with post secondary educati on , (ibid , p.469). 
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Growth in the role and size of the State in Sudan was 
accompanied by an increasing centralisation of power, 
particularly from 1969 onwards. With its huge control 
of strategic resources, the state became a focus for 
class and group interests and a vehicle for social mobility. 
In the process of managing the distribution of state bene-
fits and penalties among the population, public policy will 
have a vital impact on the "life chances" of individuals 
and groups in the country. Public policy analysis acquires, 
therefore, an increased importance not simply for its concern 
with policy output but more so because of the social signifi-
cance of policy outcomes. 
Determinants, constraints and social implications of 
public policy become increasingly shaped, on the one hand, 
by the social character of the state and, on the other hand, 
by the growing role of the state in society. In contrast 
to dominant approaches in public administration which perceive 
administrative failures in developing countries primarily in 
terms of organisational weaknesses and cultural contradictions 
we will argue that implementation problems bear a complex 
relationship to the nature of the post-colonial Sudanese state 
and its role in economy and society. Limitations on urban 
housing policy will be explained mainly in terms of the pre-
vailing policy planning model and underlying structural con-
straints flowing from the political economy. 
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We will adopt a broad framework of analysis that com-
bines structural analysis of the economy and institutional 
analysis of policy and organisational process. the macro/ 
micro nature of the research required the use of a multi-
disciplinary perspective. As some of the processes we 
intend to analyse fall outside the domain of the discipline 
of public administration we needed to cross disciplinary 
boundaries and draw on works from political economy, urban 
studies and the sociology of organisations. 
The specific focus of the study will be the administra-
tive allocation of residential land in Greater Khartoum. We 
will address analysis more to the structural underpinnings 
of the state, economy and administrative agencies and less to 
the behavioural and cultural traits of individuals who run 
housing agencies. While analysis will span colonial and 
post-colonial periods to provide a complete view of the 
development of the state and economy, the period 1970-1980 
will constitute the main referrent for the study. Data used 
were drawn from library material, official documents of the 
Sudan Government, interviews with employees in housing agencies 
and a sample survey in an illegal settlement in Greater 
Khartoum. Difficulty of access to data, particularly in 
housing agencies deprived us of first hand material about 
behavioural aspects of housing institutions; and forced us 
to rely heavily on content analysis of official documents. 
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The study consists of seven chapters. Chapter One 
provides an overview of perspectives of policy implementa-
tion in the Third World. It begins with a critique of 
conventional explanations of implementation problems, which 
are predominant in the literature of public and development 
administration. It then considers the Marxist perspective 
of policy process and identifies its limitations. Further, 
we explore writings on "urban managerialism", radical organ-
isation theory and German political studies and consider 
their contributions to an approach which relates policy 
problems to social structure. Finally, building on elements 
from the three latter traditions we propose a framework for 
studying constraints on urban housing policy in the Sudan. 
Chapter Two presents an exposition of the main features 
of the Sudanese economy. It analyses its major structural 
weaknesses as a product of dominant class interests and con-
cludes by posing a question about how dominant interests 
influence the state policy. 
The link between social structure and public policy is 
examined in Chapter Three, through a political analysis of 
the prevailing model of policy planning under the May (1969) 
Regime. The policy model will be examined against the 
ideology of the regime, the institutional organisation of 
the state and the social character of policy makers. We will 
argue that there is a conformity between the social content 
of the policy model and the dominant social interests identi-
fied in Chapter Two. We therefore propose that policy models 
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can be an important mechanism for mediating social interests 
in the policy process. 
The effect of the dominant policy model on urban social 
policy will be investigated in Chapter Four. We focus on 
two main policy areas: the link between the policy of 
regional development, urban growth and housing problems 
in the capital; and the impact of the policy of urban land 
development on the provision of and access to urban housing. 
We will argue that the pattern of regional development tends 
to destabilise the peasant communities in the Western region 
and accelerate the rate of migration to the capital. As we 
consider the policy of urban development we will show that 
the commercialisation of urban land in the early 1970s 
generated pressures on housing opportunities for the low 
income families and constrained their access. It will be 
argued that both urban and regional development policies had 
their origin in the dominant national policy model. 
The fifth chapter investigates concrete limits on the 
access of urban groups to residential land. These limits 
will be traced to the content of the allocation rules and 
the organisational arrangements at the distribution points. 
We will discuss how the allocation structure fostered dif-
ferential access to residential plots relating to site quality, 
plot space, and levels of urban service. It will be shown 
that the state bureaucracy enjoyed a subsidised access to 
high class housing whereas low income families were relegated 
to low quality housing. We will argue that limits on access 
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deriving from the allocation rules operated between housing 
classes. A second set of limits on access operated at the 
distribution points of the service, and mainly affected the 
access of applicants within housing classes (see Diagram 1.1). 
Chapter Six focuses on a case-study of an upgrading 
project in National Unity settlement of Omdurman city. The 
case-study material will be used to illustrate three dimensions 
of constraints on access to residential land. First it illus-
trates the link between the policy of regional development 
and housing problems in the capital, which is proposed in 
Chapter Four. Second, it shows the constraining effect of 
political intervention in housing policy on the access of 
lower class families to legal residence. Third, it highlights 
other non-structural constraints on access which arose at the 
operational level of the upgrading project. 
Chapter Seven concludes the study by proposing an alter-
native interpretation of the sources and incidence of con-
straints on urban housing policy. This will be done in two 
stages. First, a summary of constraints is provided and the 
constraints classified into three categories relating to: the 
institutional setting, urban political economy, and national 
political economy. Second, we attempt to synthesise processes 
underlying constraints in one integrated explanation: it con-
sists of identifying social forces and interests underlying 
the prevailing policy model, and of specifying institutional 
mechanisms through which social interest acted upon admin-
istrative process. We argue that by adopting this proposed 
- 8 -
research strategy it will be possible to comprehend how 
structural processes flowing from the wider political 
economy can influence and constrain policy implementation. 
- 9 -
CHAPTER ONE 
PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE THIRD WORLD 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
A distinctive feature of contemporary political systems 
is the increasing involvement of the state in society. Expan-
sion in the scope of state functions during the second hal f 
of this century was enormous. Parallel to this trend has 
been an equally significant tendency toward centralisation 
of power (Saunders, 1979, p.l40). Although the magnitude 
of state intervention may be large and complex in developed 
societies, it seems to acquire particular significance and 
to have profound impact in developing countries. Because of 
the scarcity of economic resources and the centralisation of 
political power in the latter countries, state actions have 
a vital impact on the "life chances" of individuals a nd groups. 
The expanding role of the state in developing countries 
attracted an increasing concern about strategies, processes 
and outcomes of public policy. A number of studies on im-
p lementation were carried out, particularly during the last 
l two decades. Generally most of these studies focused more 
narrowly o n administrative systems and procedures of implement-
ing bureaucracies or on the characteristics of administrators 
(Grindle, M. 1980, p.4). Little attention was given to link-
ing implementation problems to the characteristics of political 
1. Footnotes 4 and 30 in Grindle, M. (1980) provide an over-
view of this literature. 
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regimes or to the wider environment of implementation. 1 It 
is the intention of this study to extend an analysis of 
problems of implementation in the Sudan to other variables 
in the social , economic and political settings of the im-
plementation process. 
As an area of policy analysis, studies of implementation 
cover a wide range of aspects . Hogwood and Gunn (1981) men-
tioned seven areas of policy analysis (Ham, c. and Hill, M., 
1984, pp.8-l0) . Three areas of these viz. policy content, 
policy process and policy outcomes often constituted the 
main focus of implementation studies. Our main focus in 
this study will be policy output and its outcomes in the 
sphere of the allocation of residential land in Greater 
Khartoum, Sudan . But since we regard implementa tion as an 
integral part of the policy process r a ther than as an admin-
istrative "follow up" from policy making (Barrett , s. and 
Hill, M., 1984, p .220), we will naturally extend our investi-
gation to the process o f pol icy formation and to the content 
of housing policy in the Sudan. 
The starting roint of our inquiry is an exposition, in 
the second section of this chapter, of p revailing explanations 
of problems of policy implementation in developing countries. 
These explanations are usually predominant in the literature 
of public and development administration. They were basically 
c riticised for restricting analysis to on e level of the policy 
1 . Exception to this statement we re Riggs, F. 1964; Daland, R. 
1967; Graham, L. 1968; Cleaves, P . 1974; and Grindl e , M. 
1977 and 1980, (quoted in Grindle, 1980). 
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process - behavioural and organisational aspects - to the 
neglect of other important issues relating to the content 
and context of implementation. It will be argued in this 
section that the distribution of political power and con-
flict in society is as important for understanding problems 
of implementation. 
The argument on the impact of politicalpower and con-
flict on implementation will be examined, in the third sec-
tion, in the light of the relation between state, bureaucracy 
and society. We will consider first the conception of bureau-
cracy in Marxist theory of the state, identify its limitations 
and underline its inadequacy for analysis of constraints on 
policy implementation. We take issue with that Marxist view 
which suggests that policy outcomes could only be explained 
in terms of class conflict external to the state's apparatus. 
The link between political power and implementation is 
further illuminated by considering writings on "urban manager-
ialism", research on radical organisation theory, and the 
debate in German political studies on the "materiality" of 
the state apparatus. We note an increasing appreciation in 
these three traditions of the role the internal organisation 
of the state plays in extending social interests into public 
policy. However, the link between political action and social 
structure through the institutional structure of the state is 
not yet satisfactorily articulated in this literature. The 
work of Offe (1974 and 1975) and radical organisation theorists 
contained important ingredients of an approach to the study 
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of determinants of and constraints on public policy. 
Building on these ingredients we will present in the 
fourth section, a framework of analysis to examine the 
constraints on urban social policy in the Sudan. 
We outline the research problem in the fourth section 
of this chapter. Examination of constraints on the allo-
cation of residential landinthe capital is spread over a 
number of levels. At a macro-policy level we focus on the 
dominant policy model in the Sudan and analyse it in the 
light of the regime's ideology, the institutional organisa-
tion of the state apparatus and social character of incum-
bents. We associate limits on access to residential land 
with certain aspects of urban and regional development poli-
cies. At a micro-policy level, we trace limits on access 
in the structure, technology and processes of allocation 
agencies. We use the notion of internalisation of biases 
in policy into institutional forms, organisational structures 
and processes to denote links between the two levels of con-
straints and to underline their combined effect at the dis-
tribution points of residential land. 
1.2 IMPLEMENTATION IN THE ORTHODOXY OF DEVELOPMENT 
ADMINISTRATION 
1.2.1 General 
Host Third World countries, especially in Africa, 
emerged into independence in the post-World War II period. 
While their economies were relatively weak, expectations of 
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speedy development were high. The state was expected to 
play a major role in improving living standards, mostly 
through the public sector. Now, after almost three decades 
of independence the gap between expectations, however 
modestly defined, and actual state performance was widening. 1 
Questions about what went wrong ranged from questioning the 
relevance of planning strategies to addressing capabilities 
of administrative systems and a?propriateness of implementa-
tion strategies. 
In this section we look, firstly, at the common explana-
tions of problems of implemenation which prevailed during the 
past three decades. We associate these explanations with the 
tradition of development administration. We focus on its 
theoretical orientation, and outline policy implications and 
prescriptions which ensued. Secondly, we underline the main 
limitations in the work of development administration in 
developing countries. Broadly speaking, systematic study of 
the context of implementation received little attention in 
the approach of that tradition. 
Thirdly, we consider the usefulness of organisational 
analysis in making up for limitations in the work of develop-
ment administration. As we review a critique of mainstream 
organisation theory we note the relevance of the debate 
arising in the course of that critique to problems of im-
plementation in developing countries. We conclude this section 
l. The widespread famine in Sub-saharan Africa (1984/85) 
reflected the gravity of the situation in real terms. 
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emphasising the need to link the study of public organisations 
to issues of power and conflict in wider society. 
1.2.2 The Development Administration Movement 
Two organisational models basically influenced the 
structures and processes of policy planning and implementa-
tion in post-colonial societies: the colonial European 
model and the post-war development administration model. 
Although the legacy of colonial administrative survived well 
into the independence era, the tradition of development adrnin-
istration has been predominant. During the past three decades 
most scholarly work on problems of public administration in 
developing countries came from the North American school of 
development administration. 1 The aim of the movement was to 
produce knowledge, basic and applied which had social utility 
in the context of developing countries. To understand pro-
perly the analytical perspective of development administration 
and assess its relevance or otherwise to problems of implemen-
tation in developing countries we need to specify its place 
in social theory, establish its conceptual orientation and 
identify consequent policy implications. 2 
1. This tradition was represented by the Comparative Admin-
istration Group, "CAG", established in 1960. Its litera-
ture was disseminated through the then Journal of Compart-
tive Administration and publications of the commonwealth 
Studies Centre at the Duke University. Main publications 
of the movement included: Braibant, R., 1969; Riggs, F., 
1971; Kornberg, A., and Musolf, L., 1970; Weidner, E., 
1970; Heaphy, J., 1971; and Waldo, D., 1970. 
2. It is important to note that there was no acknowledged 
"paradigmatic consensus" among participants in the movem~nt 
nor did "CAG" formallyespouseC' specific positions relat1ng 
to issues to be discussed below. Hence not all members of 
"CAG" have adopted all the assumptions, characteristic and 
methodologies elaborated below. 
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(a) Theoretical Orientation 
As a sub-field of public administration, development 
administration essentially related to two traditions of 
administrative thought: the tradition of scientific manage-
ment, started in America at the turn of the century; and 
the trend towards national planning and government inter-
ventionism which emerged as a direct consequence of the de-
pression, World War II, and the post-war reconstruction (Nef 
and Dwivedi, 1981, p.44). 
Initiation of technical assistance programmes during 
the 1950s and the 1960s posed questions about the relevance 
of orthodox administrative theories and concepts to admin-
istration of development in the Third World (Riggs, F. 1976, 
p.648). The tendency was to search for appropriate concepts 
that would facilitate cross-cultural comparison, mostly 
borrowing from other disciplines such as Anthropology, Socio-
logy, Political Science and Economics. As Ilchman (197l,p.8) 
noted, almost every innovation in social science technology 
- systems analysis, pattern variables, the tradition-modernity 
dichotomy, information theory, pluralism, and others - found 
its way into the writings of development administration. 
structural - functionalism, systems analysis and behaviourism 
provided a significant measure of integration of the movement 
into large conceptual structures (Nef and Dwivedi, op.cit., 
p.Sl). 
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Different strands of social theory usually contain 
implicitly or explicitly certain key assumptions relating 
to ontology, epistemology and methodology (Burrell, G. 
and Morgan,G., 1979, pp.l-4). Structural functionalism 
and systems analysis upheld specific assumptions on the 
nature of social science, society and the state, which 
largely underlined the work of development administration, 
as we explain below. 
In its approach to social science the functionalist 
paradigrn1 held that the social world consisted of relative: 
concrete empirical artefacts and relationships which can 
be identified, studied and measured through approaches 
derived from the natural sciences. The use of mechanical 
and biological analogies as means of modelling and under-
standing the social world was particularly favoured in man: 
functionalist theories (Burrell, G. and Morgan, G., op.cit 
p.26). 
This epistemology influenced the research orientation 
of development administration. Nef and Dwivedi (1981) ide: 
tified three methodological traits in the approach of the 
movement. 
(a) There was an emphasis on the context and ecology 
of administration, e.g. Riggs, F. 1964, p.399. 
1. Kuhn defined paradigms as "universally recognised scien 
tific achievements that for a time provided model probl· 
and solutions to a community of practitioners" (1970, 
quoted in ibid, p.35). 
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(b) There was an interdisciplinary flavour 
blending a multitude of methods and 
concepts "which did not fit into classical 
political science or western public admin-
istration" (Raphaeli, 1967, p.l8). 
{c) There was an emphasis on logical empiricism: 
an expressed concern with theory building 
and the testing of propositions through empiri-
cal analysis e.g. Riggs, 1964, p.399. 
A key concept that underlined the functionalist percep-
tion of society was that of the "system". According to 
social systems analysis a system consisted of interdependent 
parts such that when the properties of one component in a 
system changed, all other components and the system as a 
whole were affected (Almond, G. and Powell, G., 1966, p.l9). 
This view of the social order presumed a number of assumptions 
about the nature of society: 
"(l) Every society is a relatively persistent, 
stable structure of elements. 
(2) Every society is a well integrated structure 
of elements. 
(3) Every element in a society has a function i e . 
renders a contribution to its maintenance as 
a system. 
(4) Every functioning social structure is based 
on a consensus of values among its members" 
(Dahrendorf, R., 1959, quoted in Burrell and 
Morgan, op.cit., p.92). 
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In its conception of the polity, structural functional-
ism substituted the concept of political system for that 
of the state (Almond and Powell, op.cit., pp.l6,17). A 
political system was defined as a "system of interaction 
in a society which produces authoritative decisions ... that 
are binding on the society as a whole, and are reinforced 
by legitimate physical compulsion if necessary" (Heady, F., 
1979, p.7). A functional model of political systems, intro-
duced by Almond, proposed that such systems shared six uni-
versal functions: interest articulation, interest aggrega-
tion, rule-making, rule application, rule adjudication and 
communication. These functions represented the conversion 
process whereby a political system transformed inputs into 
outputs (see Almond and Powell, op.cit.). 
Most social systems theories espoused a pluralist pers-
pective of political power. They perceived the state as 
neutral in its functions and independent of any particular 
class interests. Its functions were to regulate and mediate 
conflicts within society, by use of force if necessary 
(Saunders, 1979, p.l5l). 
Development administration held typical views about 
society, state and political power (Nef and Dwivedi, op.cit., 
pp.52,53). The role of the state was perceived as respond-
ing to and facilitating the ''free flow" of competitive market 
politics. Development administration was viewed as being 
compatible with and providing support for liberal democracy 
in the developing world (Spingler, J., 1969, pp.588 and 611-12, 
in Braibanti, op.cit.). 
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(b) Policy Orientation 
The aforementioned theoretical orientation reflected 
closely on the movement's policy analysis and policy 
approach. 'l'he movement used the term "development admin-
istration in two interrelated senses (Heady, op.cit., p.20): 
it referred to the administration of development programmes, 
and to strengthening of administrative capabilities in 
developing countries. In order to elucidate the policy 
approach adopted to achieve these objectives we shall con-
sider the movement's views on development, the role of 
bureaucracy in change, and the instrumentality of technology 
to development. 
i The Concept of Development 
The movement did not have a clear and explicit theory 
of development or precise specification of goals of develop-
ment (Nef and Dwivedi, op.cit.). Its definition of develop-
ment, characteristics and goals were mostly derived from the 
model of "developed system" formulated by Almond (Almond and 
Powell, op.cit.). Absence of the characteristics and behaviour 
patterns of the "developed system'' in the Third World was taken 
to denote a certain state of underdevelopment. Underdevelop-
ment, on the other hand, was perceived as resulting from innate 
social, cultural, political and economic defects prevailing 
in developing countries (Tapia Videla, 1976, p.l21). Develop-
ment was often defined in terms of concepts such as "modernisa-
tion", "industrialisation", "westernisation", "self-sustained-
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growth", "structural-differentiation" (Gunnel!, 1970, 
quoted in Cleaves, op.cit. p.8). 
Emphasis varied, in the literature of development 
a&ninistration, between political and economic development. 
Economic development was defined in terms of economic 
growth (e.g. Meier, 1970, quoted in Nef and Dwivedi, op.cit., 
p.Sl), and the expansion of GNP per capita over a period of 
time. A diffusion model of growth was envisaged involving 
the notion of spread of development, within an underdeveloped 
society, from "modern" to "traditional" sectors of the economy 
(Bodenheimer, 1970, pp.lll,ll2). Political development was 
conceived as the movement towards a political system that 
approximated a "modern industrial society" (e.g. Huntington 
and Dominguezi, 1975, quoted in Heady, op.cit., pp.85,86). 
Thus, the building of political institutions and processes 
after western political systems was considered a necessary 
requisite for political development in the Third World. 
ii The Role of Bureaucracy in Change 
In its analysis of how to effect change, development 
administration treated the concept of development as a 
dependent variable and administration as the independent 
variable (Cleaves, P., 1974, pp.7,8). Attention was mainly 
focused on improving the administrative requisites for 
realising the goals of public policy, but the latter were 
considered less problematic. This position conformed to the 
perspective of structural functionalism about the role of 
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bureaucracy in society: 
"a system cannot develop a high level of internal 
regulation, distribution or extraction without 
a "modern" governmental bureaucracy in one form 
or another" (Almond and Powell, op.cit., pp.323, 
32 4) • 
In societal terms, public administration, being predominantly 
drawn from the middle class,was seen as a modernising social 
force capable of introducing change in traditional values 
and behaviour patterns in developing countries. This view 
of bureaucracy was close to Lipset's analysis: 
"the growing middle class .•. like its 19th century 
European counterpart supports a democratic society 
by attempting to reduce the influence of the anti-
capitalist traditionalist and the arbitrary power 
of the military" (Lipset, 1963, quoted in Bodenheimer, 
op . cit. p.ll7). 
Within the middle class, the bureaucracy was seen as the 
focal group" ... perhaps the most important elite modernising 
roles are the technical and civil services of a country" 
(Apter, D., 1965, quoted by Ilchman, 1969, p.483). The major 
underlying assumption in development administration was, there-
fore, that by perfecting the bureaucracy, the task of establish-
ing socio-economic change and political democracy was to be 
made easier. 
This conception of bureaucracy was further strengthe ned 
following the failure of liberal democratic governments in a 
number of developing countries during the 1960s {Loveman, B., 
1976, p . 618). A view, giving first priority to political 
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stability that would be the foundation of economic growth 
and democracy, emerged within the ranks of development 
administration. The implication was that the creation of 
effective administrative systems had to precede the concern 
for political and economic development (e.g. Esman, 1971, 
mentioned in ibid). The main thrust of development admin-
istration centred on administrative reform and administrative 
training to equip bureaucracy for its perceived role in social 
change. 
iii Neutrality and Instrumentality of Organisational 
Technology 
There was a view within the movement that the vast amount 
of experience in reconstruction and organisation, gained during 
the post-war reconstruction in Europe, could be adopted to suit 
the specific developmental needs of the post-colonial societies 
(Nef and Dwivedi, op.cit. p.54). Emphases were laid on the 
transfer of appropriate organisational design and of modern 
administrative technology (Heady op.cit. p.l3). The bureau-
cratic model, based on Weber's "ideal type" construct was 
transferred to the Third World with some modifications. 1 A 
host of administrative techniques, mostly drawn from the American 
experience were introduced. These included: personnel admin-
istration, budgeting and financial administration, information 
technology, techniques of administrative planning, records 
management, and work simplification (Siffin, W., 1976, p.62). 
1. As Benson (1977(a), p.4) noted in a different context, some 
important features of Weber's argument, such as the emphasis 
on historical context and trends were removed. The core 
idea - the bounded rational organisation was retained. 
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The policy of transferring technical know-how to 
developing countries presumed that such techniques were 
value-neutral and essentially had a cross-cultural, cross-
national utility. Administrative techniques were, thus, 
considered objective universal principles. The norn1ative 
elements implicit in this type of technology, and their 
value orientations were not questioned (ibid, pp.62-66). 
Furthermore, there was a belief that the use of this 
technology could be divorced from the substance of the 
governmental policies which it would be serving. Admin-
istrative techniques were considered invariably useful 
and applicable to different policy sectors in developing 
countries. 
Looking back in restrospect, the policy approach of 
development administration to implementation problems in 
developing countries was characterised by its concentration 
on one level of the policy process ie. the administrative 
level. Much of its effort focused on introducing administra-
tive reforms and promoting administrative training. 1 The 
goals of public policy and the nature of the policy process 
were not central tothe movement's perspective, as we explain 
below. 
1. Between July 1952 and March 1963 almost 6,000 persons were 
sent abroad for training under the US aid programme alone. 
The United Nations, the Ford Foundation and the United 
States Government had helped establish or deve lop some 70 
public administration institutes in developing countries. 
(Siffin, op.cit. p.66). 
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1.2.3 Limitations in the Development Administration Approach 
By the end of the 1960s it was evident that externally 
induced modernisation had failed to eradicate the basic 
problems it purported to solve. Whilst significant increases 
of GNP had taken place, poverty, inequalities and political 
repression had either worsened or remained unaltered (Nef 
and Dwivedi, op.cit. p.SS; Loveman, op.cit. pp.619,620; 
Kesselman, 1973, p.l40). The work of development administra-
tion came under close scrutiny in terms both of its theoreti-
cal orientation and its practical implications.Of the ensuing 
critiques, relevant to this study is the failure of the move-
ment to systematically relate administrative process to its 
social, economic and political settings. The implications of 
this limitation for the study of implementation problems will 
be clarified as we consider below the main criticisms directed 
against the work o£ development administration. 
(a) The Theoretical Difficulties 
Criticism of the conceptual orientation of development 
administration came as part of a wider critique of the object-
ives, methodologies, epistemologies and value assumptions of 
western social science (Nef and Dwivedi, op.cit. p.55). 
Development administration was criticised for adopting a posi-
tivist approach to theory building and for using inadequate 
methods in selecting research variables and in data collection. 
As for the first limitation, it was argued that, far from 
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being value-free and objective, the concepts used were 
value-laden and ethnocratic (Bodenheimer, op.cit., Fay, B., 
1975, Ch.3, Jun, J., 1976, p.642). A recent trend in public 
administration considered the rules implicit in the "bureau-
cratic model" as socially negotiated constructs rather than 
absolute rules (e.g. Barrett and Hill, op.cit., p.228). A 
similar view in organisation studies questioned the taken-
for-granted objectivity of concepts such as specialisation, 
centralisation, span of control and so on ..• (eg. Benson, 
1 l977(a), p.4). The import of these critiques is that the 
conceptual constructs of development administration were 
theoretically incapable of accurately describing administra-
tive reality in developing countries. 
The conceptual weakness noted above reflected on methods 
of selecting research variables and of collecting data. For 
instance, some studies attempted to deduce administrative 
behaviour from the properties of the total social system 
(e.g. Siffin, 1966, mentioned in Cleaves op.cit. p.6), assuming 
away the possible effects of lower level variables on admin-
istration. To paraphrase Springer, those studies which dealt 
with many levels of analysis focused on one or few units of 
analysis e.g. culture in Siffin's study of Thai bureaucracy, 
(1966) or Berger's study of Egyptian bureaucracy (1957, re-
ferred to by Ilchman 1972, pp.231,235). On the other hand, 
more extensive research in terms of units was confined to a 
single level of analysis (Springer, J. 1977, p.33). The re-
sult of these conceptual and methodological limitations was an 
1. We present the complete argument on this point in sub-
section 1.2.4 below. 
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incomplete handling of the complex variables obtaining in 
the implementation environment, partial explanations of 
administrative problems, and inappropriate policy prescrip-
tions. 
(b) Policy Implications 
Government policies which followed the analyses of the 
development administration school received a number of criti-
cisms. We shall be concerned here with specific aspect of 
these critiques, namely, the emphasis on a predominant role 
for bureaucracy in change and the implication of this view 
for a number of political and developmental issues. 
We note from the above review that development administra-
tion upheld two interrelated views about bureaucracy: bureau-
cracy was equated with rational administration; it was also 
considered, in social terms, as a modernising force in com-
parison to other social groups and classes. The obvious 
policy implication, therefore, was to inculcate bureaucrats 
into modern techniques of organisation, and also to increase 
the political power of the bureaucracy so that it was capable 
of mobilising resources for modernisation. 
The possible imbalance in the distribution of political 
power between various social groups, which might arise there-
from, was considered a necessary short-term cost in anticip ation 
of long term political and economic development. Any concern 
for restraining bureaucratic authority had to be subordinated 
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to the need to create effective administrative institutions. 
Thus, Esman wrote: 
"To a number of scholars including this writer, 
the emphasis on control of bureaucracy in the 
context of most of the developing countries is 
a misplaced priority, one that might seriously 
retard their rate of progress. We ought to be 
much more concerned with increasing the capacity 
of the bureaucracy to perform, and this we see 
as a function of greatly enhanced professional 
capability and operational autonomy rather than 
further controls" (Esman, op.cit. p.62). 
This view was reportedly widespread among bureaucrats 
in developing countries. From a study of a group of planners 
from the Third World studying in the United States, Ilchman 
concluded that they saw the forces to overcome backwardness 
as either themselves and their bureaucratic colleagues, or 
elites in other fields (Ilchman, w. 1969, p.494). This 
orientation in development administration analysis meant 
support for increased state and bureaucratic control over 
political power and national resources in developing countries. 
As Loveman observed, by the 1970s development administration 
had become euphemisms for authoritarian and frequently military 
regimes (Loveman, op.cit . p.619) . The view that an "administra -
tive state" was the best administrator of development had two 
important implications for the process of policy planning and 
implementation as well as for social outcomes of state actions 
in the Third World, as we argue below:-
- 28 -
(i) Irrelevance of politics and ideology to development 
Over-emphasis in the literature of development administra-
tion on the centrality of administration to development had 
not been associated with comparable concern about the social 
character of development goals or about how they were reached 
in the first place. There was an implicit assumption of soci-
etal consensus over these issues. Politics or conflict re-
lating to development goals were assumed away in a search for 
stability and order, themselves seen as vital requisites for 
development to happen. 
But "political order" argued Kesselrnan (1973, p.l42) was 
equated with strengthening the established authorities as 
evidenced in the works of Huntington (1968) and Binder (1971). 1 
Political disorder, on the other hand, was associated with the 
presence of dissenting groups in the political arena. Accord-
ing to this pattern of analysis dominant values or the values 
and interests of those holding political power were taken to 
represent societal values as a whole and to constitute the 
frame of reference for the goals of development. On the other 
hand, values and aspirations of dissenting or under-represented 
groups were considered anti-developmental to the extent that 
those groups questioned or endangered the "political order". 
1. In this sense the concept of "political order" obscured the 
legitimacy of the means used by governments to maintain 
power (Kesselman, op.cit. p.l43). 
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Obviously, by equating development goals with the 
interests of those holding power, and in the absence of 
political debate there was a risk of excluding from the 
agenda of development the interests and aspirations of 
underrepresented groups. In the meantime, those under-
represented or excluded were largely the people in whose 
name development was being initiated. Failure of these 
groups to express their interests through a process of 
negotiation, bargaining or conflict would lead to mis-
calculation of the goals of development. In such situ-
ation, planners would be deprived from weighing accurately 
the human costs of development and less able to conduct 
an equitable distribution of these costs between various 
social groups and classes . Moreover, as some social 
groups believed that their interests were excluded from 
the agenda of development the very effort of mobilisation 
demanded by development was defeated. 
(ii) Technocracy as substitute for politics 
Closely associated with the notion of the irrelevance 
of politics and ideology to development was a belief that 
there were non-ideological bases for setting development 
goals. "Scientific planning", seen as a socially-neutral 
process conducted through the planners, was perceived both 
by aid agencies and aid receiving governments as a sound 
b a sis for identifying the socio-economic goals of developme 
The underlying trend was a gradual shift in the nature of 
policy formation from a politically-oriented process, as 
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presumed in the pluralist perspective, to a technocratic 
process: one that was governed by "scientific'' rules. 
Public adninistration , therefore, increasingly replaced 
politics as the appropriate institution and process for 
identifying developmental goals. 
Commenting on Kenya's Special Rural Development Plan, 
Ekekwe noted the lack of any notion of politically involving 
the masses. Its emphasis was on providing the personnel with 
the requisite skills of administration (1977, p.56). In 
Ghana Marshall reported that members of the "technocratic 
elite (were) ... highly suspicious of popular mobilisa-
tion and ideology and convinced of technocratic solutions ... " 
(1975, quoted in ibid, p.57). 
In their definitions of and approaches to development, 
planners in the Third World followed closely the prescriptions 
o f development administration, noted earlier. Ilchman's (1969) 
perceptive analysis of the ''ideology" of planners in develop-
ing countries deserves quoting at some length: 
"Industrialisation and modernisation are deeply held 
values, and the costs of these processes tend to be 
minimised by the planners. Their explanations of 
causes of backwardness stress the pervasiveness of 
values hostile to development and imply the need for 
substantial reform before the processes can become 
self-sustaining ... Despite problems defined in cul-
tural and political terms, the planners feel that 
economic programmes and planning - the more compre-
hensive the better - are themore trustworthy guides 
for action. The agricultural sector must be "educa-
ted" for innovations , though structural reform and 
force are also advocated . Both the desired increases 
in resources of foreign aid and the desired allocation 
of resources by the government are defined largely in 
technical terms with explicit rejection of premises 
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that might be labelled "political~" (Ilchman, 
op.cit. pp.504-505, in Braibanti, R., 1969, 
emphasis mine). 
By the late 1960s the paradigm informing this pattern 
of economic planning - neo-classical economic analysis -
came under serious criticisms (Mabogunje, 1980, Chs 1 and 
2). It was criticised for lack of historical specificity 
by treating underdevelopment without any awareness of the 
historical reality of the world capitalist economy out of 
which these conditions have emerged. It was also criticised 
for lack of class analysis, as it presumed that the develop-
ment and organisation of the economy could take place in the 
setting of an implicitly harmonious social order where there 
would seem to be no internal structural contradiction. 
The foregoing discussion of the limitations in the 
a pproach of development administration underline two import-
ant concerns about the study of public policy. First, as 
long as development is about people, conflict of interests 
over goals, process and costs of deve lopment cannot be assumed 
away. Analysis of the policy process must take account of 
social interests underpinning public policy if it is to be able 
to understand and adequately explain that policy. Second, 
planning models, administrative techniques and organisation 
designs, far from being socially-neutral, can mediate social 
interests in public policy. Sociological analysis of what is 
conventionally considered "scientific" administrative techniques 
and models must be central to analysis of public policy. This 
last point is considered in some detail in the following sub-
section. 
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1.2.4 Relevance of Organisational Analysis 
Limitations in the approach of development administration 
prompted many participants in the movement to consider alter-
native approaches to the study of administration. Proposed 
perspectives included policy studies, institution-building 
process, organisational analysis, among others (eg. Henderson, 
1981; Heady, F., 1979). 
A number of scholars in the movement called for the use 
of concepts drawn from organisation theory in the study of 
administration in developing countries (eg. Springer, 1976; 
Jun, 1976; Tapia Videla, 1976). While no specific recom-
mendations were offered on how organisation theory might be 
useful for development administration, there was an unguarded 
optimism about the relevance of concepts of the former tradi-
tion. Assumptions about the immediate relevance of organisa-
tional concepts seem to have overlooked a continuing debate 
in organisation theory about specific conceptual, methodologi-
cal and empirical issues. These issues relate closely to the 
relevance or otherwise of organisation theory to the study of 
development administration. We shall look first at the main 
difficulties in organisation theory and then consider how the 
issues generated by the debate relate to the study of public 
policy in developing countries. 
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(a) Limitations in Mainstream Organisation Theory 
Numerous criticisms have been made against mainstream 
organisation theory during the past decade. (For a summary 
of the critiques see Zey-Ferrell, 1981) • 1 These criticisms 
originated from inside as well as outside the discipline 
and were launched from a variety of perspectives. 2 We shall 
consider briefly these critiques under the headings of theory 
and methodology. 
i Conceptual problems 
Mainstream organisation theory was criticised for treat-
ing organisations as goal-seeking rational entities (Benson, 
l977(a)). Critics argued that the presumed rationality of 
organisations was partial. For instance, rationality of 
goals cannot be attributed to the organisation since these 
goals were usually defined in terms of goals and interests 
of managers and owners of capital. There was, it is argued, 
a multiplicity of rationalities originating from various 
actors and groups in organisations (Zey-Ferrell, op.cit. p.l84). 
Attributing intrinsic rational tendencies to organisations 
precluded adequate explanations of their structural features. 
1. Targets of these criticisms were the comparative structural 
approach associated with writers such as Blau and Schoenherr, 
1977; Hall, 1963; Pugh, et al 1963 among others; and the 
structural contingency approach associated with e~. Hinings 
and Lee, 1971; Hickson et al 1971; Child 1973 (quoted in 
Zey-Ferre11, 1981, p.l83). 
2. They emanated from diverse sources such as ethnomethodology, 
phenomenology and Marxism. 
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For instance, power in organisations was often analysed in 
terms of the formal authority structure. Other types of 
power external to the definition of authority were not 
adequately considered (Mouzelis, 1975; Albrow, M., 1970). 
Critics argued that this view of power ignored the under-
lying societal distribution of power and its impact on the 
nature of goals, authority structure and other major features 
in organisations. The import of the above critique is that 
th9 notion of organisations as rational goal-seeking entities 
is suspect and inadequate for understanding organisations. 
ii Methodology 
The conceptual limitations, noted above, reflected on 
methods adopted in mainstream organisation theory for identi-
fying organisational reality. For instance, attributing 
rational goals to organisations resulted in conceiving of 
organisations as ''boundary maintaining" systems (Pettigrew, 
1973, mentioned by Zey-Ferrell, op.cit. p.l87). By defining 
boundaries in terms of existing goals, analysts in mainstream 
organisation theory were able to demonstrate that organisations 
existed as 
cised for:-
exclusive units of analysis. This view was criti-
1. its neglect of the society within which 
organisations exist ... 
2. its reification of systems and goals (of 
organisations) ... 
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3. its abandonment of concern for organisa-
tional domination ... 
4. its neglect of the power dynamics through 
which organisations gain control over their 
environment; and 
5. its isolation from issues of social class, 
social stratification and social conflict •.• " 
(Zey-Ferrell, op.cit. p.l99). 
These methodological limitations made it difficult to dif-
ferentiate organisational reality from management reality. 
Organisational features, it is argued, were measured with-
out much concern about the process through which they had 
been created (Benson 1977(a), p.4). Concepts such as 
centralisation, specialisation, span of control etc. were 
measured according to descriptions given by senior partici-
pants and uncritically accepted by researchers. Thus data 
gathering methods often focused on key informants in manage-
ment positions. By contrast, the workers' perceptions of 
organisational reality were seldom considered (Goldman, P., 
and Van Houten, 1979, mentioned by Zey-Ferrell, op.cit, p.l88). 
The result of these conceptual and methodological limita-
tions was a major gap in sociological theory as organisational 
processes were not linked to macro and micro processes in any 
systematic fashion (Zey-Ferrell, op.cit., Benson, 1977(a)). 
This inadequacy bears close similarity to the limitations in 
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the approach of development administration noted earlier. 
Both traditions faced a problem of conceptual adequacy. 
Their methodologies were depicted as crude and unsatisfactory 
for identifying research objects. However, the on-going de-
bate in both traditions and particularly in organisation 
studies offers promising guidelines for dealing with the 
aforementioned limitations. In the remaining part of this 
section we will outline the positive contributions of recent 
research in organisation analysis. 
(b) Contributions of the Debate in Organisation 
Studies to the Study of Public Organisations: 
The critique of development administration underlined 
a need for a broad perspective of public organisations, 
that accounts for relations between administration and the 
wider socio-economic system. It also underlined the import-
ance of power and social interests (eg. Loveman, op.cit.) 
and their manifestations in the policy process (e.g. Tapia 
Videla, op.cit, and Cleaves, P., 1974). However, there is 
yet little clarity about how administration-environment re-
lations are structured and how power and social interests 
impinge on administrative action. The aforementioned debate 
in organisation studies contained useful insights into the 
nature of public organisations and their links with their 
environment. These insights may be classified as relating 
to concepts and to methodology. 
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i Concepts 
We noted earlier that critics of mainstream organisation 
theory challenged the view that organisational constructs 
were objective, scientific categories. Alternatively, they 
called for the grounding of organisational phenemona i.e., 
structures, goals, technologies etc. in the activities and 
practices of participants (Benson, 1977(a), p.6). The im-
port of this critique is that organisational features were 
socially constructed. Adequate understanding of these 
features entails, therefore, examining circumstances and 
processes through which those features were created and sus-
tained. 
As research focuses on production and reproduction of 
organisational reality, issues of power and interests become 
central to understanding organisations, in contrast to assump-
tions of intrinsic rational propensities of organisation, pre-
dominant in mainstream organisation theory. But the central 
question is: how do issues of power and interest help explain 
the organisational phenomenon? Writing f~the perspective 
1 
of radical organisation theory, Benson (1977b) proposed study-
ing an organisation as a social formation with multiple inter-
penetrating levels and sectors cutting across organisation-
environment boundaries. He introduced two concepts - organisa-
tional morphology and substructure - to denote two levels of 
organisational reality. As one identified components of this 
1. The term radical organisation theory was used by Burrell, G. 
and Morgan, G. (1979) to denote organisation theorists 
writing from neo-Weberian and Marxist perspectives. 
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reality at each level it would be possible to study processes 
whereby the totality of organisational reality was constructed, 
and to establish the extent to which power and social interests 
were involved in the process of construction of organisations. 
For instance, at the level of organisational morphology Benson 
identified four main aspects of organisational reality: 
a - The paradigm commitments of an organisation 
- specifically, its commitment to a domain, 
a technology and an ideology. 
b - The officially recognised and legitimate 
structural arrangements. 
c - The constitution of the organisation ie. 
bases of participation. 
d- The organisation-environment linkages (l977(b) 
pp.l0-12). 
Whereas much work in mainstream organisation theory on 
the above-mentioned features was conducted there was little 
attention to how they were created and maintained except 
through reference to rational tendencies of organisations. 
Benson's approach redirects attention to the role of power 
and social interests in the process of creation of organisa-
tional features. This approach decouples the presumed link 
between rationality and organisational features and opens up 
the latter for sociological analysis by grounding them in 
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the practices of social actors. In this way the concepts 
we use in identifying and classifying organisational life 
approximate actual practice and therefore become more accu-
rate in describing organisational reality. 
ii Methodology 
In the area of methodology the cited debate raised 
questions about appropriate units of analysis, number of 
levels and method of linkage between them. 
The assumption of the existence of more than one ration-
ality called for exploring other organisational rationalities 
or ''rules of action". In methodological terms this would 
involve collecting data from multiple sources i.e. workers, 
professionals, management, and other sources. 
Some of the underlying organisational rationalities were 
presumed external to the organisation. We noted that critics 
have recommended that analysis should be extended to the insti-
tutional and societal environment. However, there was little 
agreement among critics as to the appropriate levels of analysis 
and method of linkage between them. 
One approach in this regard was the use of exchange theory 
in interorganisational studies (eg. Cook, 1977, mentioned in 
Benson, 1977(a), pp.lO,ll). This strategy bridged the gap 
between levels of analysis by breaking complex phenomena - both 
organisations and networks - into general processes of exchange 
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of resources between organisational networks. The locus of 
explanation was shifted from the rational tendencies of 
organisations to the structure of networks, markets and 
institutional complexes (Benson, 1977(a), p.lO). 
Another approach was the use of the Marxist perspective 
of contradiction between the on-going production of social 
formations and the established order previously produced 
(Heydebrand, W., 1977). Attention was focused in this pers-
pective on the process through which specific organisational 
form was produced, the mechanisms with which it was maintained 
and its continuous reconstruction. The work of Benson (1977b) 
cited above, adopted a similar approach toward organisation-
environment links. He used the notion of substructure to de-
note the structure of these links. According to his scheme 
an organisational sub-structure consisted of: 
(1) the non-rationalised sphere of organisational 
action, linking participants to each other and 
to the larger social world. 
(2) Linkages to the larger social system such as: 
the bases of recruitment of the organisational 
elite; the framework of interests in the larger 
society; the power structure controlling the 
flow of resources into organisations; ties of 
the organisation to social class, racial and 
sexual groups. 
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(3) The bases of dominance at the inter-
organisational level e.g. control over 
strategic resources, technology, un-
certainty etc . 
Both of these approaches promised to extend organisa-
tional anlaysis beyond the confines of single organisations . 
Moreover, they offered specific examples on the possible 
levels of analyses and about the processes that link between 
them. 
The debate in organisation studies seems, therefore, 
to have offered certain conceptual and methodological innova-
tions to the study of public organisati ons in comparison with 
approaches of mainstream organisation theory and development 
administration. It brought power and interest to the centre 
of organisational analysis and therefore made it possible to 
study organisations in relation to the balance of power and 
interest in the larger social system. The specific relevance 
of this debate to this study will be outlined in the following 
sections of this chapter . 
1.2.5 Conclusion 
We examined above three approaches to the study o f public 
organisations. The first approach was represented by the work 
of development administration in the Third World. We outlined 
its theoretical orientation, policy approach and policy impli-
cation. Then we reviewed some of the limitations in that 
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approach. Theoretically, concepts used were found less 
capable of accurately describing administrative reality 
in developing countries. Methodologically research ob-
jects were misidentified in some cases, and variables 
were, in other cases, confined to a single leve l of policy 
process. Consequent policy implications tended to foster 
a central role for bureaucracy in change in comparison to 
other social institutions and groups. 
The second approach was represented by mainstream organ-
isation theory. Contrary to assumptions about the immediate 
relevance of organisational concepts to the study of develop-
ment administration we noted certain basic limitations to 
those concepts. We reviewed criticisms of the conceptual 
constructs and methods of mainstream organisation theory. We 
underlined the similarity of these limitations to those noted 
in the approach of development administration. 
The third approach was exemplified by the debate arising 
from the critique of mainstream organisation t heory. Theo-
retically, the debate focused attention on the production and 
reproduction of organisational reality and placed power at 
the centre of analysis. Methodologically, it reformulated the 
unit of analysis to encompass a variety of processes and insti -
tutions outside administrative organisations. The main import 
of that debate was its attempt to link,in a systematic way, 
forms, characteristics and practices of organisations to the 
wider environment. 
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1.3 BUREAUCRACY, STATE AND SOCIETY 
1.3.1 General 
We noted in the preceding section that a pluralist 
perspective of society and polity basically underpinned the 
work of development administration and its policy analysis. 
In this section we will examine the conception of bureau-
cracy and policy analysis in another tradition - Marxist theory 
of the state. Firstly, we will argue that this tradition ex-
hibits some of the limitations of the pluralist perspective, 
namely that constraints on policy act externally upon bureau-
cracy. We take issue with the implicit assumption in Marxist 
political theory about the neutrality of administrative tech-
niques, and the view that public policy can only be adequately 
explained in relation to class conflict external to the state 
apparatus. 
Secondly, we will consider some of the recent advances 
in social theory beyond the Marxist conception of bureaucracy. 
We will argue that the trend of "urban managerialism", research 
in radical organisation theory, and the debate in German poli-
tical studies offer important contributions toward understanding 
the role bureaucracy plays in mediating social interests in 
state policy. The work of Claus Offe and radical organisation 
theorists, in particular, contained ingredients of an approach 
to the study of constraints on policy implementation. This 
approach would aim at relating broad structural and micro 
aspects of policy together in a systematic analysis in order 
- 44 -
to delineate processes and points where constraints on 
policy are likely to occur. 
1.3.2 Marxist Perspective of Bureaucracy 
Marxist conceptions of bureaucracy basically derive 
from Marxist theory of the state. Two perspectives of the 
state characterise contemporary Marxist theory: the "instru-
mentalist'' and "structuralist" perspectives. The former 
perspective sees the state as an "instrument" of the ruling 
class. While admitting of "structural" constraints on state 
policy, this perspective frequently infers the nature of 
state policy from the class character of state personnel 
(eg. Miliband, R., 1969, p.67). 
The "structuralist" perspective, on the other hand, 
also sees the state as acting in the interests of the dominant 
class. However, this is seen not because of a conscious 
action either by dominant class or by state personnel, but 
basically due to the logic of the system (eg. Poulantzas, N., 
1973, p.245). According to this latter perspective, state 
policy is explicable neither in terms of state structure nor 
in relation to the class character of its personnel. State 
actions can only be explained in relation to the whole poli-
tical economy and the "objective" relation between the state 
and the bourgeois class. 
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These two versions of state theory generate different 
approaches to policy process and to the notion of bureaucracy. 
To the extent that the determinants of state policy are located 
outside state institutions,the ''structuralist" perspective con-
tains little room for institutional analysis of policy forma-
tion or of the role of bureaucracy in that process. The "instru-
mentalist" perspective, on the other hand, implies a conception 
of bureaucracy akin to the ''classic" Marxist view that bureau-
cracy is a means by which dominant class interests are main-
tained. 
In fact, Marx developed no explicit theory of bureaucracy 
(Perez-Diaz, 1978, p.85). Generally, he viewed bureaucracy in 
its political rather than industrial setting. As an aspect 
of bourgeois administration, bureaucracy was seen both as a 
manifestation of the centralising tendencies of capitalism and 
as an instrument of class domination (Hearn, F., 1978, p.39). 
The dynamics of modern bureaucracy received little attention 
in Marx's critique of industrial capitalism. 
It was left to Lenin to present a complete theory of the 
state and bureaucracy. In his 'The State and Revolution" Lenin 
adopted two notions of hureau~ra~y. In the first one, he per-
ceived bureaucracy as a political structure thr0ugh which 
capitalist class rul~d. !n this senQe, Lenin clearly adopted 
the ''classic" Marxian conception of bureaucracy. In the second 
notion, bure2ucracy de~otPd technical a~ministra~ion. HPre 
Lenin differentiated between the roles of bureaucrats and those 
of technical experts (Wright, E., 1974, p.87). The former 
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group was associated with political control and domination in 
the capitalist state, whereas the latter was seen as socially 
neutral, at least during the period of transition from capital-
ism to socialism. Lenin wrote: "The question of control 
and accounting (presumably the function of bureuacrats) should 
not be confused with the question of the scientifically trained 
staff of engineers, agronomists and so on. These gentlemen 
are working today in obedience to the wishes of capitalist, 
and will work even better tomorrow in obedience to the wishes 
of the armed workers" (Lenin, 1949, p.96). 
Generally, the two notions of bureaucracy noted above 
remained, until recently, central to Marxist analysis of 
bureaucracy and public policy. The notion of bureaucracy 
as a political structure of domination was predominant and 
often directed research to the class positions of bureaucrats, 
away from the internal structure of the state. 1 Analysis of 
state policy mostly focused either on the class character of 
state personnel or on the limits on policy set by ''structural" 
aspects in the social formation. 
Limitations of the Marxist Perspective of Bureaucracy 
The Marxist conception of bureaucracy, outlined above, con-
tains a number of interrelated limitations. These relate to 
assumptions about the determinants of state policy e.g. class 
origins of bureaucrats, that administrative technology is 
1. In the context of developing countries, note, for instance 
the debate on the post-colonial state cf. C. Meillassoux, 
1970, Alavi, H., 1972 and Saul, J. 1974. 
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socially neutral, and that an ownership/non-ownership of means 
of production dichotomy is adequate to explain problems of 
power and conflict in organsations. 
The first limitation concerns the assumption that the 
class origins of bureaucracy partly determined state policy. 1 
To support this assumption the link between the class character 
of the state, including bureaucracy, and dominant societal 
interests must be convincingly established. Mechanisms that 
relate political action to economic classes and limits on 
state action need to be specified. However, the "instrumental-
i s t" pe rspective ne ith e r identifie d c l early these mecha nisms 
no r specifie d how they de fined and limi t ed t he range a nd f o rm 
o f possible c lass action (Es p ing-Anders on e t a l., 1 976 , pp .lB7-
190) . 
The underlying no t i on of bureauc r acy a s a politic a l struc -
turE: o f domination l a rge ly distracted research from con s i dering 
the interna l organi sation of the state a s a possible medium o f 
c l a ss interest. Adopting a one-dimensiona l view o f bur eaucracy , 
Marx i s t analysis wa s un able to establish empiric ally how bureau-
crac y a c t e d in the interest of dominant classe s. 
A second limitation in the Marxist c onception of b ur eau-
c racy was the implicit ass ump t i on that admin ist r a tive t e chnology 
2 
was neutral. This view is implicit in Lenin' s work c ite d above . 
1 • Hiliband explained the bias in function of the stat e as the necessary 
consequences of {a) the class background of state personnel, (b) the p::::Mer 
of business interests over state personnel , and (c) the structural con-
straints imposed by the mode of production (Miliband, 1977 , pp. 73, 74) . 
2. Heam, F. noted that this parti cular view of organi sati onal technol ogy was 
used in the Soviet Union to justify the inoorporation of techni cal achieve-
nents of capitalism, r anging fran rrodern i ndustrial technology to manager ial 
programmes of labour discipl ine , developed by Taylor (1978, p . 4l) . 
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The critiques of development administration (Section 1.2.3(a)) 
and those of mainstream organisation theory, (Section 1.2.4(a)), 
showed that administrative technology was socially constructed 
and could well be seen as: 
"tactics and resources in a political struggle open 
and available to controllers of the means of p r o -
duction and reproduction" (Clegg, S. and Dunkerley, 
D . ' 19 80 I p • 54 7 ) . 
According to this view, administrative techniques, planning 
models, and organisational designs can mediate social interests 
which may, in turn, constrain state policy. Thus it was not 
simply the class affiliations of bureaucrats that extended 
social interests into policy; institutional structures, policy 
processes and policy models could be more effective in carry-
ing and sustaining social interests. 
The above Marxist perspective of bureaucracy developed 
in connection with the relation of the state to dominant classes. 
Marx's analysis did not cover the division of labour in organ-
isations (Ibid, p. 485) . Given the absence of a Marxist theory 
o f organisational contradictions, problems in organisations 
were explained solely in terms of a theory of social or system 
contradictions. But class analysis based on the notion of 
ownership of means of production was inadequate for understand-
ing problems of organisational conflict and analysing the corn-
plex relations between various groups in organisations (Salaman, 
G., 1981, pp.219-225). The notion of organisational technology 
as a socially neutral phenomenon precluded Marxist analysis from 
perceiving major organisational characteristics as arenas of 
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social conflict and pivots of organisational contradictions. 
The above limitation in the Marxist conception of 
bureaucracy distanced Marxist analysis from organisational 
studies fora long time. Underestimating the propensity of 
institutional structures and processes to mediate social 
interests, Marxist analysis excluded the internal organisa-
tion of the state from its explanations of state policy; 
and focused entirely on class conflict outside the state. 
This limitation, partly, made it difficult to build causal 
explanations of links between state policy and social struc-
ture. 
1.3.3 Materiality of the State Apparatus and Mediation of 
Interests: 
We underlined in Section (1.2) above the tendency in 
de velopment administration and mainstream organisation theory 
to treat public organi s ations in isolation from the social 
contradi~tion s in which they were embedded. The n we noted in 
this section the limitations in the Marx ist conception o f 
bureaucracy and the as sociated difficulty in Marxist analys is 
of conceiving the state internal structure a s a determinant 
of state policy. Given these two positions, what is needed 
is a systematic understanding of the relationship of s ocial 
structure to the internal organisational processes of the 
state (Wright, op.cit. p.l03). On the one hand, we need to 
de l i n eate t he limits t h at soc i a l s tructure set s for stat e 
ac t ion; o n the othe r ha nd , we mus t identi fy t he processes 
t hro ugh whi c h s uc h limi t s operate in p r ac t ice to influe nce 
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state policy. 
It is our view that both "classic" Marxist and pluralist 
perspectives provided little contribution toward integrating 
macro and micro aspects of policy. Recent developments in 
social theory provided certain insights into the relation 
between social structure and state apparatus. These insights 
derived from three different traditions in social theory: 
"urban managerialism", radical organisation theory and German 
political studies. We will now consider each of them below. 
(a) "Urban Managerialism" 
"Urban managerialism" is a variant of British urban 
sociology that derived mainly out of Weber's political socio-
logy (Saunders, op.cit. p.l66). The early thesis of "Urban 
managerialism" postulated that the actions of urban managers 
mediated and reinforced urban inequalities (Pahl, R., 1975, 
p.20l). This argument directed attention to the study of 
attitudes and motives of managers who were considered as 
major determinants of urban policy. However, this argument 
was criticised for failing to take adequate account of the 
context of constraints in which urban management decisions 
were made (Norman, 1975). In a subsequent reformulation, Pahl 
suggested that the study of urban managers should be based on 
a specific theory of the state and should take explicit account 
of the internal structure of the state and of its external 
relationship with the private sector (Saunders, op.cit . pp .l68 , 
169). 1 
1. Pah1 adopted a corporationist theory of the state in which 
bureaucrats played a crucial mediating role between state 
and capital (ibid). 
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By bringing the motives and orientations of bureaucrats 
to the fore of analysis, as possible carriers of social 
interests and, therefore, likely mediums for constraints on 
policy, ''urban managerialism11 clearly went a step forward 
beyond the position of development administration, reviewed 
in the preceding section. For in the latter tradition, the 
motives and attitudes of bureaucrats were only considered in 
cultural terms in relation to the impact of culture on 
"efficiency". They were not considered as vehicles for social 
interests. 
Notwithstanding its noted inadequacies, "urban managerial-
ism" has been useful in drawing attention to organisational 
ideology (managers' motives and value assumptions} as likely 
mediums for mediating and sustaining social interests in policy 
process. However, "urban managerialism" did not elaborate on 
how such "ideological" orientations corresponded to organisa-
tional forms and processes and therefore, how they operated 
to include or exclude other social interests. This inadequacy 
was met in the work of radical organisation theory. 
{b) Radical Organisation Theory 
Radical organisation theory evolved as part of the critique 
of mainstream organisation theory which we outlined in section 
(1.2.4(a)) above. The central arg ument of radical organisation 
theorists was that organisations should be studied as social 
formations that were part of a wider social system (eg. Heydebrand, 
QP.Cit.). Organisational characteristics such as goals, 
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hierarchies, technologies etc. were to be seen as socially 
constructed devices that were capable of reflecting patterns 
of interactions, conflict and balance of power within organ-
isations and between them and society. 
This approach to organisation makes it possible to 
develop the argument about the incidence of social interests 
in the state apparatus beyond the Marxist "instrumentalist" 
position and beyond that of "urban managerialisrn 11 • This is 
because in the perspective of radical organisation theory 
the focus of analysis was extended from class affiliations 
and the ~otives of managers to the internal processes of 
state organisation. As the issue of power was central to 
this perspective, major organisational features were seen as 
tactics and resources in a contest between social interests 
inside and outs ide organisations. In this sense, a study of 
the impact of interests on policy must extend beyond the 
motives and class origins of bureaucrats to analyse the social 
content of organisational goals , design, technology and policy 
models. 
A major test facing radical organisational analysis is 
how to relate the analysis of power and conflict in organisa-
tions to wider societal contradictions . While certain tenta-
tive proposals were made (eg. Heydebrand op.cit., Benson, 
gp.cit ., Goldman and van Houten, 1977) the field was still in 
embryonic form: A major difficulty was the underdevelopment 
of the Marxist theory of the state apparatus as we pointed out 
earlier in this section. The work of the German sociologist 
1 . Also see Clegg, S., and Dunkerley, D., 198J, Ch.l3. 
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ClausOffe,went some way toward dealing with the relation 
between social structure and political action, as we 
explain below. 
(c) German Political Studies 
Difficulties in Marxist analysis to show the links 
between state action and social structure generated an in-
creasing concern among Marxists with the state apparatus. 
Instead of being treated as a passive tool of dominant 
classes, recent research has addressed the state structure 
as a sphere of class conflict (Asping-Anderson, op.cit., 
O'Connor, 1973; Therborn, 1978). This emerging appro ach 
introduced two important modifications in the "classic" 
Marxist conception of bureaucracy: First, it elevated the 
state apparatus from the status of a tool and gave it a form 
of material existence that allowed it to shape and become 
shaped by class conflict. Second, it brought the internal 
organisational dynamics of the state into the sphere of class 
analysis, opening up questions about how they relate to 
"structural" constraints deriving from the social formation. 
This new approach to the state apparatus is found in the 
work of Claus Offe (1972, 1974, 1975, 1976). Offe attempted 
to analyse the extent to which the inte rnal structure of the 
s tate permitted it to pursue the interests of capital. lie 
distinguished between the allocation and production functions 
of t he sta t e (ib id, 19 75, p .l28 ). The f orme r f unct i on s c orr es-
ponded to th e s t a t e ' s t r a di t i o n a l r o l e in di s tri but ing r esources 
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such as roads, police and education. The latter referred 
to the state•s direct involvement in the production process. 
Both functions supported the process of private accumulation. 
But they differed in the way policies were made for either 
of them. Allocative policies were subject to direct political 
conflict and therefore "instrumental" in character. However, 
production policies cannot be made in the same way, i.e. in 
response to direct political pressures. This is because the 
demands of the powerful groups were not necessarily consistent 
with the sorts of policies necessary for ensuring continued 
accumulation. 1 The state must, therefore, devise its own 
criteria for production policies. The origin of these poli-
cies, thus, becomes internal to the organisation of the state 
(Saunders, op.cit. p.l75). 
The work of Offe draws attention to policy models, policy 
processes and organisational designs as important determinants 
of state policy. For instance, he identified three policy 
models that were available for the state in making its produc-
tion decisions: the bureaucratic model, rational planning 
model and political conflict/consensus model (Offe, 1975, 
p.l75). Be ing the immediate determinants of the state policy 
the study of these models should help explain how state action 
relates to the social structure and to the dominant interests. 
The role of the internal organisation of the state in 
shaping state policy acquires significance in the context of 
the post-colonial state. Given the fragme nted nature and 
1. For instance, nationalisation of certain industries might 
be in the long term interest of private a ccumulation but 
against immediate interests of some capitalists. 
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heterogeneity of the social structure in these societies, 
it is difficult to identify an economically dominant c1ass. 1 
Offe's above distinction in the policy process between allo-
cative and production policies becomes less important as the 
state assumes a high degree of autonomy, and, in Miliband's 
words, almost become a "state for itselfn {Miliband, R., 1977, 
p.l09). Under these circumstances the relation between 
economic and political power is inverted: 
"It is not economic power ... which shapes political 
decision making ... it is rather political power ... 
which provides the basis for the formation of an 
economically powerful class, which may in due 
course become an economically dominant onen {ibid, 
pp.l08, 109). --
The e xpansive role of the state in post-colonial societies gives 
its internal organisation a wide ranging influence over both 
allocative and production policies. As Leys observed, the 
more of the total volume of surplus value which the state 
directly appropriated, the more it was likely to be immediately 
involved in the class struggle {1976, p.42). This involvement 
must b e empirically established via analysing the i n ternal 
organisational dynamics and exploring their class content. 
The import of Offe's work is that the state-apparatus was 
an important arena for class conflict. "Structural" limits on 
state policy that d e rive from the nature o f the social forma-
tion were not, then, external to the state organisation but 
internal to it (Batley, R., 1980, pp.26-30). These limit s must 
1. According to Le ys, C., the dominant class in post-colonial 
African societies was still the f oreign bourgeoisie {1976 , 
p.44). 
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be sought in the dynamics of the state organisation. Within 
the internal organisation of the state, Offe's analysis 
focused only on policy models as important explanatory vari-
ables of state policy, but recent research emphasised t he need 
to look at the whole organisational framework and establish 
how it ... 
''defines the included interests and how they are 
related, and thus sets limits on the action a nd 
perceptions of participants". (Batley ,op. cit . p.29). 
The research on radical organisation theory went some 
way in exploring how power and interest operate within organ-
isations, as we explained in subsections (1 .2.4(b) and 1 .3. 3(b)) 
above . Used in conjunction with Offe's approach, it would 
make it possible to identify and analyse constraints on state 
policy a t different levels of the policy process. Such ana lysis 
would have to make use of the vast lite rature on development 
administration and mainstream organisation theory. 
The p roposed approach would aim at making up for the limit-
at i ons in the study of public organisat ions whic h we have r e -
vi ewe d above . Important in this respect i s the need to inte -
g r ate macro and micro levels of policy ana l ysis , and at the 
same time provide causal explan ations of state policy . Thus, 
at the macro level we need to attend to relevant economic and 
political processes that relate to the policy under study . We 
then need to consider how these macro l eve l processes trans -
late, in institutional terms, into policy models, organisa tion a l 
structures and policy p r ocesses. At a micro level we should 
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investigate the extent to which macro-level limits on policy 
are produced (or not) in the daily routines of agencies, their 
members and their clients. An outline of this approach as 
it applies to our research problem is presented in the follow-
ing section. 
1.3.4 Conclusion 
We focused in this section on the relation between bureau-
cracy state and social structure. First, we examined the con-
ception of bureaucracy in the Marxist theory of the state and 
identified two views of bureaucracy implicit in ''classic" Marx-
ist writings. The notion of bureaucracy as a political struc-
ture of domination remained central to Marxist policy analysis. 
We underlined three main limitations in the Marxist conception 
of bureaucracy. We argued that these limitations precluded 
Marxist analysis from linking political action to social struc-
ture. The link between the two remained largely presumed 
rather than empirically established. 
Secondly, we reviewed some of the relevant recent advances 
in social theory that contribute d toward overcoming limitations 
in the study of public policy. These contributions came from 
~ 
"urban managerialism, radical organisation theory and German 
political studies. They served to illuminate the importance 
of the internal organisation of the state in the process of 
policy formation. More importantly, they offered useful in-
sights into the mechanisms and processes through which social 
i nterests impinge on state polic y. The import of these 
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contributions was that social interests act upon policy 
institutions and processes, not externally, but from within 
the state apparatus. Thus, in order to examine the impact 
of interests on public policy the internal organisation of 
the state should be analysed. 
1.4 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM: LIMITS ON ACCESS TO RESIDENTIAL 
LAND IN GREATER KHARTOUM - SUDAN 
1.4.1 Defining the Problem: 
The object of this study is the implementat ion process 
of urban social policy in the Sudan. The specific focus is 
the limits on the access of different urban groups to r esi-
dential land. Urban housing policy in the Sudan i s essentially 
about providing access for all families to a "standard" level 
of housing. 1 Limits on access are seen, by this study, as a 
reflection of the existence of specific constraints on housing 
policy. Our objective, therefore, is to seek to (a) identify 
these constraints, (b) locate their sources, and (c) explain 
the mechanisms through which they operate to limit access to 
r es ident ial land. 
We advance two propositions on the nature and i ncidence 
of limits on access to residential land in Greater Khartoum : 
(a) Constraints on urban housing are explicable in 
r e lation to the nat i o nal model of policy formation. 
1. See the Six Year Plan 1 977/78-1982/83, Vol . 2 , p.l83. 
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Analysis of ideological orientations, social 
content, and institutional features of the 
policy model would help identify and locate 
sources of constraints on housing policy. 
(b) Limits on access can be traced to the organ-
isational structures, technology, and ideology 
of housing agencies. These agencies mediate 
macro-level constraints on housing policy but 
also generate secondary limits on access at 
the points of distribution of residential land. 
1.4.2 Frame of Analysis 
Whereas limits on equal access can be observed at the 
distribution points of residential land,sources of constraints 
on policy and their mechanisms are not necessarily explicable 
at the same level of the incidence of limitations on access. 
Thus, in order to encompass the various institutions and pro-
cesses involved, we need to adopt a broad frame of analysis. 
We conduct this study at three levels of analyses as diagram 
1.1 illustrates. 
At a macro-policy level, we will analyse the dominant 
policy model in the Sudan in the light of the regime's ideology, 
the institutional organisation of the state and the social 
character of the policy-making machine. We argue in Chapter 
Two that the prevailing policy model generates specific social 
and regional disparities that circumscribe housing policy. 
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Constraints on the Administration of Access to Urban Residence and 
their Under 1 ying Mechanisrrs in the Sudan 
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At a middle-range level of analysis, we will consider 
the direct link between the dominant policy model and housing 
problems in Greater Khartoum. Three dimensions of this link 
will be explored: (a) the relation between national economic 
policy, migration, urban growth and their impact on urban 
housing. (b) The impact of the policy of land commercialisation 
on housing in Greater Khartoum. These two dimensions will be 
examined in Chapter Four. (c) The trend toward rationalising 
urban services on a cost-effective basis and its impact on 
access to municipal services associated with housing. This 
point will be considered in Chapter Five. 
At a micro policy level, we examine closely the concrete 
limits on access to land by analysing the structure, technology 
and processes of housing agencies. We hope to be able to iden-
tify at this level of analysis limits on access deriving from 
macro-level constraints from those generated by secondary con-
straints - of a non-structural nature. This analysis will be 
presented in Chapters Five and Six. 
Finally, we attempt to integrate various levels of analy-
sis in Chapter Seven, and outline how constraints occurring at 
a macro-policy level are internalised in the organisational 
structures of housing agencies and limit the access of certain 
groups of applicants to residential land. 
- 62 -
1.5 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
We noted at the beginning of this chapter the signifi-
cance of implementation studies in the Third World and 
underlined the inadequacy of dominant perspectives. An 
examination of these limitations was conducted in the second 
and third sections of the chapter. 
In the second section we examined the perspective of 
development administration and identified its limitations. 
These related to conceptual formulations, methodology and 
policy implications. In terms of its policy implications, 
development administration was criticised for: (a) its support 
for a central role for bureaucracy in change; (b) the belief 
in the non-compatibility of politics and conflict with develop-
ment, and (c) the tendency to substitute "technocracy" for 
politics. Explanations of constraints on implementation in 
that tradition were inadequate, because they either concen-
trated on a single level of analysis or neglected issues of 
power and social conflict in multi-level analysis. 
We considered in the same section the relevance of organ-
isational analysis to the study of policy problems in the Third 
World and the extent to which it may provide for the limita-
tions we noted in development administration. Reviewing the 
literature, we noted the critique of mainstream organisation 
theory. There were specific objections to its conceptual con-
structs and research methods. However, the debate generated 
in the course of that critique offered promising guidelines 
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toward overcoming the limitations cited above. The import 
of the debate was that it placed political power at the 
centre of analysis and reformulated the unit of analysis 
to encompass a variety of institutions and processes outside 
administrative organisations. 
The link between political power and implementation was 
considered in the third section. Firstly, we examined the 
conception of bureaucracy in the Marxist theory of the state. 
The notion of bureaucracy as a structure of political domina-
tion was pervasive in Marxist analysis. We underlined three 
limitations in that conception of bureaucracy, relating to 
the determinants of policy, the neutrality of organisational 
technology, and the adequacy of a two-class model for o rgan-
isational analysis. We argued that these limitations partly 
underlined the difficulty of Marxist analysis to account for 
the link between the state action and social structure. 
Secondly, we considered some of the relevant advances in 
social theory and their contributions to the study of public 
policy. We outlined the relevance of works from "urban 
managerialism", radica l organisation theory and German politi-
cal studies. We emphasised the contribution of Claus Offe's 
work in underlining the importance of the state apparatus in 
policy formation. Both Offe's work and that of radical organ-
isation theorists contained important elements of an approach 
to the study of constraints on policy implementation. The 
proposed framework is intended to integrate the macro and micro 
aspects o f state policy, in a systematic analysis, in order to 
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delineate processes and points where constraints occur. 
Finally, we outlined in the fourth section, the research 
problem to be addressed by this study and presented a frame-
work for analysis to be used in the study of the limits on 
access to residential land in Greater Khartoum, Sudan. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SUDAN 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents an overview of the political 
economy of the Sudan. It consists of two parts. 
In the first part we will trace the evolution of the 
economy through its precapitalist and capitalist phases. 
Special attention will be focused on the process of the 
transformation of the economic structure under the Condomin-
ium rule and the ascendancy of the capitalist mode of pro-
duction. Then we will proceed to outline the dominant 
features of the post-colonial economy, both its pre-capitalist 
and capitalist forms. We will focus on four main sectors 
of the capitalist economy: agriculture, industry, trade, 
and transport and communications. It will be shown that 
the state's involvement in the economy has risen markedly 
during the 1970s. We will conclude by highlighting major 
structural weaknesses in the economy. 
We will address, in the second part of the chapter, 
the relation between dominant economic interests and the 
state in Sudan. We will pose the question of how dominant 
interests influence public policy. In the process of 
examining this issue we will outline the significance of 
the institutional approach to policy analysis - within a 
broad structural framework. 
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2.2 THE STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY 
2.2.1 General 
The Sudan is the largest country in Africa, with an 
area of 2.5 million kms 2 . Its soils are sandy in t h e North, 
clayey in Central Sudan and lateritic in the South. Of its 
total area of 598 million feddans about 200 million feddans 
are potentially arable land. 1 Only 20 million feddans were 
actually under cultivation. Annual rainfall ranges from 
virtually none in the North to about 120 cm in the South. 
The River Nile dominates the landscape running through the 
country for 2.5 thousand miles from south to north. It 
has two main tributaries; the White Nile originates in Lake 
Victoria in Uganda, and joins the Blue Nile, whic h comes 
from the Ethiopian Highlands, in Khartoum. The population 
of the country was put at 18.3 million in 1980. 
We will address in this section the main characteristics 
of the economy. First, we will trace the evolution of the 
present structure of the economy. Then we will outline the 
main sectors of the post-colonial economy. We will con c lude 
by underlining structural weaknesses in the economy. 
2.2.2 Colonialism and the Structuring of t he Economy 
The present structure of the Sudanese economy has 
developed through a l ong process dating back to t he Middle 
Ages. Its process of evolution may be conveniently divided 
1. Feddan = 1.038 acres = 0 .42 hectares. 
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into two main periods: the pre-capitalist and the capitalist . 
(a) The Pre-Capitalist Phase: 
The pre-capitalist phase can be dated to the earliest 
Sudanese Kingdom of Napata (725 BC- 350 AD ) . Th e economy 
was then based on animal husbandry and farming, and pro-
duction was for use value (Khalafalla, E., 1981, p .3l ) . 
The structure of the Napatian e conomy persiste d under the 
subsequent Nubian kingdoms. After a long perio d o f politica l 
decay, those kingdoms collapsed during the fourteenth century. 
The Nubian kingdoms were succeeded b y t he Islamic 
Sultanates of Funi, Musba'at and Fur in central a nd weste rn 
Sudan. That period (approximately 1300 - 1600 ) witnessed 
large movements of Arab nomadic tribes into the country, 
which increased pressure on free fertile land. Feudal r ela-
tions of production progressively increased (El-Tay eb, G., 
1 1984, p.26). The population movements stimulated trade 
and the spread of commodity exchange. 
The basic structure of the e c onomy persisted to the 
19th Century, when the Egyptians conquered the Sudan in 18 20. 
The Turco-Egyptian rule (1821-1882) marked the first l arge 
scale incorporation of the economy into the wo rld market 
through progressive increase of imports and exports and the 
emergence of wage labour, mainly in agriculture bu t also i n 
commerce and services (El-Tayeb, op.cit., pp. 26,27 ) . Despite 
1. But no land-owning class succeeded in conso lida ting its 
power (Khalafalla, op.cit., p.43 ) . 
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these developments production structures remained essentially 
feudal. 1 
A politico-religious revolution liberated the Sudan 
from the Turco-Egyptian domination and established an inde-
pendent Sudanese state- the Mahdist state (1882-1898). 
The productive forces of the Mahdist state were superior 
to those of the Funj and Fur Sultanets (Adam, F., 1977, 
2 p.38). But the feudal mode of production remained. 
By the turn of the century the dominant mode of pro-
duction was peasant farming, occasionally intermingled with 
slavery or share-cropping relations {Khalafalla, op.cit., 
p.43). The family was the unit of production and consumption. 
Land was largely collectively owned, with private ownership 
confined to riverain areas. Simple commodity production was 
minimal and exchange and money circulation were limited. 
(b) The Capitalist Phase: 
An Anglo-Egyptian military campaign overthrew the 
Mahdist state and established Condominium rule (1898-1956). 
The new regime introduced fundamental changes in the struc-
ture of the economy and created new forms of economic organ-
isation. Arrangements resulting from those changes became 
1. The Turco-Egyptian rule was a mere p re-capita list impe rial-
ism that adopted a process of primitive accum~lation 
s imilar to that of t he European Mercantalism (Ami n, s., 
1976, mentioned in ibid, p .32). 
2. Methods of cultivation improved allowing the expansion of 
irrigable areas by the main Nile . Handicrafts and small 
factories started to develop and commerce made great progress 
( ibid) . 
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the basis for the post-colonial economy. It is, therefore, 
imperative to outline broadly those changes. 
i. The Structure of the Economy 
The main economic objectives of British colonial rule 
in the Sudan were to exploit the natural resources of the 
country for the provision of raw materials to British 
industries and to expand domestic market for the sale of 
British products. The realisation of these aims necessitated 
changing the pre-capitalist economic order and the synthesis 
of a new economic structure. Thus, two strategies were 
adopted by the new regime: the geographical extension of 
both feudal and capitalist modes of production into the most 
backward areas of the country; and the expans ion and intensifi-
cation of capitalist relations of production in the less de-
pressed parts (El-Tayeb, op.cit., p.27). 
A number of policy measures were initiated to facilitate 
changes in the structure of the economy. To begin with, the 
land tenure system was detrimental to the intended change s. 
A serie s of land reforms were initiated, beginning in 1899, 
to release land for capitalist investment. Land in the 
Gezira area of central Sudan was compulsorily leased by the 
l government. Rivera in lands in Northern and Khartoum pro-
vinces were mostly recognised as private ownership; and 
central rain-belt lands were considered gove rnment land 
under communa l use . 
1. Th e Gez ira La nd Ordina n ce 1 921 was i ntroduce d f o r t hat 
purpo s e . Th e pr i ce paid t o peasants was 10 p i a stre per 
f edda n a n d t h e durat i o n o f the l ease was f o r ty year s . 
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The structuring of the economy along capitalist lines 
adopted three main patterns: the monetisation of the 
economy, direct capitalist investment, and incorporation 
in the world capitalist market. 
Monetisation of a pre-capitalist economy is necessary 
for its integration in a capitalist one (Ake, C., 1981, p.32). 
Although a market economy existed in Sudan prior to the Con-
dominium, money circulation and commodity exchange were 
limited. Imposition of taxation and promotion of imported 
consumer goods were part of the policy measures the new 
regime used to expand the money economy. A top priority 
was given to developing infrastructure. 1 The early develop-
ment of transport and communications enhanced the expansion 
of commodity exchange and money circulation. 
The process of monetisation went hand in hand with the 
spread of capitalist relations of production. A large-scale 
capitalist investment, the Gezira Scheme, was inaugurated 
in the Blue Nile Province in 1925. 2 It was financed by 
British public and private capital to secure an adequate 
supply of long staple cotton for the British textile industry, 
which was facing increasing competition from the United States, 
Germany and Japan (Barnett, 1975). The mode of production, 
which has rested on the agrarian relations devised by the 
Gezira Land Ordinance 1927, was capitalist (Kursany, I., 
1. Between 1899 and 1918 the government spent 76.3% of total 
public expenditure on the transport sector (Osman, 0., 
1960 mentioned in El-Hassan, 1976, p.l4). 
2 . The scheme began with 26,000 tenancies on an area of 
80,000 feddans. 
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1 1982 (I), p.l6). The new system of production relations 
was adopted in all succeeding cotton schemes in the country. 
Introduction of cotton as the major cash crop oriented 
the economy to export production and restructured the coun-
try's economic relation with the international market. 
Government revenue came to depend heavily on the cotton 
trade. As the government was the largest entrepreneur in 
the country, dependency on cotton made the logic of the 
Sudanese economy closely geared to the needs and strategies 
of international capital. The integration of the colonial 
economy into the international capitalist market reinforced 
the country's specialisation in primary products, and en-
hanced the expansion of capitalist relations of production 
into the non-capitalist sectors of the national economy. 
It was in response to the international market that colonial 
capital facilitated the production of oil seed and sorghum 
under capitalist relations of production. 2 
Parallel to the process of establishing capitalist 
relations of production in central Sudan, the colonial 
policy reconstructed and consolidated p re-capitalist rela-
tions in remote areas of the country. The policy of 11 in-
direct rule" or "native administration" gave the rural e lit e 
important powers over population and natural resources, 
l. The scheme operated according to a tripart ite arrangement 
between the government,the management and the tenants (see 
Section 2.2.3 below). The initial allocation of tenancies 
stratified peasants into rich, middle and poor and helped 
thereby to accelerate differentiation among them (see Adam, 
op.cit., p.40). 
2. For further details on this process, see Mahmoud, F., 1984, 
Chapter Two. 
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allowing them to reconstruct feudal relations through 
administrative means (Adam, F., op.cit., p.39) . 1 A form 
of semi-feudal relations was noted in Southern Sudan where 
agriculturalists and pastoralists gained access to land 
through tribal rights and either worked on the land for 
their local leaders or paid them part of their own product 
2 (El-Tayeb, op.cit., p.29). 
The preservation of pre-capitalist relations was instru-
mental to the process of capital accumulation in two ways: 
first, it provided a reserve army of labour for the capital-
ist economy. Second, it contributed to the reproduction of 
labour by bearing the cost of maintaining the families of 
migrant labour. 
ii. New Forms of Economic Organisation 
The above process of economic transformation, under 
the second colonial state, provided for new organisational 
forms where the public sector assumed a leading role in 
capitalist production, with private (foreign ) capital con-
centrating on distribution and circulation levels. 
1. This policy gave tribal chiefs tax and judicial powers 
under the Power of Nomads Sheikhs Ordinance 1922 and t h e 
Power of Sheikhs Ordinance 1927 (see Bakheit, G., 1974, 
in Howell, J., 1974, pp.4 5-64 ) . 
2. Asad depicted a similar process in Western Sudan: "Among 
the pastoral Kababish livestock is owned by individuals 
and managed by households, while grazing and wate r points 
are collectively owned resources. The collective process 
of production ... make available a surplus which is partly 
appropriated by Awlad Fadlallah rulers (ie. by native 
administration). In other words, the e lite does not con-
tribute uniquely to the collective process of production, 
ie. to the basic means of existence- but it does appro-
priate a privileged portion of the collective surplus " 
(Asad, T., 1972, quoted by Khalafalla, op.cit., p.44). 
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According to Khalafalla (1981) private foreign capital 
made a few attempts to establish plantation enclaves, but 
without success. This failure prompted the government to 
initiate, in conjunction with private foreign capital, 
large-scale capitalist schemes such as Gezira. The colon-
ial government, thus, emerged as a large capitalist entre-
preneur, investing in production and hiring wage labour. 
This leading role in the economy predetermined, to a large 
extent, the future economic role of the post-colonial state, 
as we explain below. 
Private (foreign) capital operated mainly in commerce 
and finance. In her study of the business class in Sudan 
(1978) Mahmoud found that foreigners and foreign companies 
dominated the import-export trade throughout the colonial 
. d 1 perlo . Their control over trade was facilitated by the 
availability of finance from branches of foreign banks in 
Sudan. The first Sudanese bank was established after 
independence. 
Industrial development was blocked by Condominium govern-
ment until the outbreak of the Second World War. The under-
lying policy was to keep the country as a market for British 
2 
ma nufactured goods (Mahmoud, 1984, Ch.3). War conditions 
necessitated establishing certain local industries to supply 
1. A Sudan Directory (1921) showed that out of 259 prominent 
business firms in the Sudan only one was owned by a 
Sudanese (me ntioned by Khalafalla, op.cit., p.47). 
2. However, intensification of cotton production led to the 
es tablishme nt of cotton ginning f actories, and by 19 33 
there were some 21 ginneries i n the country (Nirneiri, S., 
in El-Hassan, 1976, p.77). 
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goods which could not be imported. But failing to with-
stand competition from imported goods after the War most 
of those industries closed down. 
To recapitulate, the second colonial state introduced 
a radical change in the structure of the economy. It 
created a new agrarian structure based on capitalist rela-
tions of production and closely linked to international 
capital. It also extended feudal and capitalist relations 
into the backward regions of the country. These changes 
generated new organisational forms of production. The 
public sector assumed a leading role in capitalist produc-
tion and private capital operated mainly at the distribution 
and circulation levels of the economy. 
2. 2 3 The Post - Colonial Economy 
The post-colonial state inherited an economy combining 
several modes of production. According to El-Tayeb the 
Sudanese social formation ... 
"exhibits a combination of a primitive mode of 
appropriation of nature, ... a feudal mode of 
appropriation of surplus labour ••• , and a 
capitalist mode of appropriation ..• " (El-Tayeb, 
op. ci t. , p. 2 9) . 
The capitalist mode of production is the dominant one, as 
we explain below, and has been progressively incorporating 
the feudal and petty commodity modes. To outline the domi-
nant features of the post - colonial economy we shall classify 
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forms of production into capitalist and non-capitalist. 
We will then highlight the main economic activities under-
taken in either mode, according to economic sector and 
ownership of capital wherever possible. 
(a) Non Capitalist Forms of Production: 
Non-capitalist forms of production in the Sudan are 
often associated with what is commonly known as the "tradi-
1 tional" sector of the economy. Two forms of production 
are identified under this mode: primitive appropriation of 
nature and petty commodity production. 
The former type refers to the production of crops and 
animals for subsistence, with very limited circulation of 
money, commodities or labour. This type of activity exists 
in some parts of the Southern Region, 2 but there is no 
reliable information on the exact population involved in 
primitive appropriation activities. 
Petty commodity production can be distinguished from 
primitive appropriation by the former's relative proximity 
to the market economy, though subsistence is the prime goal 
of production. This form of production is characteristic 
of small-scale agriculture and animal husbandry in Southern 
1. For objections to the use of the term "traditional'' to 
describe non-capitalist economic activities in Sudan see 
Mahmoud, op.cit., pp.l8,19. 
2. In Southern Sudan, households' own produce provided 66% of 
their cereal consumption, 60% of their meat consumption, 
80% of eggs and milk consurnption,and 66% of vegetable and 
fruit consumption (Khalifa, A., in El-Hassan, op.cit., p.201). 
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and Western Sudan. The family is the basic unit of produc-
tion. Primitive cultivation methods are used, with hand 
implements rather than mechanical ones and with little or 
no inputs of fertiliser or pesticides (ILO, 1976, pp .35,36). 
These forms of non-capitalist production have also 
encapsulated elements of feudal relations of production in 
the form of the exchange of labour power for access to land 
(El-Tayeb, op.cit.). We have already cited typical examples 
in Section 2.2.2(b) above. 
The aforementioned pre-capitalist forms of production 
do not exist in pure form. They are being increasingly 
modified and incorporated in the capitalist mode of produc-
tion. At the level of production, communal ownership of 
land is giving way to individual ownership in the wake of 
an increasing expansion in capitalist agriculture, as we 
explain in the following section. The extended family is 
disintegrating and communal relations are continuously 
individualised (ibid, p.30). At the level of distribution 
and exchange, the produce of the non-capitalist economy is 
integrated within the capitalist market through merchant 
capital activities and taxation (Mahmoud, op . cit. pp.20-22). 
Commercialisation of livestock production was stepped up 
during the 1970s, as foreign capital started investing in 
animal fattening, fodder and meat production in central 
and western Sudan . 
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(b) C~p~talist Production 
The structure of the colonial economy in general and 
the leading role of the public sector in particular were 
sustained in the post-independence period. The main 
development was the slowing down of accumulation towards 
the late 1960s and the subsequent rise of state capital 
during the 1970s, in conjunction with international capital. 
In what follows, we will delineate major sectors of the 
capitalist economy. 
Agriculture 
Agriculture is the dominant economic sector; it con-
tributed 38% to GDP, absorbed 79.9% of the population, and 
provided 50% of government revenue and 95% of exports in 
1973/74 (El-Hassan, op.cit., p.5). Agricultural production 
is practiced under two main forms: irrigated and mechanised 
agriculture. 
(i) Irrigated Agriculture 
This constitutes 20% of the total area under cultivation. 
The post-independence period witnessed a marked expansion in 
irrigated agriculture, increasing from 628,815 feddans in 
1955/56 to over two million feddans in 1973/74. Three main 
features characterise irrigated agriculture: dominance of 
the public sector, specialisation in cotton production, and 
concentration in central Sudan. Expansion in acreage during 
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the 1950s and the 1960s reinforced these features. 
A major post-independence development in this respect 
was the construction of Managil Extension (800,000 feddans) 
of the Gezira scheme in 1957,which brought the total area 
of the scheme to two million feddans. The scheme is 
managed by a public corporation, the Sudan Gezira Board 
(SGB) . 1 It has some 96,000 tenant farmers and usually 
attracts much more labour during the picking season. 2 
Seasonal labour comes mainly from the western provinces 
of Kordofan and Darfur. 
Public sector investment in irrigated agriculture 
h. increased during the 1960s by the construction of Kashm 
el-Girba scheme (450,000 feddans) in 1964 and t h e "national-
isation" of the pump-irrigated schemes (700,000 feddans ) 
on the White Nile and the Blue Nile in 1967. 3 
1. Production is organised by a tripartite arrangement. 
The SGB manages the planting programme for tenants and 
provides services such as irrigation, ploughing, spray-
ing, part of the cost of labour, and ginning and market-
ing of the cotton crop. These costs are debted to a 
"joint account" which is fed by income from the cotto n 
crop only. The tenants supply their own l abour, some 
of the hired labour and some of the mechanised service s, 
and market all crops other than cotton. The proceeds 
are divided, giving 49 % to the tenant, 10% to the SGB 
and 41% to various government accounts (ILO, op.cit., 
p.48). For a critical assessment of this arra ngement 
see Kursany I, 1982(!). 
2. In 1973/74 season a total of 542,000 people were engaged 
in cotton picking. Out of this total, 139,000 were 
tenants and members of their families, 57,000 were resi-
dent labour, 9,000 were casual labour, and 330,000 were 
migrant labourers (ILO, op.cit . , p.258). 
3. For events leading to this "nationalisation" see Section 
2.3.3(a) below. 
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More than half of the irrigated area is under cotton 
cultivation (Abdel-Salam in El-Hassan, op.cit., p.45). 
Wheat and sugar cane were also introduced. Cotton and 
wheat,in addition to sorghum, constitute about 91% of the 
total area under permanent irrigation. The three main 
projects in irrigated agriculture - Gezira, Khashm el-Girba 
and pump-irrigated schemes - are located in central and 
east-central Sudan. 
Post-1970 Development in Irrigated Agriculture 
The post-1970 period witnessed a considerable expansion 
in irrigated agriculture, bringing acreage to four million 
feddans by the early 1980s (Africa Guide, 1982, p.348). Two 
main features mark recent development: attempts to diversify 
crop production, and a pronounced increase in foreign invest-
ment. 
The Five Year Plan 1970-75 and the Six Year Plan 1977/78 -
1982/83 put much emphasis on diversifying in sugar cane pro-
duction, groundnut, broad beans and kenaf . Three large 
sugar plantations were established in Sennar, Assalaya and 
Kennana, south of Gezira scheme, on a gross area of 144,000 
feddans. Groundnut production increased considerably with 
the launching of Es Suki scheme (1972) on a total area of 
80,000 feddans, divided equally between groundnut and cotton. 
Broad beans are grown in Al-Rahad scheme (300,000 feddans), 
which was inaugurated in 1977. Out of the 152, 000 feddans 
under cultivation in 1980/81 52% were under broad beans and 
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48% under cotton (Economic Survey 1981/82 p.23). Kenaf 
is a new crop, introduced in 1976 in Abu Na'ama project 
(15,000 feddans). 
The popularisation of the idea of the Sudan becoming 
a"bread basket" for the Arab world, during the early 1970s, 
attracted foreign capital to Sudan. 1 Foreign capita l 
participated in financing Al-Rahad project and the sugar 
plantations. 2 Except for Kennana sugar project, all 
development in irrigated agriculture was undertaken by 
the public sector in conjunction with foreign finance. All 
projects were located in central and east-central Sudan. 
(ii) Rainfed Agriculture 
About 11.5 million feddans, that is 82 % of the total 
cultivated area in the country in 1974/75 were under rain-
fed agriculture . Of the total rainfed land, 3.5 million 
(ie. 30%) were prepared mechanically (El-Hassan, op . cit ., 
pp.ll,l2). The history of capitalist rainfed agriculture 
goes back to the closing years of the Second World War when 
the colonial government encouraged the production of sorghum 
1. A multi-Arab fund was formed in 1977 to finance agricultural 
developments in Sudan costing over six billion dollars. 
2. Al-Rahad project cost £S 210 million. This was financed by 
International Development Association, Kuwaiti Develo pment 
Fund, Saudi Development Fund , Arab Development Fund and 
United States Agency for International Development. Se nnar 
sugar project was financed by Kuwait (£S 4.5 million) and 
Lloyds, UK (£S 9 million). Assalaya was financed by Sudan 
Government (27.5 %) and the Arab-African Bank (72.5 %) . 
Kennana was financed mainly by Kuwait (31.7%) , Sudan Govern-
ment (30.8%); other shareholders include : Lonhro (UK), 
Saudi Government, Arab Investme nt Company, Arab Deve l opment 
Authority, a Japanese firm and Gulf Fisheries Company 
(Economic Survey 1981/82) . 
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in the Gedaref area of eastern Sudan. Since then, 
capitalist production extended from the eastern region 
along the southern part of the Savannah belt to the 
western region. The area under cultivation increased 
from 33,000 feddans in 1943 to 1,993,000 feddans in 1967, 
mostly in Kassala and Blue Nile Provinces (Simpson and 
Sirnpson 1978, mentioned in Shepherd, A., 1983, p.302). 
Much of the expansion in acreage occurred following 
the formation of the Mechanised Farming Corporation (MFC), 
a state-owned corporation in 1968. The area increased 
from 2.8 million feddans in 1968 to 14 million feddans in 
1979/80 (FAO, 1982, p.68). About 30% of the cropped area 
was under sorghum during the 1970s and 20% was under sesame; 
a little short staple cotton was also grown (ILO, op.cit., 
p.45). 
Generally the capacity of mechanised farming to generate 
employment is limited. But in Sudan weeding and harvesting 
operations are carried out by manual labour. The ILO esti-
mated that 8,000 permanent jobs and 500,000 seasonal jobs 
were created in mechanised farming in 1975 (ibid, p.272). 
Mechanised rainfed agriculture is considered more 
profitable than other forms of agricultural production in 
Sudan {see o•arien 1978, pp.3,4, Kursany, I., 1982 (II), 
pp.l8,19; Shepherd, op.cit., pp.308,309; Mahmoud, op.cit., 
pp. 49, 50). High returns to capital makes the business highly 
attractive to private capital. 1 Thus, the pronounced presence 
l. Foreign capital, especially fran the Intematimal Bank for Recoo-
struction and Developrent (IBRD) and the International Developrent 
Association (IDA), was the major source of finance in mechanised agri-
culture, both for the private and public sector. (For details on loans 
fran these institutions see Kursany, op.cit., f.n.l2). 
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of state capital in irrigated agriculture is matched by 
the dominance of private capital in rainfed agriculture. 
By the end of the Extended Five Year Plan 1970/71 -
1976/77, the private sector controlled over 92% of land 
grants in mechanised farming, leaving about 8% to be run 
by the public sector (Adam, F. and Mohamed, E. 1979 men-
tioned in Kursany, 1982 (II), p.3.). Like irrigated 
agriculture, mechanised farming recorded a considerable 
increase during the 1970s, but it is predominantly con-
trolled by the private sector. 
Industry 
Modern manufacturing industry emerged in Sudan in the 
post-independence period. Its contribution to the economy 
was insignificant and its share in GDP did not exceed 10%. 
It absorbed only 4.5% of the labour force in 1976 (Economic 
Survey, 1981/82, p.l4). 
The post-colonial state played a major role in stimu-
lating industrial growth. In the first years after indepen-
dence, the industrial policy was to encourage private invest-
ment in industry and confine public sector investment to those 
fields "where private initiative and knowledge are wanting 
and private capital is either shy or not forthcoming" (A memo 
on Government Industrial Policy in 1956, quoted by Rashid, s., 
in El-Hassan, A., 1977, p.84). Thus, the Approved Enterprises 
Act 1956 was promulgated to encourage both local and foreign 
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capital to invest in industry. 1 
The number of industrial establishments rose rapidly, 
from 40 at the eve of independence to 146 in 1958 (Mahmoud, 
op.cit., p.59). The share of the private sector in 
industrial investment amounted to 98% of the total invest-
ment in industry during the period 1955/56-1959/60 (Saeed, 
0., 1972, mentioned in Nimeiri, op.cit., p.89). 
A new phase in industrial policy began in the early 
1960s, with the promulgation of the Ten Year Plan 1961/62-
1970/71 (see Appendix 2.2). The government initiated public 
sector industries. Nine factories representing a total 
investment of £S 23 million were established during the 
first half of the 1960s (Rashid, op.cit., p.84). But this 
expansion was not intended to compete with or displace 
private industry. 2 Concessions provided to the private 
sector in the 1956 Act were consolidated. An industrial 
bank was established by the government in 1962 to provide 
loans and technical assistance to private enterprise. 3 The 
1. It provided for tax exemptions from Business Profit Tax, 
reduced import duties, accelerated depreciation allowances, 
protection against foreign competition, and other non-
fiscal incentives such as provision of industrial land at 
reduced prices, reduced power and freight notes, assured 
government purchases of locally produced manufactured 
goods, guarantees against nationalisation and an assurance 
of transferability of imported capital and profits abroad 
(Nimeiri, S. in El-Hassan, 1976, p.83). 
2. Introducing the Ten Year Plan the Minister of Finance 
stated that: "Economic development is not a task to be 
shouldered by the government alone, but it also entails 
the participation of private enterprise, its encouragement 
and channelling of its efforts so that public and private 
efforts may proceed in harmony and cooperation in further-
ing economic development" (quoted by Taha, A., 1976, p.ll6). 
3. Loans provided by the Bank to private capital during the 
period 1962-1969 constitute 10% of the private sector total 
capital expenditure of the manufacturing industry (Khalafalla, 
op.cit., p.53). 
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1956 Act was superseded by the Organisation and Promotion 
of Industrial Investment Act, 1967. The latter retained 
the concessions of the 1956 Act, but also made them more 
generous than before (Nimeiri, op.cit., p.83). 
Though its contribution to GDP was small, the industrial 
sector grew rapidly during the period 1955/56-1969/ 70. Its 
share in GDP rose from 4.5% to 8.4% during the same period. 
The private sector controlled a substantial proportion of 
industrial investment during the above period. Its average 
share in capital investment in manufacturing represented 
62.6% of total manufacturing investment, despite increasing 
levels of public sector investment (Taha, op.cit., p.ll6). 
A large part of private industrial capital was owned by 
resident foreigners. 1 
Post-1970 Industrialisation 
The early 1970s saw the emergence of a strong statist 
2 
approach to economic development. Redefinition of the role 
of the public sector was reflected closely in the role, size 
and composition of industry. Emphasis on a leading role for 
the public sector was evident in the Five Year Plan 1970-75, 
and in the Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83 (See Appendix 2.2). 
1 . A study of the ownership of private industrial capital 
in the Sudan (1967) found that 74% of the total industrial 
capital was owned by foreigners, 15% was owned by Sudanese 
and 11% was in mixed ownership (SCP, 1968, mentioned in 
Mohmoud, op.cit., p.60). 
2. This point will be e laborated in Chapter Three of this 
study. 
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An immediate expansion in the public industrial sector 
occurred as a result of the nationalisation and confiscation 
of foreign (and local) businesses in May 1970. 1 Besides, 
the public sector initiated new developments in sugar pro-
cessing, textiles and leather industries. 2 We do not have 
comparable data on the respective shares of public and 
private capital in manufacturing production during the period 
1970-80, but on balance, the public industrial sector has 
recorded a marked expansion. 
Private industrial enterprise has also expanded parti-
cularly after the inauguration in 1972 of the "open door'' 
policy. Private industrial establishments increased from 
153 in 1970/71 to 864 in 1981 (Economic Survey, 1981/82, 
p.43). Concessions provided by the state to private capital 
were maintained in subsequent legislation. The Development 
and Promotion of Industrial Investment Act, 1972 made very 
extensive and explicit guarantees to foreign capit al . 
Despite a substantial expansion in indus t rial capacity 
during the period 1970-80, manufacturing output as a percen-
tage of GDP declined from 9.3% in 1969/70 to 8% in 1979/ 80 
(ibid, p.lS). This was partly due to severe rates of under-
capacity utilisation (Rashid, op.cit., pp.97,102). The 
estimated annual growth rate of manufacturing during the 
1. As a result public sector factories increased from 9 to 47. 
2 . Two sugar factories, Sennar and Assalaya, were established 
in 1976 and 1980 respectively. Nine spinning a n d weaving 
factories were established during the period 1970-82. Two 
new tannaries were also built during the 1970s. 
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1970s was only 1.3% contrasting sharply with a 5.5% growth 
rate during the period 1960-70. Industrial investment 
concentrated on the processing of agricultural products 
and consumer goods; there was little concern with the pro-
duction of intermediate and producer goods (Nimeiri, op.cit., 
p.94). Finally, the manufacturing industry remained highly 
concentrated in Khartoum Province despite the requirement of 
industrial policy that new industries should be located in 
the regions. 
Trade 
Two distinct phases mark the development of the corn-
mercial sec tor during the post-independence period. The 
period 1956-69 witnessed the process of the indigenisation 
of trade and ascendancy of local private capital. The early 
1970s ushered in a rise in state intervention in commerce, 
which was subsequently f o llowed by a return of fore ign capita l. 
(i) The First Phase : 1956-1969 
At the time of independence the Sudanese e c onomy was 
heavily dependent on foreig n trade (Hamid, G., 1977, p.31). 
The value of imports and exports amounted to around 40% of 
GDP in 1955/56, and gove rnment revenue relied greatly on 
taxes on foreign trade. 1 
l. In 1967/68 importmd export duties represented 36% of 
total government revenue (Ali,A., 1976 in El-Hassan, op.cit., 
p.l50). 
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General trade and foreign trade in particular, was 
dominated by the private sector. 1 The share of the private 
sector in foreign trade varied between 70-80 per cent of 
imports and between 35-55 per cent of exports (Mahmoud, 
op.cit., p.39). As we noted above, the sector has been 
dominated by foreign capital since the colonial period. 
By the early 1960s, indigenous capital began to move into 
commerce and finance (Khalafalla, op.cit., p.49). In 1960 
the first Sudanese commercial bank was opened. In 1962 a 
law was passed forbidding the issuance of trade licences 
to foreigners. Sudanese businessmen managed to check the 
influence of foreign commercial capital and also made 
efforts to limit the involvement of the state in trade. 
The share of the public sector in import trade showed a 
decline during the second half of the 1960s as the following 
table shows. 
Table 2.1 Trend of Imports and Exports 1964-68 
Year Total Imports Goverrurent Imports Goverrl!'reilt Irrports Total 
(£5 millions) £5 millions as % of total Exports 
1964 93.2 27.2 28.5 68.6 
1965 72.2 16.9 23.4 67.9 
1966 77.4 17.3 22.4 70.7 
1967 74.3 16.3 21.9 74.1 
1968 89.7 11.6 12.9 81.1 
Source: Ali, OJ2.Cit., p.l51 and p.156. 
l. The government controlled the marketing of cotton, and in 
1968 it took over the importation of tea, coffee and the 
wholesale distribution of salt. 
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The imports bill during the above period consisted 
mainly of consumer goods (52.6%), raw materials (33%) 
and capital equipment (13.6%). In export trade, cotton 
and cotton seed accounted for 55.8% of the total exports 
(1973). The main export commodities included: cotton, 
groundnuts, sesame, gum, hides, sorghum and cattle. The 
deficit in the balance of trade ranged between £S 5 million 
and £S 9 million annually during the period 1965-69 (Five 
Year Plan, 1970, Vol.!, p.ll7). 
(ii) The Post-1969 Phase 
The nationalisation and confiscation measures of 1970 
extended the control of the public sector to important 
areas of commerce and banking. Three large public sector 
commercial corporations were formed in 1970 dealing in 
automobiles, engineering equipments, and services and trade. 
Control over banks facilitated governmental involvement in 
foreign trade. Its share in the import trade increased 
from an average of 21.8% during the period 1964-68 to 40.5% 
during the period 1969-73 (Ali, op.cit., p.l52), while 
exports grew at a higher rate. 
The nationalisation policy also benefited indigenous 
businessmen {O'Neil, N., 1978, p.7). But the big stimulus 
to private commercial capital came with the 1972 "open door" 
policy which brought foreign finance and released the state's 
restrictions on foreign trade. 1 The commercial sector became 
l. In April 1972 a "nil-value" i.rrp)rt policy was introduced allowing 
businessrren to i.rrp)rt goods financed by rroney held abroad without 
having to satisfy import-control requirements inp:>sed by the Ministry 
of Trade and the Bank of the Sudan. This policy led to a flood of 
inported luxury consurrer goods. "nil-value imr::orts increased fran £S 17 . 2 
million in 1972/73 to £S 26 million in 1973/74, constituting 15% of total 
inports (ILO. oo.cit., p.452). 
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highly attractive to investors, diverting resources from 
agriculture and industry. It was credited with generating 
twice as much value added in 1972/73 as industry and more 
than half of the amount attributed to agriculture (ILO, 
1976, pp.l66,167) (eg. see Appendix 2.1). 
The "open door" policy encouraged foreign capital to 
invest in trade and finance. Eventually, a number of 
investment laws were enacted. The Encouragement of Invest-
ment in Economic Services Act, 1973, offered lucrative 
opportunities for investing in tourism, warehousing and 
transport. Finance became available as foreign and indige-
nous private banks were allowed to reopen in 1976. 1 By 
1982 there were eight private commercial banks, the majority 
of which were financed by Arab capital. Investment activi-
ties of most of these banks centred on the import-export 
trade. 2 
The country fell into acute financia l crisis during 
the second half of the 1970s . The massive in-flow of foreign 
capital dried up during the period 1976-78; this was coupled 
with stagnant exports and soaring imports. 3 The deficit in 
1. Also, following the July 1971 abortive coup the United 
States opened up $18 million worth of credit to Sudanese 
wheat importers; the I MF granted the Sudan a $40 million 
loan and UK offered $24 million. 
2 . E .g. Faisal Islamic Bank (£S 18.6 million paid capital) 
directed 82% of its investment in 19 79 to trade (Economic 
Survey, 1979/80, pp.l41,142). 
3 . 1980/81 was a record year in terms of disastrous yields 
of cott on; the share of cott on in the value of exports 
dropped from 65% in 1979 to 19.2% in 1981 (ibid, p.l78) . 
By mid-1981 the cost o f basic imports - o i l and sugar -
was more than Sudan's total export earnings. 
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the balance of trade grew from £5 1 million in 1971 to 
£S 244.6 million in 1979, as the table in Appendix 2.3 
illustrates. Reduced capital inflows and the rising trade 
deficit produced severe problems in the balance of payments. 
Payments for imports and debt servicing have fallen into 
arrears, and the external debt, standing at $ 3 billion in 
1978, had risen to$ 6.3 billion by December 1982 (Niblock, 
1985, p.31; ROAPE, 1983, p.66). 
Transport and Communications 
Inadequacy of infrastructure is often cited as a major 
weakness of the Sudanese economy. When the country attained 
independence, much of the infrastructure development was 
concentrated in central Sudan, linking areas of capitalist 
production in Gezira to centres of commerce and finance in 
major urban areas and to Port Sudan, the main outlet to the 
international market. 
The transport sector consisted of three main modes: 1 
rail, river and road transport. Rail transport has been 
the dominant mode, carrying about two thirds of long distance 
fre ight and one half of passengers by the early 1970s (ILO, 
op.cit., p.66). It is run by a state agency, the Sudan 
Railways Corporation. The rail network was extended in the 
early 1960s to the provinces of Darfur in the west and Bahr 
e l-Ghazal in the South. Carriage by railway inc r eased con-
siderably during the period 195 5-1969. 2 Despite the r ise in 
1. Air freight is insignificant. There are 19 airp::>rts, and one sea port. 
2. Passengers increased fran 2. 71 million in 1955/56 to 3. 8 million in 
1969/70. Goods increased fran 1.6 million t<Ds to 2.9 million tons 
during the same period ( ibid, p. 65) • 
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output, profits declined from £S 5 million in 1964/65 to 
£S 2 million in 1969/70 (Nimeiri, s., 1978, p.88). 
River transport was also run by the Sudan Railway 
Corporation until 1972, when it was put under the River 
Transport Corporation. Steamers operated almost entirely 
on two main reaches of the Nile: the northern reach -
between Karima and Dongla (275 km) - and the southern reach 
- between Kosti and Juba (1 450 km). River transport 
recordedfmarked increase in goods and passengers during 
the period 1955-1969. 1 
Road transport received little consideration during 
the first phase of the post-independence period. Until the 
early 1970s there were only 330 km of asphalt-paved roads 
outside urban areas (mainly in central Sudan) , and around 
2,000 km of gravel roads, mainly in Southern Sudan. The 
rest of the road network was dry weather tracks most of 
which were impassable during the rainy season. Unde r-
development of the road network held up the growth of com-
mercial trucking. 2 Road transport was dominated, until the 
early 1970s, by Sudanese businessmen (Mahmoud, op.cit., p.66). 
l. Passengers increased from 42,000 in 1955/ 56 to 302,000 in 
1969/70; and goods increa sed from 87,000 tons to 122,000 
during the same period (ILO, op.cit.). 
2. In 1958 there were about 13,000 trucks and buses and only 
11,000 passenger cars. By 1970 the stock of trucks and 
buses had increased by only 5,000, whereas the stock of 
passenger cars had gone up by more than 14,000 (Wilkins, c., 
1976, in El-Hassan, 1976, p.l05). 
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Post and telecommunication services have increased 
during the post-independence period. 1 Most of the increase 
has occurred in northern and central Sudan, with the western 
and southern regions receiving 17% and 13% respectively of 
the total number of post and telegraph offices, and 19% and 
3% respectively of the total number of telephone exchanges 
in 1972. 
Post-1970 Developments 
The post-1969 development planning laid more emphasis 
on developing road transport and telecommunications. It 
introduced new elements into the transport strategy, calling 
for competition between different modes of transport, assign-
ing a leading role for the public sector i n developing road 
transport, and soliciting the participation of foreign capi-
2 tal. 
Most of the development in the transport sector focused 
on roads. A major project was the 1190 km highway linking 
Khartoum with Port Sudan via Gedaref and Kassala (completed 
in 1980) , which was seen as a breakthrough in transport pro-
blems between central Sudan and Port Sudan. 3 A related project 
was the construction of a petroleum products pipeline (320 km) 
beb1een Khartoum and Port Sudan in 1977. Another 225 km high-
way linking Medani-Sennar-Kosti was completed in 1982. 
1. Post and telegraph offices increased fran 92 in 1956 to 198 in 1972. 
The number of telephone exchanges rose up fran 84 to 14 7 (Sudan Govern-
ment, 1974, p.27). 
2 . The Five Year Plan 1970-75 assignerl all invest:rrent in transport to the 
public sector. The Six Year Plan 1977-83 advocated carpetition between 
different transport rrodes to :i..rrprove the total capacity of the transport 
system. 
3. For an argurrent on the possible conflict bet~ rail and road in Khartoum-
Port Sudan route see Wilkins, C., op.cit., pp.ll6,117. 
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Improvements in road transport and lucrative invest-
ment concessions attracted the growth of private haulage 
f . 1 ~rms. In the mid-1970s foreign capital moved~ the 
transport sector, establishing a number of large haulage 
. 2 
compan~es. 
Another area of expansion was telecommunications. 
The Sudastat project built satellite ground stations in 
fourteen cities and towns in Northern, Western and Southern 
Sudan. It was supplemented with a micro-wave communication 
network connecting Khartoum with North-Eastern Sudan. The 
two projects brought radio and television services to 
almost all parts of the country, and augmented the capacity 
3 
of the telephone system. 
The above expansion in the transport and communication 
sector was reflected in a steady rise in the share of the 
sector in GDP from 7.3% in 1969/70 to an estimated 10 . 6% 
in 1979/80. Except for the development in telecommunications, 
1. The total number of vehicles in the country reached 115,000 
in 1979, of which 60,000 were commercial vehicles (Africa 
Guide, 1982, p.348). 
2. The Sudanese Kuwaiti Company for Road Transport was created 
in 1974. It started its operations with lOO juggernauts 
and built two maintenance shops. The Emirate-Sudan Invest-
ment Company Ltd., {capital: £S 20 million) was founded in 
1977 to operate in the transport sector, among other fields. 
3 . Other developments in telecommunications included: the 
introduction of telex services in 1974, and automatic tele-
phone dialling system in major cities. By 1979 there were 
around 63,000 t elephones in the country, of which two thirds 
were in Khartoum (Africa Guide, 1982, p.347). 
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the other developments in the sector followed closely the 
old pattern of distribution of the infrastructure in the 
country. It is obvious that developments in road trans-
port largely concentrated on central Sudan with little 
development expenditure going to western and southern 
Sudan. 
2.2.4 Structural Imbalance of the Economy 
We provided in this section an overview of the evolu-
tion of the Sudanese economy, and then outlined the main 
sectors of the post-colonial economy. The above review 
alerts us to three areas of incompatibility in the struc-
ture of the economy. These relate to its links with the 
international economy, links between its capitalist and 
non-capitalist part, and inter-sectoral links within the 
capitalist part of the economy. Outlining these series of 
incompatibilities is important for this study because they 
constitute a backdrop to the process of Sudanese urbanisa-
tion and its attendent problems, such as those of urban 
housing. Thus, by way of concluding this section, we shall 
delineate briefly each area of incompatibility. 1 
To begin with the links with the international economy, 
we have already explained above that Condominium government 
had structured the economy towards production of primary 
export crops. Cotton was established as the principal crop 
contributing around 65 % of export earnings (1979), and over 
1. The following analysis is based on the work of Ake, C., 
1981, Chs. 3 and 5. 
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50% of government revenue. Dependence on cotton made the 
economy sensitive to price changes in the international 
market. The ability of post-colonial governments to 
promote self-sustained growth is, therefore, constrained 
by their dependence on unreliable earnings from a few 
primary products. The resource base of the economy, that 
would provide for a rapid capital accumulation adequate 
to generate internally oriented development is extremely 
1 
narrow. The international division of labour, on the 
other hand, has reinforced specialisation in the production 
of cotton and constrained attempts at diversification. 2 
The problem in the above situation is thattheneed of the 
economy to diversify in order to generate resources for 
development is incompatible with the requirements of the 
international market. 
The second area of incompatibility concerns the impact 
of specialisation in primary production on the structural 
coherence of the economy. We have noted earlier that the 
initiation of capitalist production of cotton in central 
Sudan was accompanied by a reconstruction and preservation 
of non-capitalist relations of production in southern and 
western Sudan. As a result, the development of the product-
ive forces in the non-capitalist sector of the economy was 
blocked for a long time. Eve n in the post-independence 
period capitalist production of cotton has generated little 
l. Hence the heavy dependence on external borrowing to 
finance development during the 1970s. 
2. Against attempts to diversify the economy and reduce 
reliance on cotton the IMP-formulated economic changes 
in 1979 and after shifted ·emphasis back to cotton- (eg. 
see ROAPE, 1983, pp.67-69). 
- 96 -
development in the non-capitalist sector. 1 Development 
expenditure and social spending remained highly concen-
trated in areas of capitalist production as we will explain 
in Chapter Four. The external orientation of the economy 
is a major underlying factor behind incoherence in the 
structure of the economy. As Kursany observed: 
"most of the economic ventures which were developed 
within the Sudanese agriculture sector took the 
form of an "enclave" with all their linkages being 
tied to the economies of the metropolitan countries. 
As such they fail to inject any stimulus for the 
development of the domestic economy". (Ibid, p.28). 
The third incompatibility relates to inter-sectoral 
linkages within the capitalist sector of the economy, namely 
be tween agriculture and industry. The external orie ntation 
of the economy did not allow the development of an inte rna lly 
oriented manufacturing industry. Forward linkages which 
r e sulted from cotton production stimulated British, inste ad 
of Sudanese, manufacturing. Unlike European industrialisation, 
the post-independence Sudanese industrialisation did not 
develop from a local handicraft industry. As such it f a iled 
to generate effective l i nkages with other sectors of the 
economy. 2 Its reliance on imported inputs, on the other hand, 
l. In fact, through the importation of labour into central Sudan, the 
unequal exchange with the petty ccrrm:xlity producers and the encroach-
nent of capitalist rrechanised farming into the nm-capitalist econany, 
t he capitalist economy managed to siphon out economic surpluses from 
the non-capitalist sector and to marginalise its inhabitants. But the 
capitalist economy failed to transform the production r el ations in the 
non-capitalist sector which would penmit the complete absorption of 
its manbers in the capitalist production process (Kursany, 1982 (II), 
p.33). 
2. Intersectoral linkages occur as the hane sectors suwly each other 
with intenrediate inputs and capital goods. The higher the proportion 
of the sectors' requirements of these local! y produced goods the strmger 
will be the linkages. Salih (1975) f otmd weak intersectoral linkages in 
Sudan arrounting to 11.2% in 1955/ 56 and 11.9% in 1962/63. In USA and 
Japan these VJere 41% and 43% re~ively (Hamid, G., 1977, p . 32) . 
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contributed to problems in balance of payments, which 
in turn encouraged the intensification of primary pro-
duction to pay for imports. 
A major outcome of the structural incoherence in 
the economy has been a growing schism between the city 
and countryside, in terms of the distribution of invest-
ment, incomes and social spending. Rural areas where 
capitalist production is not dominant suffered, not only 
a lack of investment inputs, but more seriously a rapid 
deterioration in the natural environment as evidenced in 
western Sudan. We will consider the relation between the 
rural economy and urbanisation in Chapter Four. 
2.3 CLASS AND DETERMINATION OF THE STATE POLICY 
2.3.1 General 
The preceding analysis revealed certain structural 
problems in the Sudanese economy. We traced some of t hem 
to the colonial economic structure and the underlying 
interest of metropolitan capital in securing cheap raw 
materials and secur e markets. However, t he termination 
of colonial rule in 1956 was not followed by a fundamental 
restructuring of the economy. The persistence of major 
structural features almost three decades after independence 
poses a question about the interests sustaining the prevail-
ing economic structure and their relation to the post-
colonial state. 
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We shall focus briefly, in this section, on the 
social character of the state in the Sudan and consider 
its relation with dominant economic interests. Our 
purpose is not to reach a definitive conclusion on the 
nature of the Sudanese state. We are rather interested 
in opening up the issue of how dominant interests 
influence the state's policy. First, we will make a 
short note about social classes in Sudan. Then we wil l 
consider the nature of the Sudanese state and address 
the relation between class and the state's policy; that 
is how social interest influences public policy. 
2.3.2 Social Classes in Sudan 
The complexity of the post-colonia l Sudanese social 
formation makes it difficult to identify mutually ex-
elusive classes on the basis of labour situations. This 
is particularly the case in the agricultural sector which 
absorbs over 70% of the population. Explaining the corn-
plexity of labour situations El-Tayeb wrote: 
"On the one hand, being hired by the owner of 
the means o f production, the labourer is a 
source of surplus value; on the other hand, 
being the owner of his own farm, on whi ch 
hired l abour is employed , he is an appropri-
ator of surplus value created by others. 
Furthermor e , in so far as part of such a 
labourer's subsistence is supplied by the 
home f arm , the total cost of his labour 
power, and , indeed, the cost of reproduction 
of his labour power, are not met by the 
capitalist wage bill, but are partly supplied 
by the product of the direct l abour of his 
wife and his children a s well as by t he labour 
of those who are hired on the farm". (El-Tayeb, 
G., 1984, p.31). 
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The above complexity of labour situations in rural 
Sudan does not make easy the task of describing accurately 
the social structure. Without underestimating this 
difficulty we shall proceed to classify the social forma-
tion into three broad social classes: the bourgeoisie, 
the petty bourgeoisie, and the working class. 
(a) The Agro-Commercial Classes 
Colonial agricultural policy in the Sudan activated 
social differentiation among the peasantry and aided the 
formation and development of an agricultural bourgeoisie. 1 
This class accumulated wealth from pump-irrigated schemes 
during and after the colonial rule and later moved into 
mechanised farming. 
By the early 1960s there was pressure to indigenise 
trade and soon agricultural capital moved into trade, 
finance and industry. Commercial capital expanded under 
the May regime and flourished in the wake of the "open 
door" policy and the penetration of foreign capital. It 
is not possible, however, to speak of a homogenous agro-
commercial class. The complexity of the social formation 
and the uneven development of the economic structure pro-
duced several economic interests operating at different 
locations in the economy. 
l. In pursuit for local allies the colonial government 
granted religious and tribal leaders and traders licences 
(and finance) to grow cotton in pump-irrigated schemes in 
central and northern Sudan. 
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(b) The Petty Bourgeoisie 
The Marxian tradition limits the term "petty bour-
geoisie" to those who own means of production and neither 
sell their labour power nor purchase that of others. 
Given the complexity of labour situations, which we noted 
above, some social strata in Sudan bear the characteristics 
of the petty bourgeoisie but do not fit neatly its labour 
situation. El-Tayeb (1984) suggested that the petty 
bourgeoisie be seen as forming a continuum between the 
proletariat and the bourgeoisie, exhibiting, i n varying 
proportions, the defining characteristics of both. Adopt-
ing this approach, it will be possible to situate civil 
servants and peasants at certain points in this proletariat-
bourgeoisie continuum. 
(i) The Bureaucracy 
The bureaucracy resembles the proletariat in being 
property-less but approximates the bourgeoisie in ideology, 
life style and aspirations. The Sudanese bureaucracy 
developed in direct response to the needs of the colonial 
economy. Initially its members were drawn from the families 
of religious and tribal leaders a nd traders but with ex-
pansion in education it attracted members from diverse 
social o rigins . Occupants of higher echelons particula rly 
in the a rmy, the Party, the Cabinet , public corporations 
and local government had the opportunity to use state re-
sources to accumulate wealth. 1 
l. Sane of them invested in trade, others in rrechanised fanning, eg · 
see Mohmoud, op. cit., p.68 and Kursany, op.cit., pp.l6,17. 
- 101 -
Middle and lower level functionaries - ranging from 
professionals to clerical staff - increased in number 
under the May regime (see Appendix 3.2). Most of them 
were hard hit by inflation during the 1970s, and many 
sought migration to oil rich Arab countries. 
(ii) Peasants 
Over 70% of the country's population are peasants. 
Their incomes vary according to the form of agricultural 
production and farm size. 
In irrigated agriculture such as Gezira, rich peasants 
owned ten feddans or more, middle peasants owned between 
five and ten feddans and poor peasants owned less than five 
1 feddans (Kursany 1982, (I), pp.l7,18). By contrast, farms 
in mechanised farming ranged between 1000 and 1500 feddans. 
It was reported that most of the scheme owners in mechanised 
farming practiced farming as a subsidiary activity and were 
mainly engaged in trade (ibid, 1982, II, p.ll). The expan-
sion of mechanised farming increasingly displaced small 
peasants and forced them into less fertile land and into 
wage employment. 
l. Rich peasants usually hired labour for all agricultural 
operations and engaged in other activities such as trade 
and cattle production. Middle peasants participated in 
20% o f the production process - poor peasants performed 
most of the farming by themselves and their families, 
and rarely hired wage labour (ibid). 
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(iii) A third stratum of the petty bourgeoisie is 
that of the self-employed. It consists of small traders, 
sub-contractors and owners of small businesses in the 
tertiary sector. This social group has multiplied in 
urban areas in proportion to the rate of urban growth. 
(c) Workers 
Historically the working class in Sudan has developed, 
not in the manufacturing industry, but in the government 
services sector (rail transport) . The size of the working 
class grew steadily in the post-independence period as 
private and state capital moved into manufacturing during 
the 1960s and the 1970s. But generally the size of the 
urban working class is small compared with agricultural 
labour. 
The marked expansion in agriculture during the 1970s 
increased considerably the number of agricultural wage 
labourers. The total number of migratory labourers alone 
was put at slightly less than one million (Khalafalla, op. 
cit., p.59). Part of those displaced by mechanised farm-
ing tended to migrate to urban areas. In September 1981 
about 14,000 were evacuated from the capital for being 
"idle". It is believed that the majority of them were 
displaced peasants looking for urban wage-employment. 
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2.3.3 Dominant Interests and the State 
(a) The Nature of the Sudanese State 
Approaches to the nature of the post-colonial state 
in the Sudan usually look at the social content of policy 
output and the class affiliations of state functionaries. 
The state is, thus, rightly, described as representing 
the interests of the indigenous agro-commercial classes 
and those of international capital (eg. O'Neil, op.cit.; 
Khalafalla, op.cit.; Mahmoud, F., 1983, and Kursany, I., 
1983 (both in ROAPE, 1983); and Mahmoud, F. 1984). 
The search for the social character of the state 
has often addressed the link between dominant economic 
interests and the political parties. The social bases 
of the part ies that controlled political power during the 
two parliamentary periods 1956-58 and 1964-69 were found 
to be largely drawn from the agro-commercial classes. Both 
the Umma Party (UP) and the People's Democratic Party (PDP) 
were made up of big agricultural business, tribal leaders 
and senior bureaucrats. Each Party was affiliated with 
a religious sect - Ansar and Khatmiya respectively - which 
provided the ideological supports for the political organ-
isation. The patrons of both parties accumulated wealth 
in agriculture and trade with the direct a id of the colonial 
government. The social support of the National Unionis t 
Party (NUP ), on the other hand, mostly came from urban a n d 
s emi-urban areas: merchants, traders, gentleman farmers 
and middle leve l bureaucrats. The composition of the 
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Party's l eadership changed, however, during the second 
half of the 1960s and became dominated by big merchants. 
By the late 1960s capitalists had invested in various 
fields, ranging from agriculture to trade finance and 
industry, such that it became difficult to classify their 
political affiliations by type of economic activity . 1 
A broad agro-commercial class thus developed, investing 
in mechanised farming, export-import trade, insurance, 
banking, real estate and industry. It does not constitute, 
however, a homogeneous group of individuals. It has dif-
ferent,sometimes conflicting, interests. 2 
In answering the question of which class or classes 
used the state to serve its interest, research has mostly 
focused on major policy areas and issues. Most often quoted 
policy issues are: private cotton schemes, mechanised farm-
ing and trade. 
1. In a recent study (1978) of about a hundred leading 
businessmen in the country, Mahrnoud found t hat 38% 
be long to the Umma Party, 30% t o the People's Democratic 
Party , 16% to the National Unionist Party and 1 6% classi-
fi e d as others. Of those involved in mechanised farming 
6 8% belonged to the UP, 14% to the PDP and 10% to the NUP. 
The same pattern of-political affiliations was f o und in 
indus try (Mahmoud, 1984, pp .l43,144) . 
2. For the conflict between the bourgeoisie over the loans of 
the Agricultural Bank, and conflict between industr i a lists 
and importe rs over the policy of restricting impo rts to 
protect local industry s ee Khalafalla , op . cit., pp . Sl-56. 
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Private Cotton Schemes 
Private cotton schemes on the White Nile started 
1 in 1929 (Abdel-Salarn, op.cit., p.51). It was from 
these schemes that Al-Mahdi family - of the Umma Party -
began to accumulate wealth. 2 The period 1949-54 witnessed 
a sharp rise in the number of private pump-irrigated schemes 
(N~dalla, 1973, p.243). During that period, the Umma 
Party shared power with the colonial government in the 
legislative Assembly; while the Ashiqqa Party (the pre-
decessor of the NUP and the PDP) and the labour movement 
boycotted the Assembly. Another sharp increase in these 
schemes occurred under the coalition government of the UP 
and the PDP (1956-58). It was reported that most of the 
licences went to the supporters of the ruling parties. 
The sharp fall in cotton prices in the late 1950s and 
after made the financiers hesitant to finance private cotton 
schemes (Khalafalla, op.cit., p.52). The UP-PDP coalition 
sponsored a bill establishing the State Agricultural Bank 
to finance private cotton production. 3 As cotton prices 
1. FollCMing the la1.mching of the Gezira Scherre the Government started 
offering licences to private individuals to grCM cotton. Am:mg early 
beneficiaries were the religious leaders: Abdel-Rahman Al-Madi, Ali 
Al-Mirghani and Al-Hindi. All three of them becarre the patrons of 
major political parties: the l1Ima Party, the People's Derrocratic Party 
and the National Unionist Party. 
2. Abdel-Rahrran Al-Mahdi was given the v.a:xi contract for the construction 
of the Sennar Dam. He used the capital acquired therefram to establish 
purrp-irrigated schenes on the White Nile. His acreage increased fran 
200 feddans in 1928 to 1500 feddans in 1935. He received financial 
aid - in terms of grants and loans - frcm the colonial government and 
exploited virtually costless labour. He established Al-Mahdi Estate, 
which invested in finance, carmerce and agriculture (Khalafalla, op.cit., 
p.46). 
3. Outstanding loans advanred by the Bank to cott on gr<:Mers increased fran 
£S 5. 9 million in 1959/60 to £S 9. 7 million in 1961/62. Loans to non-
cotton gr<=Mers were .in the average of half a million for the period 
lqh? -hq (ihif1) _ 
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showed no improvement, the UP-led-government interfered 
in 1967 to safeguard the interests of cotton growers and 
transferred the schemes to the public sector. Despite 
being indebted to the tenants, to the government and to 
the Agricultural Bank, scheme owners were adequately 
compensated. They subsequently moved their capital to 
industry and mechanised farming. 
Mechanised Farming 
During its early development in eastern Sudan (1943-54), 
mechanised farming experimented with a system of participating 
cultivators in which income from 28 feddan-plots was distri-
buted equally between cultivators and the government 
(Shepherd, A., 1983, pp.300-302) • 1 But a Ministry of Agri-
culture Report (1954) concluded that the aforementioned 
system was inefficient. The Report counselled against the 
development of state farms and recommended developing 1,000 
feddan plots. As Shepherd noted, it was not difficult to 
read into such a report the underlying interest of big mer-
chants. The system of participating cultivators was partially 
ended in 1953 in favour of developing private capitalism. 
The state supported the expansion of private mechanised 
farming during the 1960s and the 1970s, providing bank 
finance, agricultural machinery and research (Mahmoud, 1984, 
p.49). Studies on the social origin of scheme owners found 
1. Government provided mechanised land preparation, sowed 
the sorghum seed and threshed the harvest, while the 
cultivators provided labour for other operations. 
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that they predominantly came from the "higher strata of 
the society". 1 These capitalist farmers provided a 
strong rural base to the May regime (O'Neil, op.cit., 
p.8). They managed to penetrate the regional political 
organisations and dominate the Party-affiliated tenant 
unions. 
Trade: 
During the two parliamentary regimes, import-export 
licencing was reportedly used extensively by the ruling 
parties for political gain (Nugdalla, op.cit., pp.249-254). 
The NUP and the POP interchangeably occupied the Ministry 
of Trade. The trial of the Minister of Trade (NDP member) 
in 1969 revealed that the NDP adopted a partisan policy 
in the issuance of trade licences. 2 
The nationalisation and confiscation of foreign firms 
under the May regime (1970) paved the way for the economic 
ascendancy of Sudanese merchants (O'Neill, op.cit., p.7). 
In early 1971 President Nimeiri told the representatives 
of the private sector that: 
1. Kursany classified scheme owners in mechanised farming 
in Southern Kordofan into: (a) Big merchants who were 
historically connected with the sector; (b) big cattle 
owners; (c) sons of native administrators who were edu-
cated abroad in business administration; (d) ex-civil 
and military of£icers; and (e) senior bureaucrats from 
the Party, local government and National Assembly. Studies 
of mechanised farming in Eastern Sudan reached similar 
findings (Kursany, 1982(1!), p.l7). 
2. The NUP and PDP merged into one party in 1968, the National 
Democratic Party (NDP). 
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"the nationalisation and acquisition decisions 
were not meant to detract from the role ideally 
played by the private sector, or to create an 
atmosphere of uncertainty and instability for 
this sector". (Quoted by Taha, A., 1976, p.ll7). 
Following the "open door" policy (1972) further opportunities 
became available to Sudanese businessmen. Merchants consti-
tuted an important political base for the May regime and 
were able to make use of the opportunities made available 
by the regime, to expand in the import trade and real estate. 
(b) De~ts of Public Policy 
The preceding discussion reveals that most studies on 
the social character of the post-colonial Sudanese state 
have centred their analysis on the social content of the 
state's policy. The link between the social structure and 
public policy has been explained in terms of the direct 
influence of capitalists or their representatives on the 
policy process and of the close affinity between state func-
tionaries and the dominant economic interests. 
While class analysis is indispensable for explaining 
major policy issues such as those reviewed above, it 
encounters certain difficulties when dealing with non-major 
policy issues and those policy areas in which capitalists 
have no overt class interest. But this limitation can be 
overcome by extending class analysis to the internal organ-
isation of the state, and analyse - in class terms - those 
internal policy determinants which are active when dominant 
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class interest is not at stake. In order to discover 
internal policy determinants we will need to analyse the 
social content of the institutional organisation and of 
policy process from the end of policy planning to the 
stage of implementation. 
We would like to propose an analytical distinction 
between the social character of policy makers - as one 
determinant of policy - and that of the internal organ-
isation of the state. Internal state organisation is not 
a neutral "impersonal" set of administrative arrangements. 
It can and does carry social interests, and sustain them 
even after a change of the social character of policy makers. 
It is better conceived as a set of sedimented selection 
rules laid down through a long historical process to main-
tain the interest of dominant classes (Clegg and Dunkerley, 
1980, pp.S01,503). It therefore provides an additional 
"internal selection mechanism" for those policy issues which 
do not cause an overt class conflict or those which do not 
command a consensus between the different fractions of the 
capitalist class. 
Institutional analysis is necessary if we are to un-
cover these internal selection mechanisms and establish how 
they quietly mediate social interests in the policy process. 
Institutional analysis will not, however, substitute a class 
analysis of the policy makers, nor replace a structural 
analysis of the political economy. Its value lies in dis-
covering the hidden mechanisms which dominant interests 
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use without needing to resort to overt action by political 
decision-makers. In this manner the institutional approach 
can complement a class analysis of policy makers and a 
structural analysis of the social formation. 
2.3.4 Conclusion 
We addressed in this section the relation between 
public policy and the dominant interests in the Sudan. We 
highlighted the class character of the Sudanese state. We 
then outlined the susceptibility of the internal organisation 
of the state to class influence and its potential role in 
the policy process and argued that an institutional approach 
to policy analysis should be incorporated in a broad class 
analysis of the state. 
2.4 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The main objective of this chapter has been to describe 
the main features of the Sudanese economy and to give an 
overview of the underlying social forces. It consisted of 
two main sections. 
At the beginning of the first section, we provided a 
historical note about the evolution of the economy and 
considered the way the structure of the economy was trans-
formed under Condominium rule. We then classified the post-
colonial economy into non-capitalist and capitalist forms 
of production and outlined the main features in each form. 
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We noted that the pre-capitalist forms of production were 
being slowly modified and incorporated in the capitalist 
economy. 
Proceeding to the capitalist economy, we focused on 
the sectors of agriculture, industry, trade and transport 
and communications. There was a continuity in major 
structural features of the economy throughout the post-
independence period. We noted the increasing involvement 
of the state's capital in the economy during the 1970s, 
and the concomitant rise in the share of foreign capital. 
We concluded the section by highlighting major structural 
weaknesses in the economy. 
We addressed, in the second section, the question of 
the interests underlying the prevailing economic structure 
and how they influenced the state's policy. We considered 
the nature of the Sudanese state. We argued that the 
internal organisation of the state represented an important 
mediator of social interest in policy process. Its potential 
impact on the policy process must be appreciated and investi-
gated, using institutional analysis, within a broad struc-
tural framework of analysis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE 
STATE AND POLICY FORMATION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
We have proposed above that the social content of the 
state policy can be sought in the internal organisation of 
the state, and that the influence of the social structure 
on the state actions can operate internally from within the 
state organisation. To examine this proposition we will 
analyse in this chapter the dominant model of policy forma-
tion in the Sudan in the light of the ideology of the May 
regime, the institutional organisation of the state apparatus 
and the social character of the policy makers. We will argue 
that the bias in socio-economic planning toward the merchant 
class and the state bureaucracy is explicable in terms of 
the prevailing policy model and is inherent in the ideology 
underlying the formation of the state organisation. 
We will deal with the above proposition at three stages. 
In the following section we will e xamine the ideology of the 
May regime in order to illuminate the main themes underlying 
the formation of the state apparatus. Then, a description 
of the state apparatus and its operation follows in the third 
section of the chapter. The intra-institutional balance of 
power and the pattern of social representation in the state 
apparatus are hypothesised to reflect closely on the process 
of policy formation. We note a marked concentration of power 
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in the Presidency and,a strong influence of "technocrats" 
in senior political institutions. We adopt the concept 
of "technocracy" to describe both the social character of 
the state apparatus and the institutional approach to policy 
formation. In the fourth section of the chapter we will 
examine the relation between "technocracy" and policy forma-
tion, focusing on the sphere of economic planning. 
We will conclude that the institutional structure of 
the state and its mode of operation constitute a vantage 
point for understanding the incidence of social interests in 
the process of policy formation. The dominant policy model 
- the "technocratic" model - is instrumental, in this respect, 
for analysing the social character of the state's policy 
and its social implications. The institutional structure 
of the state represented an important instrument for mediat-
ing the interests of the merchant class and those of the 
state bureaucracy. 
3. 2 THE IDEOLOGY OF THE i-tft.Y REGIME 
3.2.1 General 
The May regime came to power as a result of a military 
coup in 1969. 1 It deposed the previous parliamentary regime, 
1. The coup was initiated by non-communist members of the Free 
Officers• organisation (FOO). The FOO, which had been 
active within the armed forces in opposition to the first 
military rule (1958-64), mainly comprised nationalist, Arab 
socialist and communist officers. After initial caution, 
the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) worked to mobilise popu-
lar support to defend the new regime. 
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annulled the constitution, dissolved the political parties 
and established a one-party state, supposedly based on a 
socialist orientation. 1 Following a communist-supported 
abortive coup in 1971, the regime's policy departed radi-
cally from its earlier Leftist postures to the right. It 
is our view that those earlier ideological assumptions had 
substantially informed and guided the formation of the 
state's internal organisation and are, therefore, most 
relevant for understanding the characteristics and mode of 
operation of the state's organisation. It will also be 
seen that the seemingly sudden swing of the regime to the 
right in the post-1971 period was foreseen in the regime's 
ideology and its conceptual underpinnings. What happened 
in the post-1971 period could be interpreted as a shift 
in power-alliances within the prevailing ideology. 
Ideology is conceived in this study as the system of 
ideas, beliefs and sentiments which claims to give a complete 
theory of man and society, and provides a programme of politi-
cal action (Scruton, R. 1982, p.213) . 2 
The National Charter, which was hotly debated during 
the period 1969-1971 and officially endorsed in January 1972, 
condensed the regime's ideological project and its political 
strategy. In the preamble, the charter outlined a broad 
1. The SCP was already banned in 1965, under the parliamentary 
regime. 
2. In examining the principal ideological precepts, for the 
purpose of this study, of the May regime we will rely, in the 
main on: (a) Interpretation of the National Charter, the 
Constitution and other authoritative writings; (b) Presi-
dential speeches and statements, and (c) writings of the 
late Dr Bakheit, G., who was the principal ideologue of the 
regime as we will explain below. 
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strategy that included the following: 
1- "Liberat(ing) the will of citizens from all 
forms of economic exploitation, administra-
tive, tribal, sectarian and ideological 
oppression, placing power - on all its levels 
- in the hands of the people, through appli-
cation of the new democracy ... 
2 - Chang(ing) all obsolete laws and replac(ing) 
them by new laws concomitant with the new 
social relations ... , (guaranteeing) basic 
liberties ... and safeguard(ing) the supremacy 
of law and the independence of the judiciary ... 
3- accelerat(ing) economic development relying on 
modern scientific planning ..• 
4- liberat(ing) rural areas from ... backwardness 
by putting into force a drastic agrarian reform 
(and) ..• changing production relations for 
the benefit of poor farmers, agricultural work-
ers and nomads ... 
5 - reconstruct(ing) state organs on a scientific 
and patriotic basis to promote .•. efficiency 
and effectiveness " (National Charter, 1972, 
PP· 5-9) . 
These objectives were later incorporated in the perma-
nent constitution, subsequently promulgated in May 1973. 
This political strategy represented, however, - during the 
drafting period - a consensus formula, which was less pre-
cise both on specific substantive issues and on empirical 
strategies (Shaw, 1971-103). One implication of its general-
ity was its liability to differing interpretations. Despite 
this generality, however, one line of interpretation of the 
main concepts and their empirical imports was evident from 
the inception of the regime in 1969 and until the mid-l970s, 
the formative period of the regime's institutional structure. 
This line of interpretation can be traced and defined in 
terms of its social origin and its theoretical orientation, 
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through an exposition of three basic elements inthe May 
ideology. These elements are, the view of the regime about 
the nature of social organisation, its concept of power 
and change, and its concept of social representation in the 
polity. In what follows we briefly examine these three 
aspects in the ideology of the May regime. 
(a) The Nature of Social Organisation 
Reading the literature of the May regime one cannot 
fail to note an emphasis on social cohesion and harmony as 
a definitive characteristic of Sudanese society, built 
around the family. There was also comparable distancing 
from secondary forms of social organisation, namely economic 
ones. Addressing the founding conference of the Party in 
January, 1972, the President defined the regime's perspective 
of classes: 
" the May socialist revolution broke in our 
country and the classes are still in embryonic 
state; ... it is characterised by class loose-
ness and not the crystallising of classes, ... 
and (our) socialist orientation ..• endeavours 
to dissolve the differences between (groups) 
not to reinforce them to develop into contra-
dicting class interests ... " (The Institute of 
Socialist Studies, 1976, p.lO). 
The rejection of class as an organising concept was seen 
by Dr Bakheit as: 
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"conforming to the social nature of the Sudanese 
people •.. ; and since the interests of the ordinary 
Sudanese are associated with the family any class 
advocacy... faces opposition"* (Bakhei t, 19 7 4 ) . 
The rejection of class as a basis for social organisation 
was partly a product of the confrontation between the regime 
and the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) in the early 1970s. 
Yet principally this rejection has its roots in the Sudanese 
1 brand of petty-bourgeois socialism (Mahmoud, 1984. p.ll). 
For instance, in its economic analysis,the National Charter 
depicted the Sudanese society as composed of contradictory 
modes of production r including: 
"closed subsistence economy ... (producing •.. 
outside the circle of the national economy), 
and semi-feudalism (where old production 
relations prevailed) ..• (and) a modern economyn 
(National Charter, op.cit., Chapter 3.). 
While the Marxist notion of the mode of production was used 
- as an analytical category - there was an obvious conceptual 
difficulty in comprehending how _ classes and class relations 
relate to the production process within a particular mode of 
production. Classes were seen to exist independent of the 
mode of production. Thus, the inevitability of class contra-
dictions and class conflict were assumed away. The President 
stated that: "We will not favour one group or one class at the 
* Denotes my translation. 
1. This brand of thought did not categorically deny the exist-
ence of classes. It believed that, although classes might 
exist, their antagonisms need not be resolved through class 
struggle. 
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expense of the others. We will look at the interests of 
the whole people .•. the revolution is for all the country" 
(1974, quoted in Al-Battahani, A., 1976, p.77). The under-
lying assumption was one of an inherently cohesive society 
whose constituent parts were held together by solidarities 
which overrode class antagonisms. 
The rejection of class as a form of social organisation 
and of class struggle as an instrument of change led to the 
adoption of an alternative framework of analysis based on 
non-economic units of social analysis and to conceiving of 
change as an induced and incremental process. A perspective 
of orderly, conflict-free and controlled social change was 
to dominate the process of building the state 1 s institutional 
structure. An exposition of the regime 1 s view of power and 
change should illuminate this point. 
(b) The Concept of Power and Change 
In line with the perspective of an inherently harmonious 
society, based on non-economic social organisations, noted 
above, power was conceived by the May regime as a product 
of control of political institutions rather than the means 
of production. Power relations in society were decided by 
the domination of such institutions like political parties, 
tribal and religious institutions as it was the case under 
the parliamentary regime 1964-69 (National Charter, op.cit., 
p.21). A change in the balance of power would involve 
eliminating old power institutions. 
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The above interpretation of power disregarded the 
economic basis of political power and held the state 
institutions as the exclusive foundation of power. The 
regime's concept of power was partial and typical of the 
one dimensional approach to power already criticised in 
the literature on community power (e.g. see Lukes, s. 
1974). Following this line of critique, the incidence 
of power does not necessarily occur in association with 
a visible control of political institutions. Conceived 
as a social relation, power may exist and be exercised 
outside political organisations. Thus, whether pol itical 
parties or "native administrations" were to be abolished 
this should not necessarily mean that their power-bases 
had been eliminated. 
The one-dimensional approach to power, characteristic 
of the ideology of the May regime, had important implica-
tions for the regime's strategy of change and for the form 
which change-agents would take. At one level, after elimina-
ting old institutions the state would become the locus of 
power and would act as an arbiter between social groups and 
. t l 1n erests. It is all too easy to detect the assumption of 
the neutrality of the state vis-a-vis social classes: the 
state was above all classes. At another level, the state 
1. Dr Bakheit wrote: "The state in the Sudan was created as 
a partisan t ool used to promote interests of certain 
groups. It was not used as a compromise apparatus; a 
national apparatus to synthesise b e tween conflicting 
cultures and groups; because its ability to resist pres-
sures has been very weak" (El-Sahafa Daily, 23 .9.74, 
quoted by Al-Battahani, A., 1976, p.75). The implication 
of the above i nterpretation is to strengthen the power 
of the state so that it was able to manage effectively 
social change . This pattern of analysis was close to the 
thinking of the Development Administration Movement, dis-
cussed in Chapter One (1.2.2. (b)). 
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would plan social change in a way that safeguards "the 
harmony and cohesion" of society. Class, ideology and 
conflict, which underlined the political process during 
the parliamentary regime, were regarded as disruptive 
1 and irrational methods for effecting "orderly" change. 
The alternative method was bound to be "rational". 
Social organisation and tools of change were to be based 
on "scientific" understanding of society as against an 
ideological or political perspective of society. 
"The idea of political and social change, its 
tools, factors and implications", wrote Dr 
Bakheit, "is no longer a literary concern that 
everybody can undertake; it became an academic 
specialisation ... ,with its basis and rules ... 
which enable the researcher, without being a 
prophet or a fortune-teller, to ascertain the 
direction of change and possibilities of 
success or failure"* (Bakheit, 1969, pp.6,9). 
This perception of a new approach to social change was 
also acknowledged in the National Charter: 
"The basis of this change is social planning, ... 
based on in-depth studies .•. which classify 
problems, outline their nature, set strategies 
... and specify the means for realising revolu-
tionary change", (National Charter, op.cit., p.52). 
Two important developments grew from this pattern of 
analysis of society, power and change. First, a major role 
was assigned to the state in effecting change, through a 
1. Hence the emphasis in the regime's literature on an alli-
ance between the "revolution's social forces -Workers, 
farmers, intellectuals, soldiers and national capitalists-
around the aims of national unity and development. 
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massive process of institution-building and social planning. 
Second, a rationalist conception of change was envisaged, 
to be based on scientific method and technical expertise. 
Both these aspects pose the question of social representa-
tion or the relative roles of different social groups in 
effecting social change and in the polity. To this point 
we now turn. 
(c) The Concept of Social Representation 
We noted at the beginning of this section the emphasis 
in the National Charter on putting power into the hands 
of the people, through the application of the "new democracy". 
The institutional arrangement which would facilitate the 
delivery of power to the people was the Party, the Sudanese 
Socialist Union (SSU). The party was conceived as an alli-
ance for "the people's working forces", comprising: workers, 
farmers, intellectuals, soldiers and national capitalists. 
Although the social structure of the party was formally 
planned on an occupational basis, actual participation was 
organised in such a way that a strong occupational presence 
was prevented or controlled. 
We referred earlier to the regime 's emphasis on the 
family as the basic unit of social organisation and the 
r e jection of the concept of class. This type of thinking 
led to the adoption of the reside ntial or geographical unit 
as the main basis of political represe ntation as opposed t o 
work place or industrial organisation. Dr Bakheit expl a ined 
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this choice in the following way: The May revolution was 
able to: 
"distinguish conceptually between social and 
industrial groupings such that the latter 
category should not constitute the institutional 
(form)of the former. If the SSU were formed 
according to an industrial basis of social forces 
it would have become a front for sectional groups, 
lacking the spirit of national unity" (Bakheit, 
1974). 
In the process of eliminating the power of institutions 
of the parliamentary regime, Dr Bakheit suspected that trade 
unions could constitute a strong power-centre outside the 
state's control . To avert this situation he promoted the 
idea of a non-occupational basis for social representation. 
He defended his position saying: 
"We do not call for obliterating the identity of 
unions, but we see no reason for transforming 
the trade union movement from an occupational 
and professional movement into a political move-
me nt which would control the SSU, divide it into 
entities and change the (Party's) national frame-
work into a sectional one". (Ibid). 
The actual basis of participation seemed, therefore, 
to contradict the formally proclaimed structure of the ssu 
- the alliance of the people's working forces. To overcome 
this contradiction in the pattern of representation, the 
"people's working forces" -workers, farmers, soldiers, 
intellectuals and national capitalists - were r equired to 
function in the party, not from the bottom of the organisation 
upward, but r a ther to joi n the SSU at its higher l evels , f r om 
1 
the provincial l evel and above. Below the provincial l evel, 
I. This arrangerrent shoUld not rrean that trade nnions, below provincial 
levels were autonorrous; the regime dissolved trade unions in May 1970 and 
"'"h"'t::>rnle:>nt-l u rol"''l ;:::,roor'l t-hPm hv llrn.:=mi ~;::d·innR n.ffiliated t o the Party. 
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the party principally functioned according to residential 
location. Similar controls on occupational representation 
obtained in relation to the National Assembly. 
Notwithstanding the practical limits on occupational 
representation, the question of social representation also 
posed certain conceptual problems. The regime's programme 
of change and its instrument presupposed a massive social 
planning operation and, therefore, large numbers of expert 
cadres. The only viable source for providing the required 
cadre was the state bureaucracy. A new perspective of 
bureaucracy was, therefore, to be instituted; one that 
would go beyond the conventional bureaucratic role of 
economic and social administration to embrace tasks of 
social change, political development and nation-building. 1 
Requirements of popular representation envisaged in 
the National Charter and the Constitution were to be sub-
ordinated to the imperatives of social change. The pattern 
of social representation in the state's institutions was, 
therefore, structured to give leadership and control to 
state bureaucrats - civil and military - as against popularly 
elected representatives. The significance of the bureaucracy's 
role in the polity will be taken up in the third and fourth 
sections of the chapter. 
1. On the role of the bureaucracy in change see Bakheit, 1971. 
- 124 -
3.2.2 Conceptual Sources of the May Regime Ideology 
Although subsequent policies of the May regime departed 
radically from the 1969 pronouncements, the basic ingredients 
of the ideology, noted above, remained basically unchanged 
throughout the 1970s. The pattern of political theorising 
underpinning the regime's ideology was not dissociated from 
conventional political and social theory. Two strands of 
thought are often quoted as main sources for the May regime 
ideology: Arab socialism, particularly "Nassirisrn", and the 
political tradition of the Sudanese left (Bechtold, P. ,1976, 
p.260). The group of Arab socialists was non-Marxist in 
orientation, advocating patterns of political and economic 
development based on Egyptian experience. The second ideo-
logical source was represented by a group who had broken 
away from the Sudanese Communist Party in August 1970, on 
the issue of the kind of support which the party should have 
given to the new regime; they called for dissolving the SCP 
in favour of working within the Sudanese Socialist Union, 
the regime's new political organisation (Niblock, 1974-412) . 1 
Reading into the preamble of the National Charter one can 
easily detect the influence of these two strands of thought 
in shaping the broad strategy of the May regime. 
1. A split within the SCP appeared as early as 1966 over 
whether the Party should support progressive coups in the 
absence of mass mobilisation and whether it should merge 
with other organisations for tactical gains instead of 
maintaining its organisational autonomy. Those members 
of the Party who favoured supporting progressive coups -
some of whom were on the central committee - eventually 
defected to Nirneiri's camp (Collins, C., 1976, pp.l3,14; 
O'Neil, 1978,p.l6). 
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However, as one moves beyond the preamble, to more 
substantive and definitive issues, a third influence of 
different theoretical orientation becomes strongly evi-
dent. We shall label this brand of analysis "techno-
rationalist" and explain the connotation of the term as 
we establish the theoretical content of this tendency. 
It is not our intention, however, to question the epistemo-
logical basis of this form of analysis at this stage; we 
are rather interested in its conceptual roots and the 
implications of its assumptions for the formation of the 
state's institutional structure and the process of policy 
formation. 
The three elements of the regime's ideology analysed 
above, and their empirical import,had close affinity with 
systems analysis and the modernisation school. 1 The link 
is explicable from an early article written by Dr Bakheit 
in December 1969. Subsequent recurrence of ideas and con-
cepts from that article in the regime's political literature 
testifies to the influence of Dr Bakheit's thinking on the 
ideological project of the May regime. 
Although the title of the article, "Administrative 
Effectiveness and the Trend of Change in Sudan", implied a 
narrow focus on public administration, Dr Bakheit wanted 
essentially to develop a model for understanding and explain-
ing the "political event of May 25th, 1969". His search for 
an explanatory model for political and social change in Sudan 
1. Cf. Chapter One, Section 1.2. 
- 126 -
partly arose from discontent with the then prevailing 
patterns of analysis, which, in his view were:-
(a) Characterised by ideological bias. 
trend of change in Sudan had been 
emotionally observed and analysed along 
literary lines ... ," 
(b) Lacking in scientific method. 11 understanding 
the trend of change is no longer an analytic 
pattern associated with static ideologies. 
It is rather an objective reading into events 
and deducing of theories and patterns which 
regulate these events ... ," 
(c) adopting inadequate definitions of the Sudan's 
problems" ... conceptual splitting and doctrinal 
dispute have meaning when ideology has an 
effective role in setting the quality of change 
or in broadening its extent or in speeding its 
pace. However, most of the Sudan's problems •.. 
(relate to) obtaining political, social and 
economic systems that suit the needs of modern 
life, the creation of objective values to support 
these systems ... (and, improving) the performance 
in the various sectors (of) ... services and 
production, where there is no place for doctrines 
and where the criterion is technical experience, 
occupational and professional talent. (Bakheit, 
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19 6 9 1 pp • 7 1 19 1 4) • * 
Although at the time of writing Dr Bakheit was a 
senior bureaucrat not formally involved in politics, the 
implicit target of his criticism was the SCP and its 
reservations towards the new regime. In contrast to the 
political analysis adopted by the SCP, Dr Bakheit called 
for a non-political model. He saw the Sudan's problems as, 
"problems of modernisation whose resolution depends on 
administrative rather than political theorising" (ibid, p.l2). 
His recommended model related to systems analysis and 
social systems theory (ibid, pp.9,10). The Sudanese society 
was conceived as a system containing a number of sub-systems, 
represented by political, economic and social sectors of 
society (ibid, p.l6). Each system performed specific func-
tions, important among them were system-maintenance and 
integration functions. Any functional discrepancy among 
system components was likely to impair system performance 
and must be eliminated. 
Dr Bakheit attempted to use this model to study the 
political event of May 25th, 1969. He proposed that "the 
revolution of May 25th constitutes a system of numerous 
units, ... combined in a united form according to ... 
{specific) relations; ... (these relations) assume a parti-
cular order, which, if changed, affected the whole system 
and its parts, and affected the structure of the revolution 
and the nature of its direction" (ibid, p.l5) . 1 
1. This definition was borrowed from systems analysis. See 
Almond and Powell, 1966, p.l9. 
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Adopting this model, Dr Bakheit believed that any 
attack on a particular revolutionary segment constituted 
an attack on the revolution. The model should also permit 
the identification of those social sectors who had stakes 
in the revolution. However, this should not mean that 
other social sectors had no "functional" role in the system. 
11 Modernising forces are not the only ones capable of effect-
ing political and social change ... The traditional forces 
undertake, as well, the same duty" (ibid, p.l8). 
Through its emphasis on societal integration, inter-
dependence and consensus, systems analysis was, therefore, 
consistent with the regime's assumptions about the nature 
of the Sudanese society. The adoption of social system 
theory to understand the nature of society and change was 
seen by Dr Bakheit as grounding social research on a firm 
scientific basis. By contrast, a Marxist perspective of 
society was considered ideologically biased, political and 
hence less "rational". Systems analysis was conceived as 
a rational method for comprehending social change, but it was 
also to be used in a technical capacity to engineer social 
change. Within this framework of analysis, once the system's 
components, functions and interrelations were identified and 
classified, social problems would be adequately dealt with, 
given the right techniques and an expert cadre. 
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From the above reading into Dr Bakheit•s analysis we 
can detect a positivistic conception of society which 
attempted to ground social analysis on a narrow scientism, 
leaving no room for ideology, values and social conflict. 
Or Bakheit•s contribution belonged, therefore, to a "techno-
rationalist" pattern of social analysis, that appealed to 
science and technology to legitimise the political ideology 
of the May regime. While social system theory represented 
an important source for Dr Bakheit 1 s thinking, his long 
experience as an administrative officer, brought up under 
the paternalistic tradition of colonial administration, had 
infused into his thinking a belief in a dominant role for 
the state in society. His long professional experience 
strengthened his views on the role of technical experts in 
change. 
We noted at the beginning of this section, the impact 
of other sources on the regime•s ideology. We find no basic 
contradiction between the conceptual framework derived from 
social system theory and the other two brands of thought -
Arab socialism and the break-away group of the SCP - to the 
extent that the latter groups de-emphasised social conflict, 
adopted a consensus model of society and propagated a national 
compromise ideology. Their ideology fits comfortably Hudson's 
description: "propagating an ideology of nationalism, neutral-
ism and state capitalism called socialism" (Hudson, M.,l977, 
336). Thus, although these two groups belonged to a different 
political tradition, their approach to change and their 
empirical strategies were, nevertheless, "techno-rationalist'' 
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in orientation, in the sense of substituting science and 
technology for politics and conflict. This point will be 
elaborated in the third and fourth sections of this chapter. 
3.2.3 Conclusion 
We conducted in this section an exposition of the main 
ingredients, for the purpose of this study, of the ideology 
of the May regime and traced its main conceptual sources. 
The purpose of this exercise was to bring outthemain themes 
in that ideology which informed the formation of the state's 
institutional structure. We argued that certain elements 
in that ideology fostered a large role for the state in 
social change, to be accomplished through modern organisation 
and technology. The central role assigned to the state and 
the massive institutional framework envisaged posed the 
question of how social representation in the state apparatus 
was to be achieved. Contrary to the claims of popular repre-
sentation dominant in the regime's literature, the concepts 
of power and change adopted made it necessary that the state 
apparatus be controlled and led by bureaucrats. In the 
following section we relate the foregoing interpretation of 
the ideology of the May regime to the actual process of 
institutional formation. 
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3.3 THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE MAY REGIME 
3.3.1 General 
The internal structure of the state in Sudan was 
largely a legacy of the second colonial state 1898-1956. 
Following independence in 1956, the state apparatus basically 
provided for a "Westminster" political model which prevailed 
during the two parliamentary periods, 1956-58, 1964-69. 
Although the intervening period of the first military rule, 
1958-64, witnessed the suspension of the parliamentary system, 
generally the basic assumptions underlying the state apparatus 
remained intact. By contrast, the May regime, 1969, intro-
duced a massive reorganisation of the state apparatus and 
changed its basic premises. From the above overview of the 
regime's ideology the main assumptions behind the reorganisa-
tion process can be stated as the following:-
(a) A dominant role for the state in social change, 
involving the concentration of power in the 
Executive in contrast to legislative and judi-
cial organs . 
(b) Reorganising the institutional structure on a 
"scientific" basis and expanding it both 
horizontally and vertically to integrate the 
state's action and e nsure its efficacy. 
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(c) A belief in a "rational-scientific" model of 
socio-economic planning required placing 
technical cadres in the leadership of policy 
planning and implementation institutions. 
The process of state reorganisation was to involve, 
therefore, a change in the power balance among state insti-
tutions and, in the balance of social representation in 
them. In what follows we examine the reorganisation pro-
cess in terms of 
(a) the concentration of power in particular 
state institutions and, 
(b) the social character of dominant state organs. 
3.3 .2 The Concentration of Power in the Executive 
Most of the reorganisation process took place during 
the period 1969-74. While the early part of this period 
witnessed the dissolution of the institutions of the pre-
vious regime and the formation of provisional ones, the 
latter part marked the evolution of the permanent structures 
of the state. Except for the National Charter, whose first 
draf t was completed in 1969, most of the other institutions 
emerged in the second half of 1971 (Niblock, 1974-408). 
These included the reorganisation of local government, the 
formation of the Party,the enactment of the provisional 
constitution and the promulgation of the presidency. The 
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significance of the time sequence of the reorganisation 
process was its synchronisation with the growing influence 
of the proponents of the "techno-rationalist" perspective, 
following the break in relations between the regime and 
the SCP in November 1970. The influence of the former 
group was to be particularly felt in the pattern of the 
o rganisation that was adopted. 
The permanent constitution provided for five national 
institutions which constituted the main pillars of the 
political system. These were the Party, the Presidency, 
the Assembly, the Judiciary and local government. 1 Of all 
these institutions, the Presidency emerged as the most 
powerful in terms of executive, legislative, judicial and 
political powers. 
The Constitution established a presidential system of 
government. The President was to be nominated by the Party 
and elected by a plebiscite for a six-year term. The consti-
tution concentrated great authority in the head of state 
(Holt and Daly, 1979, 205). He could rule by decree and 
declare a state of emergency under which he assumed sweeping 
powers. Following an abortive coup in 1975, the Constitution 
was amended to give the President more powers - Articles 81 
and 82 of the Constitution. The amendments r e ndered inopera-
tive clauses of the Constitution which safeguarded civil and 
individual libertie s during emergency situations (Malwal, 
1981, 161). 
1. For the structure of the political system, see Appendix 3.1. 
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The Constitution vested legislative powers both in 
the Assembly and the President. The President could 
1 legislate by decree to be passed later by the Assembly. 
He could annul any bill passed by the Assembly, but the 
Assembly could, in theory, overrule his annulment if a 
two-thirds majority were against the~~e~-However, the 
structure of representation in the Assembly made a two-
thirds majority vote against the President very unlikely. 
He could dissolve the Assembly and call for a new election. 
Apart from emergency powers, his legislative powers were 
far greater than those of the Assembly. 
In his executive capacity the President was the head 
of the Executive. He had the power to appoint and remove 
ministers, who were accountable to him and not to the 
Assembly. However, the Assembly was allowed to question 
ministers and to force, by a two-thirds majority, a minister 
to submit his resignation, but it could not compel the Presi-
dent to accept that resignation. The President was the 
supreme commander of the army and the head of the civil ser-
vice. He had the power to appoint and remove officers of 
the army, senior officials in the public service and officers 
in the security forces. Except for two brief periods in 1970 
and 1976 the President assumed the premiership throughout 
the 1970s. 
1. The Assembly consisted of 250 members, 25 of whom were 
appointed by the President, 125 were elected directly by 
geographical constituencies, 70 were elected by functional 
and occupational associations, and 30 were selected by 
Provincial People's Councils. All candidates (up to 1978) 
must be approved by the Party. 
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Local government was another institution which was 
used extensively to promote the power of the President 
and the Executive. The 1971 local government reorganisa-
tion expanded dramatically the institutional structure 
of local government and increased its functions and powers. 1 
These new powers and functions were located in provincial 
councils, whose leaders - the commissioners - were personally 
appointed by the President and accountable to him. Within 
provincial councils, commissioners were granted veto powers 
over a number of decisions if they were judged to be con-
trary to the public interest or the general policy of the 
state. 2 
The Judiciary was directly responsible to the Presi-
dent. He appointed and removed the president and judges 
of the Supreme Court, the judges of the Courts of Appeal 
and judges of the other courts. Although theoretically 
independent, accountability to the President constrained 
judicial independence in practice. The membership of the 
Chief Justice and the President of the Supreme Court in the 
Party's Political Bureau weakened the argument that the 
judiciary was independent. 
1. The build up of the new structure of local government was 
completed in 1974. There were 3993 village councils, 737 
town section councils, 281 nomads councils, 78 market 
councils, 15 industrial area councils, 90 town councils, 
35 sub-province councils and 10 province executive councils. 
By contrast, the previous system of local government had 
a total of only eighty six town and rural councils. 
2. For critical assessment of the reorganisation of local 
government see Report of the Select Committee, National 
Assembly, 1976; Norris and Pickering 1980; Rondinelli, D., 
1981. 
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The fifth institution to be considered here is the 
Party - the SSU. Although students of government 
would not include political parties as government insti-
tutions, the role envisaged for the SSU in the regime's 
ideology, its heavy reliance on government sponsorship 
and its close involvement in the policy process made it 
more a parastatal agency than an autonomous political 
organisation. Conventional functions of interest aggre-
gation, interest articulation and mobilisation of public 
opinion usually associated with political parties appeared 
to be a secondary priority to the Party's involvement in 
public administration. 
The Party had a pyramidal structure that ran parallel 
to the structure of government. At the national level the 
Party had five institutions: the National Congress, the 
General Secretariat, the Central Committee, the Political 
Bureau, and the Presidency. 1 Representation in all these 
institutions was overwhelmingly influenced by the president 
2 
of the Party who was the President of the country. 
1. When the First National Congress of the Party was held in 
January 1974, there were 10 provincial units, 34 district 
units, 325 section units and 6,381 basic units of the SSU 
in the country. 
2. For instance, the National Congress consisted of the 
following categories: 
(a) Elected representatives of provincial conferences. 
(b) Members of the Central Committee, part of whom were 
appointed by the President. 
(c) Secretaries of the Party's specialised committees, who 
were directly appointed by the President. 
(d) Incumbents of constitutional bodies, all of whom were 
appointed by the President. 
(e ) Members of the Supreme Court, who were appointed by the 
President. 
(f) Representatives of the army, also were appointed by the 
President. 
(g) Ex-Officio members, and 
(h) Other members selected by the President who should not 
exceed 10% of the members of the Congress (SSU,l977, 
pp.49.50). 
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The influence of the President tended to increase 
at the highest organs of the Party. The significance of 
the sweeping powers of the leader of the Party, for this 
study, is that he was able to mobilise expert cadres 
from the state bureaucracy into the Party, through political 
pressure as well as by offering lucrative job opportunities. 
Apart from weakening the argument that there was popular 
representation through the Party this process helped to 
promote the influence of the Executive in the SSU. The 
implication was that the process of political decision-making 
in the Party was often dominated by members drawn from the 
civil service. 
3.3.3 The Institutional Practice 
Architects of the May regime institutions saw a strong 
pre sidency as the solution to the political instability 
experienced under the parliamentary system. Furthermore , 
given the role of the state in change envisaged in the 
regime's ideology, a strong presidency was seen a s neces-
sary for ensuring a continuity in planning and implementation 
of development. The assumption was that, policy would b e 
thoroughly debated in the Party and alternative policy options 
presen tedtothe Executive . The Assembly would check on the 
Executive 's performance and legislate measures required to 
execute policy. The Judiciary would, among other things, 
ensure that institutional practice did not contravene the 
provisions of the Constitution. 
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Institutional practice did not, however - in a number 
of significant cases - conform to the above arrangement. 
To have a brief look at institutional practice we will 
refer to the work of Malwal (1981) who was a prominent 
1 participant in these institutions during the 1970s. 
Despite the huge constitutional powers wielded by 
the President, he ignored, in many important situations, 
institutional rules and made decisions on matters of "far 
reaching consequence" without seeking the advice of those 
institutions most immediately concerned. Referring to 
specific cases, Malwal wrote: 
"It is not necessary to shuffle a whole cabinet 
in secrecy, or to appoint a member of the Central 
Committee of the SSU within one day, or even to 
announce a general amnesty ... without advance 
discussions in the political and constitutional 
institutions concerned" (ibid, 171). 
The President apparently did not like to abide by institu-
tional procedures. 
"President Nimeiri is not a bureaucrat, but a 
very strong-minded person who wants to see things 
done at once .•. he is interested in the accom-
plishment of things .•. ,and not in the methods 
used to accomplish them". (Ibid, 169, 165). 
The concentration of power in the Presidency gave 
patronage to the Executive and enabled it to overshadow 
other institutions. There was also another process of power 
1. B. Malwal was a member of the Political Bureau of the SSU 
and Minister of Culture and Information during the period 
1972-1977. 
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they have wielded for years and they have no desire to 
relinquish it ... " (Ibid, p.l69 emphasis added). At the 
level of national development policy, it was reported 
that some ministries, especially those with powerful 
ministers were taking unilateral action in executing 
development policy and even seeking external finance in 
their own way. This behaviour, argued the Director of 
the National Planning Commission, has partly led to a 
continuously widening gap between total commitment and 
available resources, (Abdel Wahab, 1976, in El-Hassan, 
19 7 6 1 pp • 2 30 1 2 3 3) o 
We deduce both from the formal arrangement of the 
state apparatus and the institutional practice that power 
was concentrated in specific institutions and that its 
exercise was dependent on coalitions and alliances obtain-
ing in those institutions. The process of policy making 
is expected to follow closely the pattern of po\;er distri-
bution within and between these institutions. Without 
overlooking the impact of broad "structural" constraints 
on policy direction, the social character of dominant power 
coalitions within the state apparatus is seen here as 
significantly important for understanding the immediate 
factors underlying certain policy approaches and for expli-
cating possible linkages between policy formation and 
specific social interests. In the following part we examine 
the social character of dominant state institutions and 
attempt to relate it to evolving policy approaches. 
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3.3.4 The Social Character of the State Apparatus 
The social composition of leading state institutions 
in Sudan contrasted markedly between the pre- and post-1969 
periods. The majority of state top functionaries under 
the first military rule were military officers (Holt and 
Daly, op.cit., p.l71). During the parliamentary period 
1956-58, 1964-69 the lawyer/businessman stereotype was 
dominant (Nugdallah, 1973, Ch.6). 
The social character of the May regime was different. 
Seen against the backdrop of the regime's ideology, the 
state's internal structure pre-
supposed the following principles:-
(a} The adopted model of social change would 
require placing of technical cadres in the 
leadership of policy-making agencies. 
(b) Popular participation envisaged in the regime's 
ideology must be subordinated and confined to 
non-policy related agencies. 
(c) A system of cooption should be maintained to 
facilitate the incorporation of those social 
sectors whose support/acquiescence might be 
necessary. 
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These principles characterised more or less the 
process of political recruitment under the May regime. 
I ncumbents of senior state institutions can be classified 
into three main categories on the basis of occupation 
and relative proximity to the process of policy-formation. 
The first category can be labelled the "university group". 
Its members mostly came from universities or international 
organisations. Most of them were drawn 
"from an academic background and held distin-
guished academic qualifications. The government 
ministers in the group are mostly specialists 
in the field relevant to their ministries; many 
have spent a long time outside Sudan working for 
a variety of international bodies .•. " (Niblock, 
op.cit., 415). 
The second category included bureaucrats who, having identi-
fied with the new regime, held senior political position 
after a fairly long care er in the civil or military service. 
The third category is a residual one, including lawyers and 
businessmen. 
The lawyer/businessman cabinet image which prevailed 
during the parliamentary period was replaced, under the May 
regime, by a coalition of military and civilian bureaucrats 
and academics and international managers. Within this 
power-coalition, we propose that a "techno-bureaucratic" 
g r o up was clearly d ominant, as far as policy forma tion was 
concerned. In what f o llo ws,we define the term technocracy, 
outline the circumstances which fostered its rise in the 
Suda n and consider the presence of technocrats in the May 
- 143 -
regime. 
(a)"Technocracy" 
Our use of the term "technocrat" draws on a body of 
writings on technocracy in Europe and Latin America. In 
order to clarify the circumstances which fostered the 
rise of technocracy to political power in the Sudan we 
shall refer first to the historical experience of Europe. 
The early development of the concept of "technocracy" 
can be traced back to the intellectual doctrines of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, notably the Saint 
Simonian school which was in favour of government by tech-
nologists (Meynaud 1968, pp.l44-199). However, the term 
"technocracy" was first coined in the USA after the First 
World War to describe a system of economic thought inspired 
by the kind of rational analysis at the basis of physical 
sciences ( ibid) . During the 1960s the term gained '"ider 
currency in France and used by writers such as Meynaud (1968) 
to argue that "real power" had shifted from the elected 
representatives to the technical experts (Bullock and 
Stallybrass, 1977, 625). The term seems, therefore, to have 
gained various meanings at different times. In contemporary 
literature "technocracy" appears to denote many different 
things: 
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"a new social group, perhaps even a new ruling 
group, a new style of rule, a new dominant 
ideology and even a new phase of social organ-
isation" (Larson, M, 1972/73, p.l). 
In a historical perspective, the rise of "technocracy" 
has been associated with the convergence of two processes: 
the growth of industrial capitalism and the correlated 
advance of functional rationality and; the concentration 
and centralisation of power in society (ibid, p.ll). Ration-
ality is a fundamental basis of 11 technocracy". For Max 
Weber,the process of rationalisation had three principal 
and interconnected historical expressions: industrial 
capitalism, bureaucratic domination and modern science. 
(Ibid, p.2). It appears, therefore, that the historical 
process underlying the growth of rationalisation constituted 
a favourable condition for the rise of technocracy in the 
West. 
Besides these structural aspects, "technocracy" is seen 
to involve an ideological aspect (ibid, p.7). The intro-
duction of "technical rationality", characteristic of aca-
demic and scientific work, into the political process - as 
technical experts assume political office - is seen to lend 
legitimacy to purely political decisions and provide a cloak 
of "ideological" support to the "structure of domination". 
From the Western historical experience, the rise of 
technocracy can, therefore, be associated with three aspects: 
a change in the structure of production and growth of scient!-
fi e knowledge, bureaucratisation, and centralisation of power 
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in society. However, there are important variations 
between Western historical experience and the complex 
of economic and political institutions currently obtain-
ing in Third World countries. 
A number of studies have noted the rise of techno-
cracy in Third World countries, particularly in Latin 
America (eg. Larson, op.cit., Collins, C. ,1982, O'Donnell 
1973). Emergence of technocracy in these countries was 
seen to correspond to a new phase in relations of depend-
ence with dominant world economies (Larson, op.cit., 
p.lO). Describing the formation of technocratic roles in 
Brazil, O'Donnell (1973) wrote: 
"Larger organisations engaged in more complex 
production, the effects of industrialisation 
upon communications, marketing, publicity and 
information-processing services, as well as 
the need for coordination of more diversified 
social units and activities - all require an 
increasing "input" of persons who have gone 
through prolonged training in techniques of 
production, planning and control" {O'Donnell, 
quoted in Collins, 1982, p.l23). 
In addition to the impact of international capital 
on local production structures, the rise of technocracy 
also relates to internal balance of power and inte rests 
in each country. Existence of a 11 Strong 11 state seems to 
represent an important condition for the rise of techno-
cracy. However, a 11 Strong 11 state d oes not necessarily 
presuppose a change in the internal structure of produc-
tion as in the case of Latin American countries. While 
change in production structures generates technocratic 
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roles the rise of technocrats to political power in the 
Third World may be closely associated with changes in the 
balance of political power. 
(b) The Rise of Technocracy in the Sudan 
In Sudan "technocracy" may be seen as a political trend 
arising not so much from changes in the structure of the 
economy as from changes in the structure of political power, 
resulting in new social alliances within the "structure of 
domination". Its emergence during the early 1970s can be 
related to three interrelated developments: 
First, it has to be seen in relation to the political 
circumstances preceding the inception of the May regime in 
1969. The period 1965-69 was marked by continuous political 
instability and factional disputes within the dominant 
parties. The Umma Party (UP) - the representative of the 
agro-commercial business -split into two factions in 1966. 1 
The NUP and the PDP merged into one party, the National 
Democratic Party (NDP) in 1968. They exploited the split 
in the UP, shifting alliance from one faction to the other. 
1. One faction was led by Al-Sadig Al-Mahdi and advocated 
reforming the party to broaden its base of political support; 
the other faction was led by his uncle, Al-Hadi,the patron 
of the party, who opposed the proposed reform. The split 
reflected a struggle between the religious leaders repre-
sented by Al-Mahdi family and the commercial bourgeoisie 
and other petty bourgeoisie who demanded more participation 
in the party (Khalafalla, E., 1981, p.69). 
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The process of political restructuring was further 
accentuated by the emergence of regional political group-
ings. In the Red Sea Hills of eastern Sudan, the Beja 
Congress was formed; in western Sudan the Nuba Mountains 
Federation was created. The emergence of these organisa-
tions,together with the southern groupings endangered the 
rural vote of the dominant parties and heightened contest 
among the latter parties to recruit the support of regional 
associations. 
At another plane, the period 1965-69 witnessed a tense 
confrontation between the three dominant parties and the 
radical movement, led by the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP). 
The SCP emerged after 1964 October "revolution" with a good 
support among the urban proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie. 1 
The UP, NUP and the Moslem Brotherhood passed a bill in the 
Parliament in November 1965 banning the SCP and unseating 
its members in Parliament, on the ground that Marxist doc-
trines were anti-Islamic. 2 
The political situation was further compounded by the 
escalation of the civil war in the south. There was a 
mounting frustration among the lower and middle classes, 
1. In the 1965 Parliamentary 
supported candidates were 
Graduates Constituencies. 
votes (ibid, p.74). 
elections eleven communist-
elected out of the 1 5 special 
The SCP received 17.5% o f all 
2. The Supreme court ruled in December 1966, that the 
decision of banning the SCP was unconstitutional, but the 
Pa rliament proceeded with the ban, leading to a deep rift 
between the Judiciary and the Parliament. 
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with political factionalism, and a declining faith in 
party politics. 1 The scene was set for the growth of an 
ideology that saw politics and conflict as irrational 
and irrelevant to problems of development and modernisa-
tion. Our earlier exposition of the main themes in the 
May ideology revealed this trend of thinking. 
Second, the political turbulence reflected negatively 
on the economy. The continuous change of governments 
undermined the capacity of the state to effectively manage 
the economy. The drain on resources by the civil war in 
the south, consuming 20-30% of the budget, and the decline 
in foreign aid and loans after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War 
led to chronic budget deficit. The government resorted to 
borrowing from local banks, and internal borrowing soared 
from $11 million in 1966 to $131 million in 1969 (Collins, 
c.' 1976, p.l2). 
The rate of national and public investment declined 
during the period 1965-69. Gross Domestic Fixed Capital 
Formation dropped from 15.8% of GDP in 1964/65 to 12.1% 
2 in 1968/69 (Hamid, G., 1977, p.l35). The implication was 
1. As Abdel-Rahim noted, there "was a state of general 
disillusionment in which the main topic for consideration 
in clubs, private discussions and even university tutorials, 
was the idea that the question for the Sudanese people was 
no longer whether or not the existing set up could ever 
be saved but what the alternative should be .. (Abdel-Rahim, 
M., 1978, p.23). 
2. It was less than the 15% minimum recommended by the UN 
for serious development (ibid). 
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a slowing down of capital accumulation (Khalafalla, op.cit., 
p.69). Obviously, the state suffered from two weaknesses 
typical of competitive accumulation: 
"first, the economic weakness of being unable 
to produce the necessary inputs of accumulation 
through accumulation itself; and second, the 
weakness that the ruling class ... is unable to 
develop a class consciousness containing consented 
and workable directives as to how the state should 
operate" (Offe, C., 1975, p.l34). 
Although the bour~ois-dominated parties controlled 
the state they were unwilling to operate it in the collective 
interest of the capitalist classes. This is partly because 
the dominant economic interests were spread over many poli-
tical parties and each fraction of capital strived to main-
t . 't . . t t 1 a1n 1 s own econom1c 1n eres s. The national bourgeoisie 
was not united in a single party in order to develop a policy 
that would secure its collective economic interest. There 
was, therefore, a need for a strong organisation which would 
synthesise the common interests of the capitalist class; 
strong enough to outweigh the political muscle of individual 
factions of capital and force them to comply to imperatives 
of the common interest of capitalist class. There was a 
need for a strong state which would halt the slowing down 
of the accumulation process and make a strategic decision 
to accelerate capital accumulation. But to provide these 
conditions the leadership of the state must not come from 
the bourgeois classes (Al-Battahani, A., 1976, p.66). The 
scene was therefore set for the emergence of a strong 
1. We noted the intra-bourgeois rivalries in Ch.2, Sect ion 
2.3.3. (a). 
- 150 -
authoritarian state in 1969 led by petty bourgeois army 
officers and civil servants. 
Third, the rise of technocracy in the Sudan can also 
be related to the problem of legitimacy which the May 
regime had to confront during its first three years in 
o ffice. Having been cut off both from the Right - in 
1970 - and from the Left - in 1971 - the regime had to 
search for an alternative ideological platform. Techno-
cracy was perceived by the May regime as an apolitical 
po licy approach which would appeal to a wider section of 
the middle and lower classes, under the notions of develop-
ment and national unity. It would also be instrumental in 
soliciting the support of foreign capital in the wake of 
the "investment strike" by the indigenous capital during 
the early 1970s. 
1 Sudanese Technocrats 
Two categories of technocrats in the May regime can 
be identified. The first category is the "university group". 
This group was technical in its pro fessional orientation in 
the sense that its tra ining and occupational practice has 
bee n based on a technical or scientific basis, whether in 
n a tural or social sciences. This group is usually present 
1 . I t must be noted tha t the term "technocrats" is use d here 
loosely as members of this group ma y not think o f them-
selves as belonging together, and by the virtue o f their 
place in the social structure they are bound to adopt 
different views on various issues. 
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in academic institutions, international specialist organ-
isations and few specialised public and private agencies 
in Sudan. The presence of members of this group in 
government is seen to be based primarily on their expert 
knowledge and technical know-how. 
Although some members of this group might have held 
political views similar to those advocated by the May 
regime, nevertheless, they primarily saw themselves as 
technical experts in the first place. Most of them would 
consider themselves as politically neutral. Niblock noted 
that a number of them had been together as students at the 
University of Khartoum, and in 1955/56 had belonged to the 
"Neutralist Block 11 which had sought to occupy the middle 
ground between right and left in the Students' Union poli-
tics (Niblock, op.cit., p.415). Another younger generation 
of the group were members of the "Socialist Union 11 , a centre-
left student group in the University of Khartoum during the 
1960s; most of the leaders of the "Socialist Union" became 
prominent figures in the May regime. 
A common ground for the "university group" is what 
Larson (1972/73) noted that, 
"They view themselves as sharing an objective 
and universal rationality based on superior 
knowledge. Their concept of reason stands 
above political lines and, in certain cases, 
conflicts with the politicians' criteria for 
decision making" (Larson, i·I. 1972/73, p.l9). 
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The tendency towards involving the "university group" 
in government is a recent development in the recruitment 
o f political elite in the Sudan, started by the May regime. 
Al though their involvement with the regime followed closely 
the deterioration in relations between the regime and the 
SCP, their presence did not become conspicuous until the 
post-1971 period as the regime's new institutions were set 
up. 
During the period 1969-85, 28 university lecturers 
took ministerial posts in the national and regional govern-
ments. The majority came from the Faculties of Agriculture 
1 
and Arts, University of Khartoum. While the agricultural-
ist consistently supplied ministers and deputy ministers 
for Agriculture, Arts lecturers mostly took senior posts 
in the Presidency and in the Party. 
A group of similar orientation to university l e cturers 
was that o f international managers. We found that a bout 
t e n of the ministers of the May regime worked previously 
f or interna tional organisations and multinational c ompanies. 
These inclu ded the IMF, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, Arab Le a gue, 
Afri c an Development Bank and priva t e firms in the UK and 
Kuwait. 
The second category of techno cra ts consiste d of civil 
s e r vants a nd army officers. Like the f ormer cate gory, this 
group also underwent unive rsity or college training. But 
1 . 32 % came from Agriculture, 22% Arts, 14 % Veterinary, 11% 
Eng ineering, 2% Economics , 2% Law and 2% Medicine. 
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unlike it, it worked in bureaucratic organisations for 
a reasonable length of time. Though it would think of 
itself, like the former category, as politically neutral, 
it was more politicised in outlook and orientation than 
its predecessors of the 1950s and 1960s who had been 
brought up under colonial notions of a non-political public 
service. In its political persuasion it identified more 
with wider nationalist issues such as national unity and 
development than with narrow political ideologies. 
The presence of both categories of technocrats in 
government was, more or less, stable during the 1970s, 
as the following table illustrates. The share of civil 
servants in junior ministerial posts increased, however, 
in the late 1970s. Thus, in 1981 there were eleven state 
ministers, eight of whom were civil servants, two from 
university and one from the military. 
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Table 3.1 Previous Occupations of the Members of 
Cabinet and Political Bureau in 1974 
and 1981 
Occupational Cabinet Political Bureau 
Groups 1974 1981 1974 1981 
Militarymen 5 6 5 5 
"University Group" 6 6 4 4 
Civil Servants 3 5 4 3 
Lawyers 2 2 3 
Politicians 2 2 
Businessmen 1 1 1 
Total 15 20 18 17 
Sources: The Middle East and Africa, 1974/75 pp.642,643, 
and 1981/82, pp.716,717; and biographies of 
ministers compiled by the writer. 
3.3.5 Conclusion 
This section focused on the institutional structure 
of the state in the Sudan. We examined two features of the 
reorganisation of the state apparatus.during the 1970s. 
First we noted the concentration of power in the Executive 
and the Presidency. Institutional practice indicated that 
certain power-coalitions within the Executive were dominating 
the process of policy formation. Second, we attempted to 
analyse the social character of the state's dominant insti-
tutions. In contrast to previous regimes, technocrats were 
significant at the level of policy formation during the 
19 70s. It must be stressed, however, that their prominence 
should not imply that they had "autonomous" power in relation 
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to dominant economic interests. The considerable power 
of the President was an important limitation on techno-
crats. Furthermore, legitimacy needs of the regime neces-
sitated, at times, departure from technocratic policy pre-
scriptions, leading at times to cabinet reshuffles. The 
significance of the ascendancy of Sudanese technocrats 
to political power is better comprehended in relation to 
the process of policy formation, policy models adopted and 
the social character of that policy. The relation between 
technocracy and policy formation is examined in the follow-
ing section. 
3.4 TECHNOCRACY AND POLICY FORMATION 
3.4.1 General 
Our approach for understanding the process of policy 
formation and its impact on the social content of policy 
centres mainly on analysis of the institutional structure 
and its mode of operation. The pattern of institutional 
arrangement and the social character of major policy insti-
tutions signify, for this study, a strong presence of a 
"technocratic 11 policy model in the Sudan during the 1970s. 
In this section we trace, broadly, the technocratic influ-
ence on the pattern of economic planning in Sudan. An 
exposition of the notion of "rationality" adopted in the 
technocratic planning model should help us in understanding 
the social character of planning policy. The technocratic 
policy model is seen to have biased socio-economic programmes 
to the interest of a narrow sector of the population to the 
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detriment of wider sectors in urban and rural areas. The 
social impact of this pattern of planning is discussed 
in Chapters Four, Five and Six. 
We defined in the preceding section the meaning of 
technocracy adopted in this study and outlined the histori-
cal context for its rise. The significance of technocracy 
for policy formation may be examined by considering basic 
elements in technocratic thinking in relation to substantive 
policy areas. The next step will be to assess how far 
these e l ements informed the process of policy formation. 
Studying writings of three Brazilian technocrats, Collins 
(1982) identified the following as recurring themes in tech-
nocratic thought: 
(a) Emphasis on "development" as the taken-for-granted 
ultimate goal of society, with minimal considera-
tion for socio-political cost, conflict, moral 
questions and ideology. 
(b) A recog nition that the state has a fundamental 
role in achiev ing the afo resaid objective o f 
development. 
(c) A belief in functio nal r a tionality as c ombining 
substa ntive rationality. 
{d) Planning is viewed as a r a tional necessity of 
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government action. 
(e) Political stability is seen as a sine qua non 
for effective planning and implementation of 
development (Collins, op.cit. pp.l25-136) . 1 
These themes bear close resemblance to elements of the 
ideology of the May regime we discussed above. Emphasis on 
development, to be carried out through central planning, 
under conditions of political stability and national unity, 
was the dominant feature of state policy in Sudan during 
the 1970s. The notion of rationality implicit in planning 
activity is taken for granted, in technocratic thinking, as 
instrumental to the effective realisation of developmental 
goals. However, a universal relevance of this notion of 
rationality to the formulation of broad objectives of social 
change has yet to be established. 
Two categories of rationality were identified in the 
literature: functional rationality and substantive ration-
ality. {Diesing, P., mentioned by Larson, 1972/73, p.3). 
The former category refers to techniques and processes of 
action, the latter is concerned with the content of final 
goals and societal objectives. Rationality, however, 
possesses a contradictory element in the sense that func-
tional rationality could work against substantive rational-
ity. Weber, for instance, saw technical rationality as 
inevitably contradicting substantive equality and substantive 
1. Cf. Ilchman's analysis, me ntioned above, Chapter 1, 
Section 1.2.3(b). 
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democracy (Larson, op. ci t. , p. 3) • K ~1annheim expressed this 
contradiction in the following way:-
"(I~dustrial rationalisation served to increase 
functional rationality ... but offered far less 
scope for the development of substantial rational-
ity in the sense of the capacity of independent 
judgement •.• (F)unctional rationalisation is, in 
its very nature, bound to deprive the average 
individual of thought, insight and responsibility 
and to transform these capacities to the indivi-
duals who direct the process of rationalisation". 
(Ibid, p.4, emphasis in original). 
The root of this contradiction partly lies in that 
certain societal goals and values such as equality and 
social justice do not meet the specific requirements of 
t h . 1 t' 1' 1 ec n1ca ra 1ona 1ty. The problem arises when, in the 
absence of an objective rationalisation of societal goals, 
instrumental strategies based on technical criteria of 
rationality, become goals in themselves. As a consequence, 
functional rationality constitutes the basis for setting 
up goals of public policy, hence substituting for sub-
stantive rationality. This substitution process is likely 
to become more pronounced as technocratic elements assume 
a central role in policy formation. But technocratic 
involvement in the policy process involves two contradict-
ory dimensions as we noted earlier: 
1. One way to overcome this contradiction and approac h 
substantive rationality in the formulation of societa l 
goals and objectives may be through removing restrictions 
on communications. As Habermas (1970) put it:-
"Public, unrestricted discussion, free from domination, 
of the suitability of action orientating principles •.. 
at all levels of political and repoliticised decision-
making processes is the only medium in which anything 
like "rationalisation" is possible". (quoted in Hearn, 
OJ2. ci t. , p. 4 4) . 
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"On the one hand, the immediate efficiency of 
the technique is based on growing specialisation; 
on the other hand, the type of expertise called 
for ... is not specialised but functionally poly-
valent ... (and) .•. extend(ing) ... over the 
broad range of ... policy planning". (Larson,op.cit., p.ll) 
emphasis in original). 
In considering issues of a socio-economic and political 
nature policy models must go beyond the bounds of functional 
rationality, simply because the bases of technical rational-
ity are too narrow to deal with wider social issues. However, 
in the absence of an alternative policy model and by the 
nature of their orientations and training, technocrats tend 
to treat substantive policy areas using models based on 
functional or technical rationality. One implication of 
this policy approach is that socio-economic and political 
issues are dealt with to the extent that they lend them-
selves to technical treatment. This is because prevailing 
models were unable to assign appropriate weights for social 
factors such as asset and income distribution, balanced 
regional development, social mobility etc. (Thavaraj, M., 
1984, p.526). Those policy problems which do not fit into 
the technocratic model are likely to be considered residual 
issues and therefore assume secondary importance in the 
planning process. 1 Technical terms like 'natural advantage', 
~bso~ive capacity', 'critical thresholds' a nd 'rates of 
growth' were often used to explain away the regional dis-
crepancies created by development (Ilchman, 1972, p.244). 
Another implication of the technocratic policy model is that 
1. The above approach to planning was reportedly centra l t o 
the "ideology" of planners in the Third World (eg. see 
Chapter One, Section (1.2.3. (b)). 
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it does not encou•rage active participation by the people 
concerned in plan preparation and implementation, leading 
often to a gap in communication between planners and the 
people for whom development is being initiated. 
3.4,2 A New Policy Approach 
We noted in the second section of this chapter 
emphasis in the May regime ideology on societal consensus 
and dismissal of politics and ideology as irrational. The 
tendency was to promote planning as an alternative method 
of effecting change. A change in the mode of opera tion of 
the institutional structure of the state was taking place 
from the early 1970s. It was manifested in two processes:-
(i) In contrast to a political model of policy 
formation which prevailed during the parlia-
mentary period a technocratic mddel was 
adopted by the May regime. In the latter 
policy model, technical and scientific 
approaches to planning were to constitute 
the basis of policy formation. Both in the 
National Charter and the Constitution clear 
emphases were laid on scientific planning 
and, 
"the role of scientific research, 
universities and higher institutes 
in providing frameworks for economic 
projects ... (and) applying science 
in all fields of production". 
(National Charte r, op . cit., pp.43,44). 
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The institutional dimension of this shift in 
policy approach was soon reflected in the 
formation, for the first time in the modern 
history of the Sudan, of a wide network of 
planning organs (see Diagram 3.1). At the 
highest level of the state, there was a 
Supreme Council for Planning under the direct 
supervision of the President and responsible 
for setting the broad planning objectives. 
A National Planning Organisation, an advisory 
political body, was to a scertain views of the 
different sections of the population in rela-
tion to major development objectives. The 
Ministry of Planning, formed as early as 1969, 
was in charge of administering and coo rdina ting 
the planning and implementation of projects. 
The National Planning Commission, formed in 
1971, was responsible for detailed programming 
of na tional planning objectives int o a ctual 
projects. Below this level, there was a myria d 
of planning units in various ministries and 
de partments at central, regional and loca l leve ls. 
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Diagram 3.1 The Institutional Structure of National 
Planning 1969-1979 
Planning Unit Institutional Level 
1. Supreme Planning Council Presidency 
2. National Planning Organisation A nationwide political 
body 
3. Ministry of Planning Central Government 
4. National Planning Commission Administrative Unit of 
Central Government 
5. Planning units in central, Administrative units 
regional and local departments 
The formation of this planning network fostered 
a surge of technocratic roles at various insti-
tutional levels of the state hierarchy. Emphasis 
in development policy on scientific planning and 
therefore the need for planning expertise meant 
that technical cadres with high academic quali-
fications assumed more significance in the process 
of policy formation. This tendency was reflected 
in the concentration of highly qualified personnel 
in the National Planning Commission, the key 
planning institution, as Appendix 3.3 illustrate s. 
The import of the new policy approach was the 
centralisation of the planning process and the 
increasing use of "rational" planning systems in 
the policy process (e.g. see Rondinelli, 1982) . 1 
l. For the trend toward centralisation in the public indus-
trial sector, see Rashid, s., in El-Hassan, 1977, pp.l06, 
107. 
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Shortly we will examine the impact of the new 
policy model on economic planning. 
(ii) Another manifestation of the change in the 
mode of operation of the state was the expand-
ing involvemant of the state in the economy 
since the early 1970s and hence the increasing 
need for central planning. In contrast to the 
pre-1969 regime, the growth of the public 
sector under the May regime, whether measured 
by the size of public sector employees, or by 
the magnitude of public sector spending or by 
the extent of government involvement in total 
economic activity, was considerable. We already 
outlined in Chapter Two, Section 2.2.3(b), the 
extent of public sector's involvement in the 
economy. (See also Appendix 3.2). 
One implication of this quantitative expansion 
of the state sector was the spread of bureaucratic 
forms of (large-scale) organisation as the princi-
pal instrument for implementing development and 
change. This implementation strategy came to 
influence the process of policy planning, orien-
tating it towards large-scale production units, 
the relevance of which to certain socio-economic 
problems is questionable, as we explain below. 
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To recapitulate, we noted above the basic elements 
of technocratic thought and then criticised the notion 
of rationality employed in the technocratic policy model. 
The shift in Sudan towards a technocratic policy model 
was pointed out. In the remaining part of this chapter 
we examine briefly the impact of this policy strategy 
on the pattern of economic planning in the Sudan during 
t he 1970s. 
3.4.3 Economic Planning 
We already underlined in Chapter Two the structural 
imbalance in the Sudanese economy. This imbalance is 
closely reflected in the regional distribution of develop-
ment. More than 90% of the irrigated land is in Kassala 
and the former Blue Nile provinces (of central Sudan); 
almost 90% of mechanised farming takes place in these 
provinces (ILO, 1976, p.ll). Elsewhere the modernisation 
of agriculture has been barely felt, leav ing regions of 
western and southern Sudan with poor peasant economies. 
Moreover, the provision of public services such as educa-
tion, health, power and transport has also been concentrated 
in the higher income areas, thereby accentuating the dis-
parity (ibid). 
This pattern of investme nt distribution is originally 
inherited from the second colonial state. Yet, it has been 
substantially consolidated under the post-colonial govern-
ments.1 The early 1970s saw the propagation of the idea of 
1 . A note on these Development Plans is available in 
Appendix 2 .2. 
- 165 -
Sudan becoming a "bread-baskee' for the Arab world, by 
blending Arab money, western technology and Sudan's 
natural and human resources. This idea was developed in 
the Extended Five Year Plan, 1970-77, and subsequently 
elaborated in the Six Year Plan, 1977/78-1982/83. However, 
underlying planning philosophy which would bring about 
perceived economic change was not questioned. Assumptions 
of the prevailing model of economic planning were taken 
for granted. The model underlying this pattern of economic 
planning has two principal characteristics relevant for 
our analysis. These are: 
(a) the assumption of the existence of a dual economy 
and the association of development with the expansion 
of "modern" sector into peasant economy, and, 
(b) emphasis on the use of large-scale production units 
to modernise the "traditional" sector. 
These two aspects bear close affinity to elements of tech-
nocratic thinking discussed earlier, as we explain below. 
(a) The Concept of Development 
Economic policy in the Sudan identified development 
as the progressive expansion of the "modern" sector of 
agriculture. According to the Six Year Plan 1977/78-
19 82/8 3, "modern" agriculture, providing more than half of 
the country's agricultural production, was more productive 
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than "traditional" agriculture and capable of eff 
utilisation of investment. (Ibid, Vol.2, p.36). 
The linkages between the two parts of the ec 
were considered to be weak as in the theory of th 
istic economy which assumes the existence of two 
less separate economies (Oesterdiefkhoff and Wohl 
1983, p.37). However, the assumption of weak lin 
characteristic of Sudanese development planning, 
questionable. There are important links between 
sectors, relating to labour, trade and production 
cesses, which undermine the dualist thesis. 
Historically, the "traditional" sector suppl 
seasonal labour to irrigated agriculture in centr 
(M. El-A.G. El-Din, 1978). Furthermore, the "tra 
sector was made to bear the costs of maintaining 
er's family, providing a replacement for him when 
and absorbing him when he became ill, unemployed 
(O'Brien, 1979, p.l66). The social expenditure p 
the "traditional" sector for the reproduction of 
the "modern .. sector represents a transfer of valu 
former sector to the latter. 
The two sectors are also linked together thr 
and production processes. For instance, the live 
produced in the "traditional" sector contributed 
9.9 % of the total GDP and 25.3% of the agricultur 
product (Mahmoud, 1981, p.l3). Trade in meat and 
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put at more than £S 120 million annually. The 
in the "traditional" sector were integrated in 
"modern" sector of the economy through commerci 
and production for exchange as well as through 
on animals and crops (ibid, p.lS). Against t:t 
of physical output of all major exports from tr 
"modern" sector of agriculture during the 1970!: 
portionate contribution of the "traditional" SF 
the total value of exports has increased. ThuE 
sesame and livestock - products largely of the 
sector - contributed almost 50% of the total vc 
exports during the period 1974-1981 (ROAPE,l98~ 
What emerges from the concept of developmE 
in Sudanese development planning is that the ma 
economic growth in the "modern" sector of the e 
However, development as a process is not synon~ 
economic growth (Colman and Nixon, 1978, p.S). 
ceivable that average GNP, as an indicator of e 
might rise, while at the same time income ineq~ 
and negative progress is made to other developn 
It may be argued that economic growth can 
through the "traditional" sector. Following it 
Sudan, the ILO argued that traditional agricult 
animal husbandry were capable, in the long tern 
returns to investment than either mechanised re 
gated agriculture (1976). 1 
1. For a useful comparison of productivity in t 
see J. O'Brien, 1978. 
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Emphasis on economic growth and down-playi: 
development goals such as social equality and e1 
security are notable characteristics of technoc: 
ing. This attitude can be partly related to thE 
their method of analysis, being based on technic 
ity. Mostly planners have been trained economi! 
discipline is to keep non-economic factors outs: 
purview of analysis (Thavaraj, op.cit). But it 
be argued that personal convenience may underly 
concern for economic growth. Shepherd suggestec 
Sudanese bureaucracy preferred investment in la: 
irrigated farming in central Sudan because it w< 
source for revenue when compared with the diffi< 
taxing the peasant produce in western and southE 
(Shepherd, 1982, p.4). Imperatives of the techr 
model and personal interest may reinforce each c 
favour of economic growth . 
(b) The Use of La rge Scale Produc tio n Unit~ 
Development policy in the Sudan has been er 
by the wide use of large-scale public sector ors 
for implementing development programmes. We all 
to this trend in Chapter Two. Although the use 
of implementation strategy in agriculture achie\ 
of "success" in central Sudan, its relevan ce to 
the peasant economy in western Sudan has been q~ 
Given adequate evidence for its failure in weste 
continued recurrence of this implementation stra 
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partly explained by a strong presence of technocratic 
elements in the planning machinery, whose interests are 
served by this type of implementation arrangement. 1 
The origin of large-scale production units in the 
Sudan goes back to colonial agricultural policy. Outside 
the general administration, finance and service sectors, 
the public corporation became the dominant implementation 
strategy in central Sudan, where agricultural investment 
has been concentrated. The association between the public 
corporation and agricultural investment was consolidated 
in the 1960s with the increase of acreage in the Gezira 
project, the construction of the Khashm Al-Girba Scheme 
and the establishment of the public corporation of Agri-
cultural Production in 1967. A major boost to large-scale 
production units, however, came in the 1970s as the public 
sector involvement in the economy increased dramatically 
under the Five Year and the Six Year Plans. 
The relevance of this type of production system to 
the peasant economy in western Sudan was found neither 
ecologically desirable nor technically suitable. (A dams 
and Howell, 1979, p.Sll). Suitability of soil, land-use 
patterns and costly technical inputs constituted important 
barriers against replicating large-scale production units 
in western Sudan. For the government, however, modernising 
1. Other interests behind development of large-scale pro-
duction units include agro-commercial classes in mechanised 
farming and international aid agencies (see Shepherd, 1983, 
pp.300,301). 
- 170 -
"traditional .. sector meant constructing large-scale 
projects to mechanise 11 traditional,. agriculture, the 
establishment of modern ranches, the establishment of 
large-scale agricultural cooperatives and the develop-
ment of close relations between "modern,. agricultural 
schemes and neighbouring "traditional., agricultural 
areas (Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83). 
It is suggested that the persistence of this policy 
approach despite its obvious limitations had particular 
professional and career roots (Adams and Howell, op.cit., 
p.516). Three main factors can be identified: 
First, the historical bias of development towards 
large-scale irrigated agriculture in central Sudan struc-
tured policy planning towards export-crop production and 
hence gave the Ministry of Agriculture an important leverage 
in development policy. Early 11 development units" which 
guided development policy in the early 1950s were located 
in the Ministries of Finance, Irrigation and Agriculture 
{Abdel-Wahab, op.cit., p.220). This institutional arrange-
ment must have been a strong influence on the agenda of 
development policy, leaning it towards export-oriented irri-
gated agriculture. By the t~e the Ten Year Plan 1961-1971 
had been promulgated the Ministry of Agriculture was already 
an influential institution in national planning. The heavy 
reliance of the country on cotton for its foreign earnings 
ensured the importance of that institution. 
second, the career structure in the Ministry of Agri-
culture was leaning towards those trained in irrigated cash-
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crop farming and related fields. Promotion and lucrative 
secondment were going to those who remained nearest the 
professional network based on the ministry and the major 
schemes such as Gezira and Rahad (Adam and Howell, op.cit., 
p.517). By contrast law career status was accorded to 
general agricultural service in the ministry. Thus resource 
management and rural development planning were accorded a 
relatively low priority, as against crop science and agri-
cultural engineering (ibid). 
Third, the bias towards irrigated agriculture reflected 
on patterns of training and research in agriculture. While 
the Sudan has one of the best trained cadres of senior 
agricultural staff in Africa, few of them worked in western 
l provinces (Howell, J., 1977, p.lOS). In the Gezira Scheme 
and Research Station alone there were fifty Ph.D. holders 
in agriculture in the mid-l970s, mostly trained in the needs 
and problems of irrigated agriculture. Thus, agricultural 
research mainly developed in r esponse to the needs of irri-
gated cash-crop farming and its results have predominantly 
benefited the "modern sector'' (ILO, op.cit., p.38). On the 
other hand, scant research was available on ''traditional " 
agriculture. Consultants on the Southern Darfur Development 
Plan have reported that a review of hundreds of research 
results in the Sudan have turned up nothing relevant to the 
l. Agricultural research in Suda n dates back to 1902. Most 
of the research is under the control of the Agricultural 
Research Corporation (ARC) . By 1979 the ARC had 164 
research scientists with Ph.D. or M.Sc. degrees, 139 
assistant resear c h scientists (B.Sc. l evels), 625 technicians 
and 4,000 permanent labourers (FAO, 1982, p.78). 
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problems of ,. traditional" farming in that province ( ibid) . 
Training and research orientations were, therefore, 
another significant factor biasing policy structures 
towards irrigated agriculture and implementation strate-
gies developed in central Sudan. 
It is obvious, therefore, that, although the bias 
towards large-scale production units had its origin in 
colonial agricultural policy, it was progressively consoli-
dated through technocratic practice both at levels of 
planning models and organisational strategies of implemen-
tation. While dependence on cotton as a major export crop 
constituted a major "structural" limitation on alternative 
production systems, the Ministry of Agriculture and related 
departments, with their expert cadres, were instrumental 
in perpetuating the use of large-scale production units in 
implementing development programmes directed towards the 
peasant economy in western Sudan. 
3.4.4 Conclusion 
Our central concern in this section was the impact of 
technocracy on policy formation. We outlined first what 
might be the basic elements of technocratic thought in 
relation to development. We focused on the notion of 
rationality as a fundamental aspect in technocratic planning. 
We argued that limitations inherent in the notion of func-
tional rationality and its potential contradiction with 
needs of substantive rationality are important considerations 
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for understanding the social character of the technocratic 
policy model. 
We noted the shift to a new policy approach in the 
Sudan during the early 1970s. Adoption of a technocratic 
policy model was reflected in: {a) the formation of an 
expansive planning network and the ascendancy of techno-
crats in the policy formation machinery, and (b) the 
proliferation of large-scale production units as a dominant 
implementation strategy. 
We focused, in the third part, on the impact of the 
t echnocratic policy model on the pattern of economic plan-
ning in Sudan. An exposition of the concept of development 
employed by techno-bureaucrats revealed a central concern 
with economic growth and minimal consideration for other 
developmental goals. Another feature of the technocratic 
policy model was the wide use of large-scale production 
units in the implementation of development programmes. 
Technocratic influence in proliferating and sustaining this 
implementation strategy was outlined. 
While emphasis on economic growth and the use of l arge-
scale production units associated closely with the pattern 
of techno cratic policy analysis, they were also related t o 
othe r distant factors. Important among these was the role 
of the international market in sustaining the current struc-
ture of the economy. Secondly, any dramatic change in the 
present distribution of development expenditure might be 
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resisted by certain privileged groups who continued to 
benefit from the status quo. (Shepherd, op.cit.). Given 
the correspondence between technocratic policy prescriptions 
and the interest of international and indigenous capital, 
identified earlier in Chapter Two, we may conclude that 
the technocratic policy model served to extend "structural" 
constraiJs into policy process. 
Finally, emphasis on productivity and growth, character-
istic of the technocratic policy model, were equally domi-
nant in other policy areas such as urban housing, as we 
explain in the following chapter. 
3.5 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
We proposed at the beginning of this chapter that the 
institutional structure of the state could be an important 
instrument mediating social interest in public policy. In 
order to examine this proposition we selected three aspects 
of the institutional structure of the state, in Sudan, for 
analysis. These were: the main ideological assumptions 
underlying the formation of state apparatus and informing 
institutional goals and practice, the formal institutional 
structure, institutional practice and the social character 
of dominant institutions, and the evolving policy model. 
An exposition of the main themes in the ideology of 
the May regime, in the second section, revealed an emphasis 
on a large role for the state in social change, to be 
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accomplished through modern organisation, science and 
technology. This change-strategy involved placing expert 
cadres in the leadership of state institutions and there-
fore compromising the regime's claims of popular participation. 
Looking at the formal institutional arrangement and 
institutional practice in the third section, we noted an 
excessive concentration of power in the Executive and the 
Presidency. Policy formation was much dependent on power-
coalitions and alliances obtaining in the Executive. In 
contrast to previous regimes, technocrats were found to 
have had very important roles in the process of policy 
formation under the May regime. Circumstances fostering 
their ascendancy were briefly outlined. 
The fourth section of the chapter focused on the 
relation between technocracy and policy formation. We 
identified first the basic elements of technocratic policy-
model. Examining the notion of rationality, we noted a 
contradictory dimension which we hypothesised to reflect 
on technocratic policy analysis and on the structure of 
policy prescriptions. Secondly, we attempted to apply our 
analysis of the technocratic model to policy models in the 
Sudan. We noted the shift in policy approach during the 
early 1970s towards a technocratic policy model. We pro-
ceeded to examine the impact of this new policy approach on 
the pattern of economic planning. An exposition of the con-
cept of ''development" adopted in technocratic planning 
reve aled a central concern with economic growth and minimal 
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consideration for other developmental goals. We noted 
also a wide use of large-scale production units despite 
their limited applicability. Both the emphasis on 
economic growth and the use of large-scale production 
units were explained in terms of the dominant techno-
cratic model. 
Undoubtedly, the institutional structure of the state 
in Sudan has influenced considerably the pattern of policy 
planning and, therefore, the content of socio-economic 
policies. The part played by the institutional structure 
in the process of policy formation did not occur, however, 
independently of the conditions of class conflict. The 
trend towards establishing a "strong" state in the Sudan 
in the early 1970s, and therefore the change in the mode 
of operation of state structure, is seen here to have been 
fostered by the conditions of the accumulation process 
rather than in isolation from or in contradiction to those 
conditions, as we explained in Section 3.3.4 above. Our 
analysis of the prevailing policy model served to pinpoint 
how "structural" constraints acted upon the policy process. 
It also points to the significance of the institutional 
approach for structural analysis of the state policy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN GREATER KHARTOUM 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The subject matter of this study is the constraints on 
implementation of urban social policy. Our perspective of 
limitations on implementation, as stated in Chapter One, 
goes beyond the conventional view of organisational problems 
to deal with limitations which might arise in connection with 
institutions and processes outside immediate administrative 
control. We proposed above that both the form of the state 
in Sudan and the concomitant economic programme constituted 
broad limits on effective implementation of social policy. 
The previous chapter outlined the pattern of economic develop-
ment pursued in Sudan, and pointed out its limitations. 
In this chapter we address the social implications of 
the Sudanese model of economic planning. We consider the re-
lation between national economic policy and urban growth, on 
the one hand, and the impact of both aspects on urban housing 
and patterns of land disposal in the capital,on the other. 
First, it will be shown that the processes underlying migration 
and rapid urban growth in Greater Khartoum were essentially 
generated by the adopted model of economic development. Far 
from consolidating rural economies and checking undesired 
rural emigration, the pattern of development has been de-
s tabilising the peasant economy and accelerating emigration 
in Western Sudan. Second, we argue that, together with those 
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national factors affecting urban growth and the demand for 
residential land in the capital, Another set of influences, 
internal to urban political economy, have been active 
during the last decade, changing significantly the struc-
ture of land disposal. Central to these influences was 
the process of urban land commercialisation and its attend-
ant implications. We argue that a careful consideration 
of land market dynamics is necessary to understand the limita-
tions on urban housing, land policy and allocation patterns. 
The chapter consists of three main sections. The follow-
ing section provides an overview of urbanisation character-
istics in the Sudan, exploring the main factors underlying 
urban growth. It focuses on the relation between regional 
development policy in Western Sudan, emigration and urban 
growth. The implications of urban growth on housing in Greater 
Khartoum are dealt with in the third section. The adequacy of 
housing strategies in the capital is assessed too. The fourth 
section examines the policy of land commercialisation and 
assesses its likely effect on access to residential land in 
the city. 
4.2 URBANISATION PATTERNS IN SUDAN 
4.2.1 General 
Urbanisation has been a world wide phenomenon during much 
of this century. Its features in Third World countries, however, 
differ markedly from those experienced in western industrialised 
countries (World Bank, 1979) .In the former countries, urbanisatior 
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is occurring far more rapidly, against a background of higher 
population growth~ lower incomes and uneven distribution of 
resources within countries. A more or less similar pattern 
can be discerned in Sudanese urbanisation. In this section 
a description of the main characteristics of urbanisation 
in Sudan is provided. The increasing rate of urban growth 
is explained with reference to a flawed strategy of regional 
development and excessive concentration of resources in the 
capital. The section consists of two sub-sections. The 
first one outlines the main features of Sudanese urbanisation. 
The second sub-section examines the impact of the strategy 
of regional development on urban growth. 
4.2.2 Main Features of Urbanisation 
The history of urbanisation in Sudan dates back to the 
pre-historic period (El-Bushra, 1971). However, the pattern 
of urbanisation that followed the Anglo-Egyptian occupation 
of the country in 1898 was distinctively different from early 
urbanisation. The political and economic measures introduced 
by the condominium regime altered radically the pattern of 
distribution of resources and population in the country. The 
colonial economic system defined which regions have been 
linked to the monetary economy and which regions remained 
largely outside the monetary economy with a large proportion 
of their population engaged in the subsistence economy (Hardoy 
and Satterthwaite, 1981-192). The large-scale cotton produc-
tion established in central Sudan turned the peasant economies 
in Western, and to a lesser degree Southern Sudan, into the 
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main suppliers of agricultural labour and food, and fostered 
the growth of urban centres in North-Central Sudan. The 
population movement that had been created was kept circulating 
between areas of production in central and eastern Sudan, and 
rural areas in the western region(El-Din, M., in Pons, V., 
1980, p.427). It was not until the Second World War that 
urbanisation began to assume a more visible and systematic 
pattern. 
At the eve of independence the first population census 
revealed that 8.3 per cent of the country's population was 
living in urban areas. The urban population was growing at 
an average annual rate of 6.5 per cent during the period 
1955/56-1973/74, as Table 4.1 shows. The pattern of urban growth 
was variable. While the period 1955/56-1964/65 recorded an 
average annual growth rate of 5.2 per cent, the rate of growth 
was faster during the period 1965/66-1973/74 (Al-Arifi, in 
El-Bushra 1972). By 1973/74 urban population was 17.4 per cent 
of the total population with an average annual growth rate of 
7.2 per cent (US Agency for International Development (1978-
App.A-39)). The urban population of Sudan is expected to 
reach 31 per cent in 1985 (Ibid-App.A-3). The following table 
depicts urbanisation in Sudan in the period 1955/56-1985. 
While levels of Sudanese urbanisation seem modest by 
international or even by African standards, the dynamics of 
the urbanisation process as well as its implications have had 
serious effects in both rural and urban areas. In what follows 
we outline the main features associated with urbanisation in 
the Sudan; these are: regional imbalances in resource distribution 
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Table 4.1 Growth of Urbanisation in Sudan, 1955/56-1985 
Population Population Average Annual Population Projected 
1955/56 Gro.vth Rate 1973/74 Population 
1955/56-1973/74 1985 
(%) 
Sudan 10,262,536 2.2 14,758,346 population 20,348,500 
Urban 853,872 6.5 2,605,895 
r:opulation 6,345,600 
Population 
of Greater 245,736 6.9 784,300 l,77l,(X)() 
Khartoum 
Greater 
Khartoum as 2.4% 5.3% 8. 7% 
% of Sudan 
Greater 
Khartoum as 28.7% 30.0% 28% % of urban 
Sudan 
Sources: 1. ILO 1976 - Ch. 8. 
2. International Agency for Developnent (1978) 
3. Al-Arifi in Pons V. (1980). 
migration,and primacy of the capital. 
(a) Regional Imbalance in Resource Distribution: 
We emphasised in the preceding chapter the imbalance in 
the structure of the economy between the "modern" agricultural 
sector and the "traditional" sector of subsistence agriculture 
and livestock production. This economic structure influenced 
the pattern of distribution of investment and development, 
generating marked regional disparities. Regions of capitalist 
production and centres of exchange and finance attracted more 
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resources, infrastructure and services. At the eve of 
independence the following pattern of resource distribution 
was reported: (see Map, Appendix 4.1). 
Table 4.2 Gross Domestic Investment of Regions in 1955-56 
Region Total Percentage 
Investment of Total 
(000) 
A - Khartoum, Northern and 
Kassala Provinces 11,906 56 
B 
- Blue Nile Province 4,178 20 
c - Darfur and Kordofan 
Provinces 3,533 17 
D - Southern Provinces 1,616 7 
Suda n 21,233 lOO 
Source: R.A. Renin, 1963-119 
The bias in investment distribution in favour o f regions 
"A" and "B" was sustained in subsequent developme nt plans. 
The main departure in those plans was the encouragement of 
priv ate mechanised agriculture in the clay pla ins of Weste rn 
Sudan. Agricultural production in the "traditiona l" sector 
received very little government support, with the We stern and 
Southern regions of the country in particular, deprived not 
only of a g ricultural investment but also of phy sical infra-
s tructure and social s e rvice spending (Adams a nd Howell, 1 9 79 , 
306). 
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This investment disparity was reflected in employment, 
incomes and social services. There is very scanty data on 
income distribution in Sudan. While the 1967/68 Household 
Budget Survey is the major source of information, its 
findings cannot be generalised to the whole country since 
it excluded the nomadic population and the population in the 
Southern region. Notwithstanding these limitations, the 
survey results reflected a pattern of regional disparity in 
incomes and expenditure favouring central Sudan as the follow-
ing table illustrates. 
Table 4.3 Average Annual Income and Expenditure per 
Household in Rural Areas (1967/68) 
Province Average Income Average Expenditure 
(£S) (£S) 
Northern 124 174 
Khartoum 236 248 
Kassala 183 180 
Blue Nile 180 180 
Kordofan)Western 153 153 
Darfur )Region 98 98 
Source: ILO, 1975, 506. 
The low level of incomes in the Northern province is 
attributed to a natural scarcity of investible resources and 
this has often been supplemented by remittances from urban 
areas. The gap in incomes between central Sudan, and western 
and southern regions is further widened by the pattern of 
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distribution of infrastructural services;this point is dealt 
with in sub-section (c) below. Variations in incomes and 
social services provided a strong stimulus for migration 
from poor regions to central Sudan. 
(b) Migration 
Two types of migrational patterns which are commonly 
observed in Sudan are rural to rural migration and cityward 
migration. We shall look first at the former type of 
migration . 
Historically, the pattern of population movement between 
different regions of the country has been associated with 
levels of socio-economic development in thoseregions. For 
instance, the western and northern regions have been losing 
population to the more developed regions of central Sudan. 
This pattern of population movement is illustrated in the 
following table. 
The pattern of inter-provincial migration shows that 
the provinces of Kordofan , Darfur, Bahr El-Ghazal and North-
ern province were losing population mostly to Khartoum , Red 
Sea, Kassala and Blue Nile provinces in central and central-
eastern Sudan. Concentration of investment and employment 
opportunities in the latter regions constituted a significant 
"pull" factor for potential migrants in the former regions. 
Rapid population growth, declining incomes and increasing cash 
needs were among major "push" factors in poor regions. The 
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Table 4.4 Pattern of Inter-Provincial Migration (1973 Census) 1 
Province Total Population In-Migrants Out-Migrants Net-Migration 
(Per cent) {Per cent) (Per cent) 
Khartoum 1,018,544 35.7 7.0 + 28.7 
Red Sea 267,031 22.6 9.9 + 12.6 
Kassala 776,551 16.4 5.6 + 10.8 
Blue Nile 2,686,239 13.1 5.3 + 7.8 
Upper Nile 791,603 8.9 3.8 + 5.1 
Equatoria 667,298 5.0 3.6 + 1.4 
Bahr El-Ghazal 1,310,382 1.3 2.8 1.5 
Darfur 1,617,163 2.8 15.0 - 12.2 
Kordofan 1,677,076 5.4 18.8 - 13.5 
Northern 959,071 3.8 27.5 - 23.6 
SOurce: 1973 Census - Quoted by Rizgallah, M.K., in PonS, V. (1980), p.418. 
1. Nanadic populations in all regions and cotton pickers in Blue 
Nile Provinces are not included 
high rate of emigration in the Northern province was not due 
so much to lack of investment as to the limited agricultural 
potential and extreme fragmentation of landholdings. Beside 
the Northern province, the provinces of Kordofan and Darfur 
stood as the main sources of migrant labour in Central Sudan . 
Unti l the Second World War rural labour c irculated 
between the capital and the agricultural area s of Central Sudan , 
(M . El -A.G. El-Din in Pons , 1980 , 427). The post-war period 
marked a reversal of pre-war income balance between town and 
country in favour of the former (ibid). The increase in urban 
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wages, however, did not include casual labour. The Northern 
province, with a long tradition of emigration, with a well-
established system of education, with acute land shortage, 
and a high rate of natural population increase supplied 
proportionately more migrants to the capital city than any 
other region (Ibid, 437). The 1964-66 Population and Housing 
Survey revealed the following regional distribution of the 
capital's population:-
Table 4.5 The Capital's Population By Place of Birth 
(Percentage) 
'[Province Greater Rural Northern Blue Kassala Kordofan Darfur Southern Outsidej 
Khartoun Khartoum Nile Sudan 
i 
! 
iPopula- 68.2 1.2 13.3 4.6 0.9 4.6 2.4 1.4 
ltion % 
i 
Source: Population and Housing Survey, 1964/66. Department of Statistics, 
Khartoum, 1968-8. 
Since the early 1960s, however, the contribution of 
Western Sudan to migration to Khartoum increased rapidly. The 
expansion in the Gezira project, the increase in acreage of 
3.4 
mechanised farming and the extension of railway lines to Darfur 
province accelerated the already established emigration in 
Western Sudan. On the other hand, the initiation of import 
substitution light industry in the capital, during the same 
period, increased the demand for industrial labour. The second 
ha l f of the 1960s marked a rise in the number of migrants from 
\•lestern Sudan living in the capital. 1 
1. The intensity in migration from western Sudan to the capital 
during this period was partly caused by deliberate vote-hunting 
campaign in Khartoum. 
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A survey of urban households in Greater Khartoum, 
conducted by the ILO in 1974, found that the majority of 
migrants came from the Northern province (24.7%) followed 
by Kordofan (22.9%), the Blue Nile (16.6%) and Darfur 
(16.6%), (ILO, 1976, 352). Compared with the 1964/66 
figures the last survey showed a marked rise in the pro-
portion of migrants originating in western Sudan (Kordofan 
and Darfur). Taken together, their proportion exceeded 
that of emigrants coming from the Northern province. Thus, 
in both, inter-provincial migration and cityward migration 
the western region was supplying more migrants than any 
other region in the country. The disparity in the regional 
distribution of resources is an important explanatory factor 
behind this migratory process. Concentration of resources 
in Greater Khartoum is another significant factor. 
(c) The Primacy of the Capital 
A significant feature of Sudanese urbanisation is the 
high degree of concentration of political and economic activi-
ties and population in the capital city. The primacy of the 
capital is partly a colonial legacy. Policies of the post-
independence period accelerated concentration in Greater 
Khartoum. 
The city's population grew from 81,880 in 1904 to 202,381 
in 1931 (McLough1in 1970, 105). Its growth slowed down until 
the Second World War (ibid). The dramatic growth took place, 
however, in the post-independence period. The city's population 
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increased from 245,736 in 1955/56 to 438,890 in 1964/65 
(MEFIT, 1975, p.9). By 1973/74 the population of the 
capi tal reached 784,300. According to MEFIT study, 
migration was the major source of the city's growth during 
the period 1955-1973. In 1980 the capital's population was 
put at 1.2 million (Sudanow, 1980-55), containing 31 per 
cent of the country's urban population (Misra, H.N., 1983-
162) . 
This high concentration of population in Greater 
Khartoum is largely a post-war development resulting partly 
f rom the high concentration of social and economic activities. 
The attainment of independence in 1956 enhanced the city's 
political role. The expansion of government machinery shortly 
after independence led to a disproportionate concentration 
of skilled manpower in the capital and therefore an urban-
biased policy of social spending. The over-concentration of 
social service facilities in Greater Khartoum is illustrated 
in the following table. 1 
The concentration of educational and health fac ilities 
in the capital became pronounced when compared to populati on. 
Thus , while the province's population formed 7.7% of the 
country's population in 1973, it received 11.1%, 10.9%, 
23 .9 % and 4.3% of primary education, secondary education, 
health centres and dressing station facilities respectively. 
I n contrast, Darfur province which formed 14.4% of total 
population received fewer services. The southern region -
1. The population of Greater Khartoum was 74 % of the province 
population in 19 73/74 . 
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Table 4.6: National Distribution of Selected Social Services 
(1973) 
Province Population % Percentage General Health Dressing 
of Prirnal:y Secondary Centres Stations 
Schools 2 Schools (%} (%) 
(%) 2 
Blue Nile 3,740,405 25.3 39.6 26.8 31.2 35.3 
North em 957,671 6.4 11.2 24.4 8.0 12.5 
Kassala 1 1,547,475 10.4 13.2 11.6 11.6 24.3 
Khartoum 1,145,921 7.7 11.1 10.9 23.9 4.3 
Kordofan 2,202,345 14.9 14.9 18.8 8.7 8.5 
Darfur 2,139,615 14.4 9.9 7.5 9.4 3.5 
Upper Nile 836,263 5.6 2.2 2.4 
Equatoria 791,738 5.3 2.9 5.9 
Bahr El-Ghazal 1,396,913 9.4 2.2 3.2 
Tot al 14,758,346 100 100 
1. Kassal a Province includes the present Kassala and Red Sea provinces. 
2. Data on education were canpiled for the six northern provinces only. 
Source: IW-1976-512; The 1973 census qooted in El Hassan 1976,27. 
Upper Nile, Equatoria and Bahr El-Ghazal - which contained 
20.!% of the country's population got even fewer health 
centres than Darfur. 
The pr imacy of the capital is a l so reflected in the 
concentra tion of industrial establishments and associated 
economic activities. Thus, over 66 % of the industrial 
establishments in the country were reported in Khartoum 
province in 1978 (Misra op.cit. 168 ). It employed 62 % of 
industrial l abour and 48 % of industrial capital in 1971. 
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The capital also had 85% of all commercial companies, 80% 
of the banking activities and almost all insurance facili-
ties (El Bushra, 1972-7). The trend towards industrial 
concentration in the capital was increasing until 1977 
(El Tom, M. and El Tayeb, G., 1981-97). The sharp rise 
in the number of banks in the capital during the late 1970s, 
on the other hand, consolidated the commercial primacy of 
Greater Khartoum, as witnessed by the expansion of commercial 
sector employment. The primacy of the capital, therefore, 
constitutes a significant ••pull" factor in the migratory 
process. Unless there is a reversal in the industrial-
location policy1 and an increase in regional social spending 
the trend will continue, and so will its impact on migration. 
4.2.3 The Strategy of Regional Development: 
Awareness of a symbiotic interdependence between rural 
and urban areas prompted recent studies on Third World urban-
isation to emphasise the need to situate urban policies within 
a national policy framework that takes account of the impact 
of national and regional policies on urban problems (e.g. UN 
Habitat Conference 1976, World Bank 1979, 1980 among others). 
A common theme in this literature is the call to decentralise 
development and resources to deprived regions, and the stimu-
lation of regional growth poles that would limit rural emi-
gration and therefore help check rising urban growth rates. 
1. Although the Development and Promotion of Industrial 
Investment Act, 1972, provided that new enterprises should 
be located in rural areas, they were mostly located where 
infrastructural facilities were available, that is in major 
urban centres of central Sudan, such as Greater Khartoum, 
Port Sudan and Medani, (Mahmoud, 1984, pp.66,67). 
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Three methods are used by governments in this respect. 
Direct investment in basic services; public investment 
in new economic activities, and the use of public funds 
to encourage private investment, (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 
1981,212). 
This decentralisation strategy received much publicity 
in the Sudan. Both the Ten Year Plan 1961/62-1970/71 and 
the Five Year Plan 1970/71-1974/75 were criticised for 
neglecting the question of regional equity in resource allo-
cation and for their over-concentration on the sectoral 
development of the economy, (Al-Arifi, 1972,66; The Six Year 
Plan 1977/1983, Vol.l,2ll, among others). Thus the long 
term Development Plan 1977/78-1994/95 called for equitable 
regional distribution of resources and for closing the gap 
between agricultural and non-agricultural incomes (Six Year 
Plan, ibid, 40). These aims were eventually formulated 
into specific targets to be achieved by the Six Year Plan 
1977/78-1982/83. The realisation of those targets was to be 
accomplished through modernisation of traditional agriculture 
and improvement of regional infrastructure. 
We outlined in Chapter Three the critique of the model 
of "development" adopted in Sudanese economic planning. The 
Six Year Plan adopted the same model in its strategy of 
regional development. The Plan proposed that regional back-
wardness, particularly in Western Sudan, could be alleviated 
by the expansion of mechanised agriculture, on the one hand, 
and modernisation of traditional agriculture on the other hand. 
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The absorption of the 11 traditional" sector into the "modern" 
sector was seen by the Plan as the best way to effect regional 
development. 
The Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83 allocated (32 per cent) 
£S 425 million of the public sector investment and £S 290 
million of the private sector investment to agriculture. The 
share of agriculture in both public and private investment, 
amounted to 27 per cent (£S 715 million) of the total develop-
ment investment in the Plan. The public sector investment 
in agriculture was allocated in the following pattern. 
Table 4.7 Sectoral Distribution of Public Sector Invest-
ment in Agriculture (in SYP) £S 000) 
Investment Sector Amount £S Percentage 
Agricultural Services 71,274 16.7 
Crops 143,380 33.7 
Irrigation 155,177 36.5 
Livestock Production 55,169 12.9 
Total 425,000 99.8 
source: Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83, Vol.II, 29. 
The pattern of sectoral distribution of public sector 
% 
investment in agriculture shows tha t the bulk of investment, 
over 80 per cent, went to "modern" sector agriculture, which 
is mostly concentrated in central Sudan. The "traditional~~ 
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sector received very little in the public sector investment, 
namely the 12.9 per cent allocated to livestock production. 
The Plan, therefore, anticipated thatmost of private sector 
investment would go into modernising "traditional" agri-
culture, mainly through expanding mechanised farming. 
A number of studies indicated that the expansion of 
capitalist agriculture in Western Sudan had adverse effects 
on the peasant economy (Shepherd, 1982; Kursany, 1982). It 
has been argued that progressive commercialisation of agri-
culture has pushed small producers into less fertile land 
or simply forced them to migrate. The expansion of mechanised 
agriculture has also reduced the pastures available for the 
animal population, thus forcing many nomads to seek wage em-
ployment. 
At another level, the argument goes, mechanised rain-
fed agriculture has failed to absorb the displaced labour 
into the production process. The capacity of the peasant 
economy to employ more people was being undermined by the 
expansion of modern agriculture and hence more people were 
joining the migratory process. Since fewer work opportunities 
were available in agriculture, the majority of displaced 
migrants seek non-agricultural jobs, mostly in towns, as the 
following table indicates. 
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Table 4.8 Absorption of Migrating Male Workers by 
Occupational Category 1971-75 (Percent) 
Age Transport, Trade Factories Agriculture Government and Corrmunication Unclassified 
and Utilities Labour 
16-20 7.07 12.63 54.04 5.56 4.09 
20-35 18.34 13.19 44.20 3.56 7.65 
35-55 21.84 21.84 32.18 2.30 8.04 
55- 65 00.00 20.00 40.00 0.00 0.00 
Unern-
ployrnent 
16.67 
13.06 
13 .79 
04.00 
Source: Z.A. El Bashir and S.M. Al1rted, 1978,8, quoted in Misra, H.N., 
op.cit., 164. 
The strategy for regional development adopted by the Six 
Year Plan seems reminiscent of past economic planning experi-
ences . This is particularly true with reference to the Plan's 
conception of the mecha nism for regional distribution of 
resources. The Plan assumed tha t benefits accruing from 
mechanised agriculture would eventually "trickle down" t o the 
local population in the fo rm of wages and local investment. 
While the job-creation capacity of this capital-intensive pro-
d uction is limited, the likelihood of profits being r einvested 
in the region was very slim. A number of studies have shown 
that there was a tendency for capital to migrate to central 
Sudan (e.g. Mahmoud, 1984; and Kursany, 1982). Most of this 
capital went into t e rtiary activities s uch as trade, transport 
a nd urban real estate. 
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The only remaining option for regional development is 
direct government investment in infrastructural services. 
We already indicated above that the social spending policy 
has always been biased to urban centres. While the regional-
isation measures introduced in 1980/81 provided institutional 
structures for regional representation and political leverage 
in central government, the huge administrative costs of these 
new organisations might endanger the meagre services already 
in existence. 
4.2.4 Conclusion 
This part of the chapter outlined the main character-
istics of urbanisation in Sudan. We identified three basic 
attributes of the urbanisation process: uneven distribution 
of development, a rapid flow of migration particularly from 
the Western Region, and the excessive concentration of re-
sources and population in the capital. We examined the 
current strategy for regional development and concluded that 
the adopted model of development did not break away from past 
planning patterns. The objectives of the Six Year Plan for 
achieving a balanced development and closing the gap between 
agricultural and non-agricultural incomes was difficult to 
realise. The development strategy could well precipitate 
further regional inequalities, which would accelerate the 
migratory process. The implication of such inadequacies in 
regional policy would be an increasing growth in urban areas 
and mounting pressures on urban amenities. 
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4.3 HOUSING POLICIES AND PROBLEMS IN GREATER KHARTOUM 
4.3.1 General 
Negative effects of urban growth often reflect sharply 
on the housing situation. Housing problems, however, can 
be caused by inappropriate planning of shelter needs as 
much as by uncontrolled urban growth. In this section, we 
examine critically the housing policy in the capital. We 
argue that because of inadequate definitions of housing 
need, lack of an integrated approach to housing, rapid urban 
growth and rising housing costs, the current housing stra-
tegy cannot deal effectively with the problem. The likely 
outcome is an increasing commercialisation of the housing 
market and further intensification of housing problems. This 
section consists of three parts. The first one describes 
the main housing supply systems. The second section examines 
the recent trend of comprehensive planning of housing in the 
capital. The third section assesses the relevance of current 
housing strategies. 
4.3.2 Main Housing Supply Systems 
Provision of urban housing in Sudan, as in many other 
post-colonial societies, was considerably influenced by the 
l egacy of colonial urban policy. Colonial housing supply 
systems in urban Sudan were confined to: (a) sale of open 
plots and, (b) the provision of state-built staff housing. 
The post-independence era witnessed the evolution of other 
syste ms. Now there are four principal systems of housing 
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provision in Greater Khartoum: 
(1) The distribution of serviced plots to 
different income groups 
(2) State-built low-cost housing for low 
income groups 
(3) State-built staff housing 
(4) Upgrading of illegal settlements 
The distribution of sites and services plots and up-
grading of illegal settlements constituted, since the early 
1960s, the major system of housing provision in Sudan. This 
housing provision strategy places Sudan among the few Third 
World countries which did not opt for a conventional housing 
provision approach as a major policy. Since the early 1970s 
conventional housing came under criticism, and "self-help" 
housing was alternatively advocated, mainly by the World 
Bank and the United Nations specialised agencies. "Self-
help" housing is widely considered more realistic and afford-
able in the Third World (Bamberger, M. 1982). The experience 
of Sudan, therefore, may well provide some insights into the 
adequacy and efficacy of this housing approach in easing 
problems of urban shelter in poor countrie s. 
Though predominantly oriented to a "self-help" housing 
strategy, urban housing policy in Sudan can still be criticised 
on three counts:- First, it leaned heavily towards government 
employees and those in "formal" employment to the detriment 
o f those enga ged in the "informal" sector. This bias permeat ed 
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definitions of housing need, housing standards and building 
codes; it precluded the access of the majority of those 
who, in ideal circumstances, would be the target of "self-
help" housing policy. ·rhis point is discussed at some 
length in the next chapter. 
Secondly, the housing policy made little budgetary 
allocation for the provision of infrastructural services in 
sites-and-services programmes. Public sector housing invest-
ment in the Ten Year Plan 1961/62-1970/72 was allocated in 
the following pattern. 
Table 4.9 The Housing Budget in the Ten Year Plan 
1961/62-1970/71 
Investment Category Allocated Budget 
£S Millions 
1 - Serviced plots 
a - Supply of water and 
Electricity 4.5 
b - Loans for Government 
Officials 5.0 
2 - State-built Housing 
a - Staff Housing 3.957 
b - Low Cost Housing 0. 900 
Percent 
29.8 
36.2 
27.8 
6.2 
Total 14.357 100.0 
Source: The Ten Year Plan 1961/62-1970/71; quoted in 
Farghali 1977-56. 
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While serviced plot schemes provided about 32,000 
residential plots during the period 1960-1970 only 29.8 
per cent of public sector housing investment was allocated 
for the provision of basic services. On the other hand, 
27.8% of public investment in housing was used to finance 
housing units in staff housing schemes. The meagre funds 
ass igned to serviced~lot schemes meant that whole neighbour-
hoods had to wait for a number of years without infra-
structural services. 
Thirdly, urban housing policy in Sudan lacked a com-
prehensive approach to housing problems. There was no urban 
development strategy that directed and informed housing 
policy. In the absence of a comprehensive urban development 
plan the housing question was managed in isolation from other 
urban processes. At institutional level there was very little 
coordination between housing agencies and other relevant urban 
institutions. The outcome was a piecemeal distribution of 
urban land, oversized housing plots, exceedingly wide r oads 
and large open spaces (Ahmed, H., 1978,p.3Z). At the level 
of the urban environment the result has been an excessive 
horizontal expansion of the city, with constantly rising 
costs for the provision and maintenance of the infrastructure. 
In soc i a l terms, official housing output was lagg ing behind 
housing demand in the capital. While the total output of 
urban housing, through various forms of supply did no t exceed 
70 ,000 units / plots in the country as a whole during the Ten 
Year Plan period, actual housing demand in 1968 was put a t 
124,000 units. In terms of the quality of housing, out of 
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the 70,000 units/plots mentioned above, 40,000 plots remained 
without basic and necessary services until the early 1970s 
(National Housing Policy 1975-7). In Greater Khartoum the 
housing deficit stood at 15,926 units in 1975/76, and about 
24,979 of the capital's housing stock was classified as sub-
standard dwellings needing improvements (ibid, 17). 
The Sudanese experience with "self-help" housing indi-
cates that such a strategy could be as inadequate and in-
accessible as conventional housing in the absence of a com-
prehensive settlement policy and the material and political 
support of the state. The success of such policy does not 
only require the integration of housing strategies into a 
national development policy but equally important is the form-
ulation of a comprehensive urban development strategy that 
takes account of the impact of 11 externalities" of national 
development policy on the urban scene. In the following sec-
tion we examine the Sudanese efforts towards comprehensive 
planning in the housing sector. 
4.3.3 Experiments with Comprehensive Planning:-
Four conceptions of urban planning are dominant in urban 
planning literature (Roberts, M., 1974, 28). These are trad-
itional planning, structure planning, systems approach plan-
ning, and advocacy planning. Both structure and systems 
approach planning emphasise the relation between physical 
environment and the various processes that underlie urban 
growth and development as significant factors in the planning 
- 201 -
process. This broader perspective of urban planning can 
be seen,as well, in the Habitat Conference recommendations, 
that policies on human settlements must be integrated within 
national development strategies and should be comprehensive 
(Hardoy and Satterthwaite, op.cit. 207). This means that a 
successful urban housing strategy must not only relate to 
a national housing policy but equally ought to integrate 
into a comprehensive urban development strategy. These two 
broad objectives represent a bench mark against which housing 
strategy may be examined. 
The Five Year Housing Plan 1970-75 
'J..'he trend towards comprehensive planning in the housing 
sector emerged in Sudan in the late 1960s with the inception 
of the May 1969 Regime. It was influenced by the proclaimed 
ideology of the new regime's "socialism", which presupposed 
state-controlled socio-economic planning. The formulation 
of directed town and country physical plans, and setting of 
a national housing policy were the main objectives of the 
newly created Ministry of Housing, formed in 1969. The Five 
Year Plan, however, was sectoral in nature and housing and 
physical planning received a low priority. 
Three major housing programmes were carried out in the 
capital during the Plan period 1970-75. They included an 
upgrading programme in Omdurman city, two squatter resettle-
ment projects in Khartoum and Khartoum North cities, and 
allocation of plots in middle and upper income housing 
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programmes in Khartoum city. 
Despite the institutional integration of housing and 
planning agencies in the new Ministry, for the first time 
in the history of Sudan, the above-mentioned housing projects 
were planned and carried out in the absence of a comprehensive 
urban development plan. The outcome was fairly predictable: 
weak coordination between housing agencies and service insti-
tutions produced prolonged delays in services provision; con-
ventional definitions of housing need, standards and building 
codes were upheld, limiting the access of a wider sector of 
urban population; a comprehensive urban strategy was lacking; 
and expanding housing need encouraged squatting and occupation 
of public land. Thus comprehensive planning of shelter needs 
in the city remained only a policy target that was not realised 
during the Plan period. 
The Six Year Housing Plan 1977/78-1982/83 
The strategy for comprehensive planning was reiterated 
in the Six Year Plan too. Housing policy envisaged a two-
phase programme. The first phase extended over the Plan 
period - 1977/78-1982/83 and was to provide housing in major 
urban centres of more than 20,000 persons. The second phase, 
which followed the first one, was to deal with smaller settle-
ments. The bulk of housing supply envisaged in the first 
phase was to be provided through sites-and-services and up-
grading schemes, as the following table illustrates. 
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Table 4.10 The Six Year Housing Plan, By Supply Systems 
Sites and Upgrading La.v-cost .r.Ddem Total 
Services Housing Flats 
Nl.IDlber of 
units/plots l29,CXX) 42,000 5,000 18,CXX) 194,CXX) 
Percent 66.5 21.6 2.5 9.3 99.9 
Source: Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83, Vol.II, pp.l82-200 
The total housing investment in the Plan was £S 424.5 million, 
of which the State would contribute £S 26.5 million only. The 
rest of the investment was to be financed by private sector 
and individual beneficiaries. In fact, most of the state 
contribution to housing investment was to go into conventional 
low-cost and high-class housing. This pattern of investment 
distribution is reflected in Table 4.11 below. 
Table 4.11 Housing Investment in the Six Year Plan 1977/ 78-
1982/83 (£S Million) 
Investnent Category Public Investment p~l Private Total 
Investrrent Investrrent 
Sites-and-Services 27.6 197.8 225.4 
Low Cost Housing 6.5 6.5 
Luxury Housing 20.0 160.0 180.0 
Upgrading of 8.4 4. 2 12.6 Settlem:mts 
Total 424.5 
1. Public Electricity and Water Corporation. These are short 
t erm investments by PEWC immediately repaid by the bene-
ficiaries. 
Source: Agency for International Development, 1978-pp.lll-5. 
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The Plan also budgeted about twelve million pounds for 
preparation of master plans in thirteen major towns 
(£S 320,000) and for the consolidation of service struc-
tures in the capital (£S 11.3 million). (Six Year Plan 
1977/78-1982/83, Vol.II, p.l90). 
The share of Greater Khartoum in the Housing Plan 
was not spelled out in detail in the Plan, but according 
to various sources the following programme was planned 
for the period 1977/78-1982/83. 
Table 4.12 Greater Khartoum Housing Plan, By Supply System 
M:>de of Provision Sites-and- Upgrading of Low-cost M:>dem 
Services illegal housing Flats 
settlements 
Number of units/ 30,CXJJ 25,CXJJ 359 1,473 
plots 
Percent 52.8 44 0.6 2.6 
SOurces: l. "Interview with Khartoum Carmissioner11 , A1-Ayarn Daily, 
17.8.1978. 
2. "Stat.eirent by the Minister of Construction and Public 
W:>rks", El-Sahafa Daily, 2.10.1982. 
3. "Statement by Deputy Conmissioner of Khartoum Western 
District", E1-Sahafa Daily, 3.6.78 
4. Sudana.v, July 1981, 39, and January 1983,45. 
Total 
56,832 
100.0 
Data on the housing programme reveal that the bulk of 
housing supply was to be made through"self-he1p" housing, 
87% of the national programme and 96.8% of the planned 
target in Greater Khartoum. The question of meeting housing 
needs, therefore, relied almost e ntirely on the potential 
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capacity of the "self-help" strategy. Before we examine the 
viability of the "self-help" strategy in the Sudan, a brief 
description of the scale of housing needs at national and 
metropolitan levels is imperative. 
Projection of Housing Needs 
Compared with the Ten Year and Five Year Plans, the Six 
Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83 was the first one to explicitly 
state an estimate of urban housing needs. It projected an 
overall housing need of 375,000 units in thirteen major urban 
centres during the period 1977-1985. In Greater Khartoum 
the need was put at 159,000 over the same period. Details 
of needs are reproduced in the following table. 
Table 4.13: Projected Housing Need for Major Urban Areas 
and the Capital 1977-1985 
Cooponents of 
Housing Need 
Major Urban 
Centres 
Greater 
Khartoum 
New-
Households 
250,CXXJ 
114,400 
Backlog 
50,000 
19 ,60) 
Sub-Standard 
and liDServiced 
units 
75,000 
25,000 
Sources : l. Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83 , Vol.2, p.l82. 
Total 
375,000 
159,000 
2. Agency for International Developnent, 1978- Appendix A-41. 
3. El-Sahafa Daily, 3.6.78. 
The Housing Plan envisaged the provision of 194,000 
units/plots, far less tha n the projected need of 375,000. 
Against an e stimated need of 159,000 units/plots in Greater 
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Khartoum only 56,832 units/plots were planned. Moreover, 
it was not certain that actual provision matched planned 
targets, either nationally or in the capital. In 1977 
16,000 plots were planned in Greater Khartoum as the first 
stage of the housing plan. Some 430,000 applications were 
filed and 125,000 families qualified (Sudanow, June 1983, p.44). 
It is not our purpose, however, to argue on whether and 
how the gap between projected needs and planned targets can 
be bridged. We are rather interested in (a) whether the 
housing programme was based on a realistic understanding of 
the shelter needs of various sectors of urban population and 
(b) whether planned housing targets were accessible and afford-
able for the target group. In fact, both concerns are central 
to the current debate on the capacity of ''self-help" housing 
to contain shelter problems in the Third World (Ward, P. 1982) . 
Both issues will be highlighted below. 
4. 3. 4 Relevance of Current Housing Strategy 
Despite institution-building experiments and technical 
innovations introduced in formulating housing policy during 
the 1970s, the present housing strategy hardly constituted 
a break-away from past housing practice. This argument is 
particularly plausible in relation t o the comprehensiveness 
dimension of the housing strategy . 
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Firstly, reference has been made in Chapter Three to 
the sectoral nature of the Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83 
and its emphasis on expanding the 11 productive" sectors of 
the economy - agriculture and industry. The pattern of 
regional development pursued in the Plan is seen to have 
negative social effects on the peasant economy that reflected 
on urban housing, as we argued in Section 4.2.3 above. Neither 
did the development plan provide mechanisms whereby those 
"externalities 11 of development could be mitigated, nor did 
the housing strategy anticipate the likely effects of such 
"externalities 11 on urban housing. 
Secondly, the formulation of the objectives of the 
housing strategy reflected an explicit bias to urban settle-
ments; rural areas, where 80% of the country's population live, 
were not included as immediate targets of the housing strate gy. 
Thus, instead of attempting to reduce the negative effects of 
national development policy, through providing and consolida-
ting rural infrastructure, the national housing strategy 
embarked on tackling the after-effects of development, but 
long after they matured and were manifested in urban areas. 
In this sense, the housing strategy was, in fact, dealing with 
shelter problems in remarkable isolation from the processes 
unde rlying migration and urban growth. 
At the urban end, an integrated approach to urban housing 
pre supposes definition and calculation of needs in relation 
to the totality of urban processes that rel ate to housing. It 
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also presupposes anticipation and careful monitoring of 
reciprocal links between housing and other related urban 
processes. In this sense, planning of urban housing must 
be conceived of as a process rather than a preparation of 
separate sectoral plans. 
The structure oftheHousing Plan was typical of that 
of the Six Year Plan, as it approached urban housing in 
isolation from other urban processes. The process whereby 
the Housing Plan was f ormulated rested on two elements: 
First, the projection of housing needs according to a certain 
growth rate (6.8% for Sudan and 7.0% for the capital), a fixed 
family size (5.8) and an estimated housing stock; second, the 
setting of housing standards and levels of service provision 
on the basis of a triple classification of would-be beneficia-
ries according to their incomes. The Plan was not based on 
a structure or master plan for the capital that would organise 
land-use according to present and future needs. The mas ter 
plan which was contracted to MEFIT engineering consultants in 
1974 was not adopted by the authorities until October 1982 
(Mazari, S. 1982). In the absence of a comprehensive physical 
plan, the 1977/78 Housing Plan was reduced to s eparate housing 
programmes geared to housing different income groups . 
An important consideration that the Housing Plan neglected 
was the likely effect o f urban market forces on the housing 
strategy. Housing and construction relate symbiotica lly to 
land, labour and building materials markets. These aspects 
can dete rmine the accessibility and affordability of shelter. 
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Their impact on the Housing Plan was either considered 
favourable or was not fully realised. Since the next section 
focuses on the impact of the land market on housing we will 
make a brief comment below on the likely effect of labour and 
building materials markets on housing. 
Housing problems do not simply arise from the quantitative 
deficit in housing stock, but more importantly from the high 
cost of housing relative to income earnings of the beneficiaries. 
The Housing Plan admitted this difficulty and proposed to over-
come it by earmarking 80 per cent of planned plots to house-
holds making less than £S 600 per year i.e. the low income 
group. In Greater Khartoum the Plan devoted 70 per cent of 
the planned output to this group (Agency for International 
Development, op.cit. 111,27). This measure, however, presumed 
that once a low-income family was allotted a plot then its 
shelter problem would be solved. This view underestimated that 
the bulk of the housing demand would occur among those coming 
from the rural areas. In fact, of the 7.8 per cent population 
growth rate in Greater Khartoum, 5.6 per cent was contributed 
by migration. The majority of emigrants had less earning 
ability and poor employment prospects. 
The ability of this group to build for itself is not only 
constrained by its employment situation. The policy of property 
development initiated by the Government in 1974, the rapid 
expansion of the construction sector and rising inflation rates 
contributed to a dramatic increase in the price of building 
materials, both local and imported. Construction labour rates, 
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on the other hand, increased considerably since 1973, probably 
far more than other sectors of the economy. Thus, even if the 
70 per cent of planned housing in Greater Khartoum was to go 
to lower income groups as planned, and this is not certain as 
we argue in Chapter Four, the problem of affordability would 
still have to be confronted. 
4.3.5 Conclusion 
We conclude from the above discussion that, although a 
strategy for comprehensive planning of urban housing was pro-
claimed from the early 1970s, actual housing policy was not 
integrated into national development planning. Given past 
levels of implementation, comprehensive planning meant the 
aggregation of projected housing needs in thirteen major towns 
with little consideration for the impactofother sectors of 
the economy on the distribution of population, on employment 
and on the scale of housing needs. 
The lack of an integrated approach to urban housing was 
conspicuous in the capital. There was no master plan. Pro-
jection of needs took no adequate consideration of the likely 
effects of other urban processes on plan implementation. Most 
important in this respect was the impact of the Government 
intervention in the property market on housing as we will find 
in the following section. In the absence of comprehensive 
planning of housing, the prospect that "self-help'' strategies 
would effectively solve problems of low-income housing becomes 
unwarranted. 
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4.4 URBAN LAND POLICY IN GREATER KHARTOUM 
4.4.1 General 
The preceding sections shed light on the impact of the 
national development policy on the urban growth and housing 
in the capital. The pressures generated by migration con-
tinued to shape the demand for residential land in the capi-
tal throughout the post-independence period. Another set 
of influences, however, internal to the urban political 
economy, appear to have been active in shaping land disposal 
patterns. Central to these influences is the process of 
commercialising urban land and its implications for a host 
of other factors that relate to urban land. In this section 
we identify these influences and attempt to clarify the link 
between them and the national political economy. We also 
outline how the commercialisation process affects acce ss to 
residential land in the capital. 
This section consists of three parts. The first one 
describes land policy during the period 1956-1969. The 
second part examines the policy of land commercialisation 
in Greater Khartoum. In the third part we assess the effect 
of commercialisation on access. 
4.4.2 Pragmatic Urban Planning and Land Policy 
A number of aspects affect the formation and development 
of urban l and policy. Important among these are:the prevailing 
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mode of economic organisation of production, land tenure, 
government commitment to providing housing and the admin-
istrative arrangement for that provision. In Sudan both 
the mode of economic organisation and the system of land 
tenure substantially influenced land policy. The organ-
isation of the economy along capitalist lines under the 
second colonial state (1898-1956) brought about basic 
changes in land tenure and stimulated a change in the 
status of urban land from a use-value commodity to a com-
mercial commodity. Obviously, land policy was arranged to 
account for changes in the concept of land and to regulate 
its use and transactions, as we will explain below. The 
commitment of the state, in the post-independence period, to 
housing provision and the way this was organised shaped the 
patterns of land policy. In what follows we comment briefly 
on land tenure in the Sudan, and then outline the main facets 
of urban land policy during the 1956-1969 period . This his-
torical note is necessary for understanding the circumstances 
surrounding the process of land commercialisation during the 
1970s. 
(a) Land Tenure in Greater Khartoum 
There are two types of land ownership in Sudan: indivi-
dually-owned land and state-owned land. The total area of 
the country is 596.6 million feddans, of which six million 
are privately owned; 1 the rest is owned by the state (Awad, 
M.A., 1971,218). Communally-held lands are state lands sub-
ject to mere usufruct rights vested in a tribal or village 
community {ibid). The state-owned land, therefore, amounts 
to 98.9 % of the total area of the country. 
1. Feddan = 1.038 acres = 0.42 hectares. 
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In urban areas the proportion of privately owned land 
is markedly higher than the national average, particularly 
in Greater Khartoum. The main reason for this variation 
is that, during the settlement of land claims early this 
century, land titles were granted freehold and settlement 
campaigns were mostly confined to towns and riverain lands. 
Secondly, the colonial government sold large tracts of urban 
land to individuals, on a freehold basis, during the period 
1900-1907. From 1910 onwards a mixed system of landholding 
was introduced and by 1947 a leasehold system was adopted 
as the principal basis for disposal of state l and. Th is 
variation of tenure systems is reflected in the pattern of 
landholding in the capital. 
In Khartoum town, except in the Mogran area, the land 
between the railway station and the Blue Nile is in general 
l freehold, part being owned by Government. The land in the 
south of the town is leased, except for 122 privately-owned 
plots in El Qoz. The area east of the Airport is leased 
e xcept for half of the plots in Burri El-Mahas, which are 
freehold (Doxiadis Associates 1959,108). In Khartoum North 
town , the old settlements of Khogali a nd Hamad to the west 
and south-west of the town respectively, and part of the land 
in Shambat and Halfaya in the North-west are freehold. Other-
wise , all recent extensions are l easehold. In Omdurman, most 
of the land in the old town is privately owned (ibid.). All 
extensions from 1947 o nwards are leasehold. Land tenure in 
the capital can be summarised as follows: 
1. See Map, Appendix 6.1. 
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Land Tenure in Greater Khartoum (Per Cent) 1978 
Town Freehold Leasehold Mixed 
Khartoum 40 60 0 
Omdurman 30 65 5 
Khartoum North 65 35 0 
Source: Agency for International Development, 1978-111,30. 
The current expansion of the city is mostly taking 
place on communal lands which were either under seasonal 
agriculture or grazing. Thus as the capital grows land 
tenure tends to approximate the structure of national tenure, 
as long as the expansion occurs away from rivers, whose lands 
are mostly privately held. In the latter case, the state 
would have to invoke its acquisition powers to extend public 
control over riverain lands. 
Modes of Land Acquisition 
There are four laws that organise land acquisition between 
the state and private individuals in Sudan. 1 These are: the 
La nd Settlement and Registration Ordinance, 1925; the Pres-
cription and Limitation Ordinance, 1928; the Land Acquisition 
Ordinance, 1930, and; the Unregistered Land Act, 1970. 
1. There are other modes of acquisition that relate to land 
transac tions between privat e partie s - see El-Mahdi, S., 
19 79, chapter IV. 
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(1) The Land Settlement And Registration 
Ordinance 1925 
This Ordinance was a consolidation of earlier ordinances 
relating to land, which were issued during the period 1899-
1925. The Ordinance established state ownership over all 
waste, forest and unoccupied land unless a claimant proved 
the contrary. Claimants had to produce necessary documents 
to prove their rights to full ownership. This law was not, 
however, available for every person who had a claim to land. 
For both institutional and economic reasons only few areas 
of the country were settled under the 1925 Ordinance (El-
Mahdi , 19 71 , 8) . 
(2) The Prescription and Limitation Ordinance 1928 
According to this Ordinance, unregistered land in the 
presumptive ownership of Government as well as private land 
can be acquired by prescription. Thus Section (3) of the 
Ordinance provided that "ownership of land may be acquired 
by peaceful, public and uninterrupted possession thereof by 
a person not being a usufructuary for a period of 10 years .. ", 
" ... provided that if ownership be claimed as against the 
Government, the period shall be twenty years instead o f ten". 
The 1928 Ordinance, therefore, provided leeway for those who 
did not have access to the Land Settlement and Registration 
Ordinance 1925. Title to and rights over land were accessible 
via a civil court if a settlement process was not available. 
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(3) The Land Acquisition Ordinance, 1930 
Under Sections 4 and 5 of this Ordinance the Government 
can acquire ownership of land compulsorily for public purposes 
or for an individual to use it for local development, subject 
to the payment of fair compensation (El-Mahdi, S., 1979,93). 
(4) The Unregistered Land Act, 1970 
This Act transferred the presumptive ownership of Govern-
ment over unregistered land, established under the Land 
Settlement and Registration Ordinance 1925, into full owner-
ship. Thus Section (4) of the 1970 Act reads "all land of 
any kind whatsoever ... , which is not registered before the 
commencement of this Act shall, on such commencement, be the 
property of the Government and shall be deemed to have been 
registered as such, as if the provisions of the Land Settle-
ment and Registration Ordinance have been duly complied with". 
Section (5) of the 1970 Act prohibited the establishment of 
any easement and the acquisition of any right or title by 
prescription over any land which has been registered in the 
name of Government or which is deemed to be so registered 
under Section (4). The 1970 Act, therefore, limited the 
applicability of Section (3) of the Prescription and Limitation 
Ordinance 1928, mentioned above, as far as Government Land is 
concerned. However, the 1970 Act exempted persons who had 
been using Government Land f o r a long time from the acquisi-
tive effects of the Act subject to the approval of the Presi-
dent. The Act made the state the biggest landlord in the 
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country and gave it a dominant position in the property 
market. 
The above review shows that both the Land Settlement and 
Registration Ordinance, 1925, and the Unregistered Land 
Act, 1970, facilitated in varying degrees the control of 
the state over land. The Land Acquisition Ordinance, 1930, 
gives the state access to private land as need arises. Com-
pared with other Third World countries, particularly where 
land is overwhelmingly privately held, the above legal 
framework seems most appropriate for the development of an 
effective urban land policy. 
(b) Urban Land Policy 1956-1969 
One of the main objectives of any urban land policy 
would be to organise the supply of land for various uses, 
including residential use. The control of the state in the 
Sudan over land seems to facilitate the process of stable 
and orderly provision of residential land. However, the main 
problem in this respect was the lack of any clearly defined 
objective or strategy for urban land policy. We have noted 
above the absence of an urban development strategy. Because 
of that inadequacy, urban land policy came to be mainly 
geared towards meeting piecemeal housing targets. Thus the 
pragmatic approach of housing policy became characteristic 
of land policy too. The main focus of policy and practice 
centred around the preparation and distribution of residential 
land, the administration of replanning and upgrading schemes, 
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and the routine discharging of land-related problems, 
such as processing of land transactions and authorising 
of different land-uses. The principal policy measure 
followed in this respect was the operation of legal con-
trols such as planning, zoning and building regulations. 
These measures often have little or no effect in promoting 
an effective land strategy (Devas, N., 1983, 210). 
Another limitation of the land policy was organisational. 
Urban land administration did not have the organisational 
and technical resources conducive to developing an effective 
land policy. Typical of former British colonies, land con-
trol and administration was separate from land-use planning. 
Land-use planning was seen as a technocratic function, while 
land control and allocation were regarded as either political 
or an administrative tasK (United Nations, 1973,42). This 
schism in the approach to urban land hindered the emergence 
of definitive land objectives. 
Land Policy and Property Development 
In contrast to the state role in urban development during 
the 1950s and 1960s, there was little participation by the 
private sector, save the personal efforts of indiv i dual bene-
ficiaries in sites-and-services schemes. Three main r easons 
can be given : First, land disposal policy discouraged the 
involvement of the private sector in housing and property 
development. The replacement of an open-auction policy by 
closed a u c tion after independence directed the bulk of 
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allocated plots to civil servants, as we argue in Chapter 
Five. The alternative option for the private sector was 
to develop privately-owned land whose price and cost of 
development was prohibitive relative to expected returns 
in the housing or property markets of the 1960s. Secondly, 
the size and technical ability of property capital at the 
time was limited. Most of the capital accumulated in agri-
culture during the 1930s and 1940s was reinvested in burgeon-
ing import substitution industries in Khartoum in the 1960s 
{Mahmoud, 1978, 228). Commercial capital was originally 
expatriate until the late 1960s and was mostly transferred 
abroad. However, still a large slice of private capital 
went into housing and buildings during the period 1956-1970. 
As expatriates leaving the country at the time of independ-
ence hurriedly sold their properties, Sudanese merchants 
scrambled to buy them· (Ibid, p.l38) . 1 Furthermore, resi-
dential land allocations of the 1960s also attracted a cer-
tain amount of private capital in the construction of homes 
2 in the sites-and-services schemes. A third reason for the 
insignificant role of the private sector in property develop-
ment during the 1950s and 1960s was the absence of an urban 
land market. In addition to the fact that government is the 
biggest property owner, the main institutions of an urban 
land market were lacking, namely, the real estate agency and 
the mortgage finance institution. 
1. Apart from being a symbol of wealth and status, house 
ownership is a basic collateral for bank finance. 
2. Construction was partly financed from state loans to civil 
servants which we referred to in Section 4.3.2 above. 
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A small number of real estate and auction agencies 
existed. Their owners essentially worked in trade and 
took real estate as a secondary occupation (Balula, A., 
1967,20) . Despite their existence, most land/house trans-
actions were conducted outside them, on a personal basis 
be tween buyers and sellers. 
The main difficulty for the land market, however, was 
the absence of finance institutions. Government and com-
me rcial banks were the only lending institutions. While 
access to government loans was confined to civil servants, 
commercial banks gave priority to business finance. Thus 
over 60 per cent of total advances of commercial banks, 
during the period 1958-1967 went into financing foreign 
trade, (Saeed , O.H., 1970,20). The Estate Bank, Government-
owned, was established in 1968 to provide housing f inance 
and invest in property development. While its capital was 
limite d - £S 10 million - about 70 per cent of its ho using 
loans went to civil servants {US Agency for International 
Development, 1978, 111,40,43). 
Given the above reasons, private involvement in property 
development was confined to the efforts of individual plot 
owners. Absence of an effective property market a lso con-
formed to a popular conception that considered land as a con-
sumption commodity which was prized for its use value. It 
seems that state policy of allocating plots for nominal rather 
than economic price consolidated this attitude towards land. 
By the end of the 1960, however, urban growth in the capital 
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was running at a 7.8% annual rate and the housing deficit 
was building up so that much pressure came to bear on 
urban land. A tendency for realising economic value from 
the urban property was emerging. 
4.4.3 The Policy of Land Commercialisation 
The process of commercialising land in Sudan, which 
began in the early 1970s, can be attributed to the desire 
of the government to improve its revenues, as well as to 
an "investment strike" 1 on the part of commercial capital 
in the period 1969-1971, and its eventual swing to real 
estate. In what follows we look first at the factors 
behind the new land policy and then examine the response 
of the private sector to land commercialisation. 
(1) Factors Underlying the Sale of State Land 
As early as January 1971, El-Sahafa Daily addressed 
the idea of encouraging private investment in property 
development, following an interview with the Minister of 
2 Housing (El-Sahafa Daily, 11th and 12th January 1971). 
At that time such a proposition contradicted stated housing 
objectives limiting the commercial construction of costly 
villas and directing private capital into productive spheres 
(Five Year Plan 19 70, Vol.l, p.ll5) . Three years later, the 
1. The term is borrowed from Offe, c ., 1975,143. 
2 . At the time of writing newspapers in Sudan were state-
owned and controlled by the party (Sudan Soc i alist Union) . 
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Minister of Local Government, Housing and Community Develop-
ment announced a new land policy whose cornerstone was the 
effective utilisation of state land for both commercial and 
service uses. He stated that government land in the capital 
and the regions was to be put up for sale (People's Local 
Government Journal, Vol.2, No.2, 1974,72). The new policy 
was subsequently incorporated in the Six Year Plan 1977/78-
1982/83. Since 1974 large tracts of urban land were auctioned. 
In the budget estimates of 1978/79 returns from the sale of 
public land were put at £S 16 million. 
Urban land was considered a lucrative source of revenue 
that could be used to finance the rising costs of administra-
tion, particularly following the massive expansion in state 
administration during the early 1970s. Financial strains 
on local government were particularly severe in the aftermath 
of the 1971 reorganisation. This situation was aggravated by 
a considerable fall in local government revenues during the 
period 1969-1971. 
Another consideration behind the new land policy was the 
Government's intention to mobilise the financial remittances 
of Sudanese expatriates working in oil-producing Arab countries. 
This measure was considered beneficial to the balance o f pay-
ments, and as a way of improving government revenue s and of 
r e directing expatriate money into a useful purpose instead of 
it being spent on importing luxury commodities. One thousand 
plots were designated for this purpose in Khartoum town alone 
in 1978 (El-Sahafa, 1978,17,6). Sudanese expatriates were 
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promised handsome land concessions if they invested in agri-
cultural, commercial or industrial ventures in the Greater 
Khartoum area. 1 
A third factor behind the new land policy was govern-
ment's need to encourage the private sector to invest in 
high class housing. The expansion in state administration, 
especially in its upper echelons, as well as the influx of 
multinational companies, following a move towards an "open-
door" economic policy in 1972, stimulated the growth of 
demand for high class housing in the capital. The Six Year 
Plan 1977/78-1982/83 was quite explicit about the role 
assigned to the private sector in the Housing Plan, as we 
noted in Section 4.3.3 above. 
The commercialisation policy also received an enthusi-
astic response in the Housing Department. It was seen as 
an opportunity that would enable the Department to develop 
as an autonomous public corporation and invest in the housing 
sector on a commercial basis (National Housing Committee, 1981) . 2 
Taken together, the factors underlying the new land policy 
relate broadly to the political circumstances surrounding the 
inception of the May regime in 1969, its ideology and insti-
tutional form. They equally relate to the regime's subsequent 
1. A two-tier exchange rate introduced in September 1979 was 
attracting about $300 million a year from remittances of 
Sudanese expatriates (Africa Guide, 1982, p.349). 
2. In contrast to central and local government institutions 
the public corporations in the Sudan had a prestigious 
status and lucrative salaries. 
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transformation in 1971, in terms of its social and economic 
programme. This link between the new land policy and the 
political process is elaborated in Section 7.3 of Chapter 
Seven. 
(II) Response of the Private Sector to the New 
Land Policy 
We argued earlier that the inception of the May regime 
in 1969 triggered an 11 investment strike" by private capital, 
especially after the nationalisation and confiscation 
measures of 1970. The announcement of socialism as a goal 
and the apparent radical nature of the new regime frightened 
the capitalists and private investment declined drastically 
in 1969/70 (Mahmoud, 1984, p.l40). Commercial capital began 
to move into real estate, since it was generally considered 
a politically safe investment area, was taxed at a low rate 
and provided a protection against inflation. Moreover, it 
was, then, economically attractive in view of the growing 
demand for housing in the capital during the early 1970s. 
The post-1971 economic policy of liberalising the economy 
provided much assurance to private capital to operate openly. 
!.and. 
Thus following the allocation of high-class housingtin 1972, 
there was a boom in building activity and expansion in the 
building materials trade. As the new land policy was inaugu-
rated in 1974 private sector investment in urban property and 
c onstruction was already underway. There is no detailed data 
on the sectoral allocation of private investment during the 
period 1970-1975. However, the following table on the share 
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of the private sector in Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
during the Five Year Plan period serves to reflect a 
gradual rise of private investment in housing. 1 
Table 4.15 
Year 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
The Share of Private Sector in the Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation During the Period 
1970-1975 (£S millions) 
Housing Invest:rcent Other Investment Total Private 
Invesbrent 
16.3 36.4 52.7 
17.6 27.4 45.0 
20.7 37.3 58.0 
39.7 42.8 82.5 
18.4 63.5 81.9 
Source: Six Year Plan 1977/78-1982/83, Vol.l, p.l3. 
Private housing investment during the Five Year Plan 1970-1975 
represented 86 per cent of the Plan's total housing invest-
ment (£S 130.9 million), and 18.9 per cent of the Plan's 
overall investment (£S 595.8 million). Apart from investment 
in housing and buildings, most of the rest of the private 
sector investment during the Five Year Plan went into trade 
a nd transport. 
1. The fall of the private investment in housing in 1974 / 75 
was partly due to the completion of construction on the 
land which was allocated in the 1970 Housing Plan. It wa s 
also due to a shift in private investment to other sectors 
of the economy. 
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Given the absence of property-finance institutions, 
until about 1975 property finance came mainly from 
Sudanese capital, originating in agriculture or commerce. 
The period 1976 onwards witnessed the ·opening of foreign 
banks in Sudan, most of them branches of Arab banks. This 
development enhanced the property and construction sector 
as finance was made available. Some of these financial 
institutions, namely Faisal Islamic Bank, entered the pro-
perty market as developers as well. 
The property boom was also stimualted by the municipal 
policy of modernising the town centres of Greater Khartoum, 
during the period 1974-1978. Open market traders, street 
hawkers and pavement sellers were removed from town centres 
and placed in newly created stall-markets located on outer 
zones in each town. The same period witnessed the prohibition 
of prostitution in the capital and the eviction of prostitutes 
from inner city slums. These policy measures fostered a sharp 
rise in property values in the city centre as demand for com-
mercial buildings was growing. The business district expanded 
both horizontally and vertically. This process also encouraged 
owner-occupiers in the inner city areas to sell dear and move 
out into cheaper property. Although there is no data to guage 
the exact magnitude of this process, the conspicuous physical 
growth of the business district and its expansion into resi-
dential quarters is a significant indicator. 
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High returns from real estate, from foreign trade and 
from distribution swung the balance of investment in favour 
of commerce and property deals, and against agriculture 
and industry {Barbour, 1980, p.92). This economic pattern 
was reflected at a macro-level in changes in the shares of 
economic sectors in GDP (see eg. Appendix 2.1). 
The foregoing analysis reveals that private capital 
has responded favourably to the new land policy, investing 
in both commercial and residential property. Private capital 
also benefited from the availability of foreign finance in 
the post-1975 period. On the other hand, the Government had 
the opportunity to increase its revenues from the sale of 
lands and to a lesser extent from property taxes. Urban land 
and housing strategy assumed that the new land policy, by 
relieving the Government from investing in high-class housing 
and increasing its revenues, would enable housing authorities 
to take care of low-income housing. In the following section 
we review this assumption as we consider the implication of 
the commercialisation policy on access to land. 
4.4.4 The Impact of the commercialisation Process on Access 
to Residential Land 
Broadly speaking, there are three areas where the com-
mercialisation process might constrain the access of low-
income groups to urban shelter. These are: (a) the effect 
on the stock of residential land, (b) the effect on the ability 
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of beneficiaries in state-allocation programmes to consoli-
date their ownership,and {c) the indirect impact on illegal 
settlements. 
To begin with the first area, we argue that the sale 
of public land for investment purposes ntight have a high 
opportunity cost as far as future housing needs are concerned. 
The fact that the state owns 99 per cent of the country's land 
has always underpinned urban land policy, and fostered an atti-
tude that much public land can be disposed of without signifi-
cantly affecting Government's ability to meet low-income housing 
needs. This assumption is difficult to sustain for two reasons: 
First, the supply of urban land is physically limited. The 
urban catchment area can only provide optimal mobility within 
certain spatial limits, beyond which urban functions become 
costly. We noted above, (Section 4.4.2) that most river lands 
are privately held so that any future expansion can only occur 
away from rivers, unless acquisition powers were to be invoked. 
Moreover, some state land that lies immediately outside the 
metropolitan boundaries has been leased from 1974 onwards to 
indigenous and foreign developers. Thus in both private and 
state land, encumbrances would have to be resolved at some 
cost which must be weighed against returns from current sales 
of public land. Secondly, this misconception about the abund-
ance of Government land presumes that any piece of land can 
be readily put to specific use as need arises. Accordingly, 
the differential cost of future land development was assumed 
away. This understanding is not true, because each piece of 
land is unique and its value for use depends on its location. 
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The current disposal of state land for investment purposes 
would preempt future residential location in the city and 
could increase the cost of mobility for those who would 
live in new locations. This proposition is very likely 
since the new land policy and consequent land programmes 
were neither based on a comprehensive urban development 
strategy nor on a long term physical plan. The present 
land policy, therefore, leads to material reduction in the 
stock of residential land and could result in increasing 
the cost of mobility for residents of new locations. 
The second area where the impact of the commercialisa-
tion process might be serious, at least in the short term, 
is the effect on the ability of beneficiaries in state 
housing programmes to consolidate their possession for a 
reasonable length of time. It has been frequently stressed 
in the literature on low-income housing that the root of 
the problem is affordability. Housing policies may be des-
cribed as effective when target groups are capable of con-
structing their houses and of consolidating ownership. As 
we consider the impact of land commercialisation in Greater 
Khartoum the potential for consolidation seems uncertain. 
An obvious consequence of the commercialisation policy in the 
capita l was a sharp rise in land values. The gap between 
land's original price in Government programmes - and its re-
s ale price was immense. Government norma lly provided plot s 
in sites-and-services schemes for a nominal price which 
included the cost of land development. The following table 
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surveys prices of plots allocated in state housing pro-
grammes in Khartoum town in 1960-1977. 
Table 4.17 
Class of 
Land 
First Class 
Seoond Class 
Third Class 
Sources: l. 
2. 
Prices of Officially-Sponsored Plots in 
Khartoum Town 1960-1977 
1960 1970 1977 
Size Price £S Size Price £S Size 
aoorr? lCXX) 800m2 750 55Qr? 
60:xr? 560 6CQn2 600 450m2 
3CX:m2 60 3COm2 80 3(X)m2 
MenD, Ministcy of Housing 1970, and 1975. 
us Agency for International Development l978,III,6. 
Price 
1520 
710 
315 
£S 
According to property dealers, land prices in the capital 
have increased dramatically since the early 1970s. In Khartoum 
town prices peaked at £8 250-300 per square metre in the town 
centre, which is first class land (El-Ayyam Daily, 16.8.1978). 
Values declined the greater the distance from the centre. Thus 
prices of £8 200 and £S 150 per square metre were reported in 
Khartoum east and Khartoum west respectively (Ibid). While 
the former neighbourhood is first class land the latter is 
partly second class land. Prices then declined as one left 
the old town southward across the railway station to £S 60 per 
square metre in Khartoum No.2, a second class area, and £S 35 
per square metre in Khartoum No.3, an adjacent third class 
a rea (ibid). In third class neighbourhoods, recently distri-
buted in the city outer zone, plots were being sold for 
£8 3000-4000 (US Agency for International Development 1978, 
- 231 -
III,3l). A similar pattern of land values was reported in 
Omdurman and Khartoum North towns (El-Ayyam Daily, 16.8.1978). 
This property boom had a sharp impact on building 
materials and constructionlabour. The distribution of im-
ported building material has been controlled by a public 
corporation since 1973, and when construction materials were 
"officially" available access was extremely limited. The 
a lternative was the "black market" where prices were con-
siderably higher. For instance, while the official cement 
price was £S 40 per sack in 1977, it was supplied at £S 140 
by commercial distributors (US Agency for International 
Development, op.cit. 111,50). The price of bricks, though 
substandard both in size and quality, increased from £S 5.0 
per 1000 bricks in 1973 to £S 48 in 1980. A half lorry-load 
of building soil - commonly used to construct mud walls in 
third and fourth class areas - shot up from £5 0.45 in 1973 
to £S 15 in 1980. The same increase applied to other build-
ing materials as well as labour costs. 
Construction costs consequently rose considerably. 
According to local architects and contractors, f o r an average 
third class house the cost per square metre has increased 
from £S 20 to £S 60 during the period 1973-78 (ibid). A 
minimum house in a third class area with a roofed area of 50 
square metres, comprising a bedroom, a verandah, a kitche n 
and a toilet was estimated to cost about £S 3000 in 1978, ex-
c lusive of site-and-services cost. 
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Wages have not kept pace with the increase in the 
cost of living. 1 Annual average wages of workers were 
£S 223.6 and £8 280.8 in the private and public sectors 
respectively in 1973 (Masloum, 1974, quoted in Mustafa, 
1976). Government wages were increased in 1975 by 12% 
for high wage earners and 18% for low-wage earners (US 
AID, op.cit. pp.ll-24). 
Given this magnitude of rise in construction costs, 
rising land values in the property market, and a decline 
of wages in real terms, as a result of inflation, some bene-
ficiaries in state-sponsored housing programmes will cer-
tainly be tempted to reap the considerable difference between 
the official land price and the market price. One indicator 
that such a process has already taken place is the increasing 
number of high-rise buildings in third class areas, adjacent 
to first and second-class neighbourhoods. This process frus-
trates the objectives of the housing strategy since dis-
possessed families are added to the number of people in hous-
ing need as their plots pass into the property market. 
The third area where the impact of the commercialisation 
process may be examined is illegal settlements. Here the 
effect may be conceived in two ways:- (a) the effect of popu-
lation movement from legal residence to illegal settlements 
on living standards and occupancy rates, (b) the outcome of 
1. The increase in the cost of living was erratic, with 1971 
and 1976 showing virtually no inflation while the cost of 
living in 1974 and 1975 increased by 25% and 22% respectively. 
It showed a 17% increase in 1977. In 1978 it was 13% for 
high income families and 12% for low income families (US.AID 
1978, pp.ll-24). 
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extending land and housing commercialisation into illegal 
settlements. 
As for the first process, we already pointed out above 
the effect of rising l and values on the consolidation of 
ownership and the possibility of owners ending up in illegal 
residence. It was reported that many immigrant workers who 
were settled in older areas of the capital had sold their 
smaller plots to purchase larger ones on the outskirts of the 
city ( Ahrned , M., 1978). 
Another group of residents, more directly affected by 
rising land values, were tenants, especially those living in 
town centres where the occupancy rate is the highest in the 
country. In our sample survey in the Unity illegal settle-
ment of Orndurman town (Chapter Six) 17.8 per cent of the 
respondents last lived in the inner city areas in Omdurman 
and Khartoum towns. The rental market v1as tightened also by 
the reformulation of the Rent Restriction Ordinance 1953. It 
was argued that the Ordinance in its previous form had favoured 
the tenant and inhibited private investment (Sudanow, 1977,10). 
The new arrangement increased rent rates in third class and 
parts of second class areas, but exempted first class and part 
o f second class areas from the provisions of the Ordinance, 
so that their rents were t o be fixed by the market. 
this policy underestimated the "spiral effects " of rents in 
high class housing on the whole r ental market. As more people 
- whether home-consolidators or tenants - move into illegal 
settlements, greater overcrowding and deterioration in living 
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standards would follow. 
The commercialisation process might also lead to the 
integration of the informal land market into the formal 
one, with serious implications for communal land-users, 
1 t enants in illegal settlements and the Government. Already 
an informal land market operated in village lands on the 
metropolitan boundaries since the 1960s. These lands were 
theoretically state lands unde r effective communal use and 
administered by "native administrations". As cityward 
migration picked up in the latter half of the 1960s and 
demand for residential land grew, both "native administrators" 
and villagers began to deal in communal land (Abdel-Bagi, ~· 
cit., 23). By 1975 illegal settlements formed on those lands 
accounted for 29 per cent of the capital's population. Al-
though the Unregistered Land Act 1970 confirmed Government 
legal control over these lands, it did not prevent specul a tion 
and land occupation. 
The penetration and commercialisation of the informal 
l and market has adverse effects on rents in illega l settle-
ments. The process of sub-dividing plots for rental purposes 
is common in illegal settlements. The commercialisati on of 
the r ental market accele rates this process of subdividing 
plots, at the expense of average space standard and an over all 
decl ine in living standards for both tenants and owners. 
1. See Burgess, R., 1977. 
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The expansion of the informal market means the transfer 
of more communal lands from agricultural and graz ing use 
l into residential use. It is beyond the scope of our study 
to consider the effect of this process on "traditional" l and-
holders. But the ultima te effect will be a reduction in the 
stock of urban land and the transfer of public l and to land 
markets at considerable cost to the community and little 
material return to the Government. 
4.4.5 Conclusion 
We proposed at the beginning of this section that the 
commercialisation of urban land in the early 1970s affected 
s i gnificantly the pattern of land disposal in the capital. 
This proposition is examined against the background of pre-
vious urban land policy in the Sudan. The structure of land 
tenure gave the state a leading role in urban development 
with an insignificant contribution from the private sector. 
Evolving land policy, however, lacked clearly defined object-
ives and was mostly pragmatic. 
The value of urban land changed drastically during the 
last decade , as land entered the market as an economic cate-
gory . The background of this change relates to the political 
circumstances of the early 1970s and to the economic needs 
o f the regime. Even t u a lly , a vigorous property market emerged 
with serious implications for access t o land. We proposed 
1. This process is exemplified in the Halfaya neighbo urhood 
of the Khartoum North city during the period 1969-1977, 
according to an interview with the l eader of the town 
council, 1977-1979 , (18.12.1982). 
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that the commercialisation process would reduce the sto ck 
of residential land at a high cost, it would weaken the 
capacity of plotholders to consolidate their ownership, 
and it would have negative implications on the squatter 
population. 
4. 5 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
We proposed in this chapter that national development 
policy in the Sudan had significant and identifiable limit-
a tions on the implementa tion of urban social policy, name ly 
the distribution of residential land. These limitations 
c a n be traced in two spheres: the pattern of urban growth 
and its underlying dynamics, and the policy of land com-
me r c ialisation in the capital. 
In the first section of the c hapter we attempted t o 
expla in the rising rates of urban growth in relation to 
regional development policy and the increasing primacy of 
the capital. We argued that a pattern of uneven regional 
d istribution of inve stment and development, inherited from 
the c olonial state, has b e en maintained and stre ng the ned by 
successive deve lopment plans. Th i s pattern o f resource dis -
t r i bution produced r e giona l variations in i ncome s, emp l o yment 
a n d s ocia l services, betwe en the reg ions in centra l Suda n 
and those in weste rn and s outhern Sudan. The resul t was a 
c ontinuous flow of migrants, ma inly from the weste rn reg ion, 
into central regions and the capital. 
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The implications of rapid urban growth on housing 
were dealt with in the third section of the chapter. In 
addition to the negative effects o f uncontrolled urban 
growth on housing, we argued that the current urba n housing 
strategy was itself inadequate in two respects: the housing 
strategy was neither effectively integrated in a national 
settlement policy, nor was it based on a comprehensive urban 
development plan. The fact that housing planning was con-
ducted in near-isolation from other urban processes and with-
out adequate apprecia tion o f the possible effects of market 
forces on housing, undermined the proclaimed objectives of 
the housing strategy and tightened the housing situation. 
The second sphere where the effect of national policy 
on implementation was pronounced was the new land policy p r o -
claimed in 1974. This was examined in the fourth section of 
the chapter. It was shown that urba n land deve lopment was 
dominate d by the state t hroughout the 1950s and 1960 s, while 
t h e private sector had little participation. Evolving land 
policy was pragmatic and mostly oriented to meet piecemeal 
needs of the housing policy. Access to land was regulated 
by the state, as the real estate market was almost non-exist ent 
during the period 1956-1969. 
The e a rly 1970s witnessed, howeve r,the evolution of a 
vigorous property market in conjunction with a n ew land policy 
proclaimed in 1974. Factors behind the new land po licy as we ll 
as the response of the private sector were outlined. The like ly 
outcome o f the commercialisation proce ss was examined. We 
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proposed that the commercialisation process would reduce 
the stock of residential land needed to house low-income 
groups, it would weaken the capacity of new plotholders t o 
consolidate their ownership, and it would affect negatively 
the squatter population. 
The important result of the commercialisation process 
for our study, was the establishment of a third channel for 
the d istribution of residential land, be sides the Government-
sponsored allocation programmes and the illegal housing market . 
S ince Government-sponsored allocations are intended to benefit 
the low-income population who cannot buy their dwellings in 
the market, the implicit assumption of the new land policy was 
t hat the newly established r eal estate market would not inter-
fere with Government-controlled allocations. We argued that 
t he " spiral effects" of the property market already permeated 
rental markets, Government-sponsored residential plots and 
squatter settlements. The assumption o f separating the real 
estate market from Government-sponsored allocations cannot, 
therefore, be sustained . 
Policy assumptions behind the new l and policy were not 
dissimi l ar from those underlying regiona l development policy. 
In both cases , there was a n over-emphasis on the econ omic 
returns of policy (capitalist agriculture - land sales) and 
less concern with the socia l i mplications for target communi-
ties . In both situations, policy was conceived in sectoral 
terms as far as national economic planning was concerned, but 
the social impl ications of pol icy were not treated likewise . 
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The "externalities .. of development policy were not conceptu-
a lised in institutional terms at the national planning level 
s o that they may be adequately dealt with . This inadequacy 
at the level of national policy inte~acted, in varying v1ays, 
to affect the pattern of urban land disposal and the access 
of various groups to residential land. For this reason we 
argue that the limitations on policy implementation can be 
traced back to the national policy process rather than being 
treated as an isolated phenomenon at the level of implementing 
o rganisations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE STRUCTURE OF ALLOCATION 
OF URBAN RESIDENTIAL LAND 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
We will focus in this chapter on the specific agencies 
and processes of the allocation of residential land in 
Greater Khartoum. We present two main arguments about the 
natureofthe allocation process and its outcomes. We argue 
that the allocation structure does not provide all urban 
families with equal access to residential land. The rules 
of land, planning and service provision contained built-in 
biases against the access of the urban lower classes. 
Secondly, we maintain that the operation of the allocation 
structure in practice tended to generate further obstacles 
tb• access. 
The chapter consists of three sections. We present an 
overview of the institutional structure of the housing agen-
cies in the first section. In the second section we examine 
critically the allocation rules relating to land, urban 
planning and service provision. Finally, we focus in the 
third section on the operation of the allocation structure 
in practice and consider its distributive effects. 
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5.2 THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF HOUSING AGENCIES IN 
GREATER KHARTOUM 
5.2.1 General 
~his section presents an overview of the agencies 
responsible for land, planning, housing and service pro-
vision in the capital. A description of the institutional 
setting of housing is a necessary background to the analysis 
of the allocation rules in the following section (5.3). It 
will also highlight issues of administrative fragmentation, 
multiplicity of jurisdictions, and overlapping of decision-
centres that bore closely on the allocation process as we 
explain in Section 5.4 below. 
The institutional structure of the housing agencies 
underwent two basic changes during the 1970s. First, follow-
ing reorganisation of the local government in 1971, respon-
sibility for land disposal, housing and urban planning was 
shifted from the central government to provincial administra-
tion. Second, the central government recovered control over 
these jurisdictions in 1973/79. But, before we outline these 
developments and their concomitant institutional changes we 
will describe briefly the housing institutions during the 
first phase of the post-independence period. 
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5.2.2 Housing Administration 1956-1969 
Although legislation on land, urban planning and housing 
existed from the early days of the Condominium rule in Sudan 
(1898), urban planning institutions did not appear until 
after the Second World War. A town planning unit and a 
Central Town Planning Board were formed in 1946. Statutory 
powers over urban land and planning were vested in the Gov-
ernor-General and carried out by a number of central 
departments. These included: the Town Planning Unit and 
the Directorate of Lands, both in the Legal Department; the 
Central Town Planning Board and the Surveys Department and 
the Popular Housing Unit in the Labour Bureau of the Intelli-
gence Department. A host of other departments were also in-
volved in urban development either through the provision of 
hous ing for employees or by carrying out construction and 
related activities for other departments. These included 
departments such as Construction and Public Works, Education, 
Health, Defence, Civil Aviation and Sudan Railways. 
Following independence in 1956 the inherited institutiona l 
structure was prese rved with minor modifications. But the 
number of governmental units multiplied and the responsibilities 
of the housing agencies increased considerably. More coordina-
tion was called for, within and b e tween housing agencies. 
Shortly before independence a Ministry for Local Govern-
me nt was established (1954). It included the departments of 
Popular Housing, Town Planning and the Directorate of Lands. 
- 243 -
The Surveys Department went to the new Ministry of Industry 
and Mining while the Lands Registry remained in the Judicial 
Department. 
The Central Town Planning Board was the institution 
responsible for organising urban planning and coordinating 
the activities of the various departments and units involved 
1 in urban development. It consisted of representatives from 
the ministries/departments of Local Government, Construction, 
Surveys, Health, Housing, Lands and Town Planning. The 
record of the Board contained a number of limitations. Weak 
coordination within and between respective departments was 
reported (e.g. Ahmed, 1978, p.47). Centralisation of the 
planning process and remoteness from the implementing agencies 
was also underlined (e.g. Zein, K., 1978, p.216; and Mazari, 
s., 1982). Generally, planning of urban housing remained 
centrally controlled throughout the period 1956-1969. 
5.2.3 The Reorganisation of Housing Institutions: 1969-1982 
(a) The First Phase, 1971-1977 
The year 1969 marked the formation of the first ministry 
of housing in the history of the country. It integrated 
housing and urban planning which were scattered over a number 
of departments. The Central Town Planning Board was dissolved 
and its functions were divided between the Minister of Housing 
and the provincial authority. However, following the promul-
gation of the 1971 Local Government Act, urban housing, land 
1. According to the provisions of the Town and Village Planning 
Act 1956. 
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use and urban planning functions were assigned to provincial 
administration. The Ministry of Housing was subsequently 
dissolved (1973) and the Departments of Housing and Lands 
were annexed to the Ministry of Local Government. 
Under the 1971 Act the Province Executive Council (PEC) 
became the planning authority. Each council had a committee 
on building, planning and housing, responsible for: 
1. The control and regulation of building activity; 
2. Implementation of town and village planning and 
replanning regulations; 
3. The disposal of governmental land; 
4. The preparation and upkeep of maps of residential 
areas, and, 
5. The provision of housing (The Establishing Warrant 
of the People's Executive Council of the Khartoum 
Province, 1973, Ministry of Local Government). 
The committee consisted of three categories of persons: 
councillors, general administrators and technical officers. 
Field agencies such as local land and planning units 
came, after the 1971 Act, under the direct control of pro-
vincial administration. Thus, the distance between policy 
planning - at provincial level - and implementation was 
narrowed down with the same personnel participating, more 
or less, in the two processes. This arrangement should have 
improved coordination and policy follow up, but the 1971 Act 
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provided for a dramatic expansion of the administrative 
levels and units. Under the 1951 Local Government Ordinance 
Khartoum Province was divided into four administrative units: 
three municipal councils and one rural council. Following 
the introduction of the 1971 Act the administrative levels 
and units mushroomed into:- 31 local town and village coun-
cils, six district councils and a province executive council 
(see Fig. 5.1). The result was a complex vertical and hori-
zontal network of communication and considerable brakes in 
the policy process. 
Outside the structure of the urban administration there 
were a number of autonomous agencies providing specific urban 
services. These included the Public Electricity and Water 
Corporation, the Ministry of Construction and Public v-.:orks 
and the Estate Bank. 
Another institution closely involved in urban administra-
tion was the Party, that is the Sudanese Socialist union (SSU). 
The Party had a hierarchical structure running parallel to 
that of the local administration, at the national, regional 
and provincial levels. It participated in the policy process 
both directly through its delegates sitting in the administra-
tive agencies, particularly in the Province Executive Council 
- the senior policy-making organ - and indirectly by sponsoring 
councillors for different levels of urban administration. 
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This complex institutional structure of urban admin-
istration fostered considerable coordination problems among 
the administrative units within levels, across levels and 
between the provincial administration, on the one hand, and 
the central agencies and the public corporations on the 
other. Implementation of the 1977 Housing Plan represented a 
test-case for the effectiveness of the structure of urban 
administration. In Section 5.4 below, we will consider some 
of the problems which have arisen in this respect. 
(b) The Second Phase, 1977/78-1982 
The period 1977 onwards witnessed certain political 
developments that facilitated a return of the housing, land 
and urban planning jurisdictions to the central government. 
Paradoxically this renewed centralisation at the metropolitan 
level occurred through a process towards decentralisation 
(regionalisation) at the national level. The latter culmin-
ated in the Regional Government Act, 1981, that established 
five regional governments in Northern Sudan in addition to 
the regional government in Southern Sudan, already in exist-
ence since 1972. 
The new reorganisation of the urban administration was 
subsequently enacted in the Khartoum Administration Act, 1980. 
It amounted to a full swing return to the 1951 Ordinance in 
which central agencies controlled the housing functions. Under 
the 1980 Act housing and urban development became the res-
ponsibility of the national Ministry of Construction and Public 
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~ig . 5.1 The Structure of Khartoum Province Administration 
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Works. Housing policy was prepared centrally by the Ministry 
in conjunction with the ministries of Planning and Finance. 
Implementation was the responsibility of the Department of 
Housing and Directorate of Lands, both coming under the 
~inistry of Construction and Public Works. The Department 
of Housing consisted of five main sections: Lands survey, 
Town Planning, Sewerage, Housin~ Projects and Research Unit. 
The Directorate of Lands comprised a central office and three 
regional units in the cities of Khartoum, Omdurrnan a nd 
Khartoum North (see Fig. 5.2). Other central agenc ies in-
vo lved in urban development such as the Water and Electricity 
Corporation continued to operate independently of the struc-
ture of the urban administration. 
In contrast to problems of administrati~6 fragmentation 
and multiplicity of jurisdictions which characterised the 
institutional structure of the housing agencies during the 
first half of the 1970s, the new structure of urban admin-
istrati on seemed to have generated a different set of proble~s . 
The centralisation of housing and urban development functions 
brought an increase in the responsibilities of the housing 
agencies disproportionate to their actual resource capabilities . 
In sect ion 5.4 below we highlight the implications of the 
centralisation measures for the access of differ e n t groups to 
urban housing. 
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5.2.4 Conclusion 
We have provided above a brief description of the 
institutional structure of the housing agencies in Greater 
Khartoum during the 1970s. Changes in the structure and 
functions of these agencies followed closely the changes 
in the urban administration and in the local government 
system. During the first half of the 1970s the functions 
of housing and urban development were assigned to provin-
cial administration under the 1971 Local Government Act. 
Central government recovered control over these functions 
in 1977/78. Reorganisation of urban administration during 
the two phases generated institutional changes in the 
structure of housing agencies and produced a different 
set of problems and challenges in each phase. The policy 
implications of these changes and their outcome for access 
to housing will be discussed in Section 5.4 below. 
5.3 THE SOCIAL CONTENT OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR LAND 
PLANNING AND SERVICES PROVISION 
5.3.1 General 
The main argument in this section is that limitations 
on access to residential land may be traced back to the 
basic laws and regulations which organised and continue to 
organise urban development in Greater Khartoum. An under-
lying notion of a socially stratified city was built into 
t he lega l framework of urban development which in turn 
prevented equal access. We shall argue first that, being 
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initially premised on a capitalist notion of land allocation, 
land disposal laws and regulations did not envisage prefer-
ential access for the economically weak sector of urban 
population under the colonial state. However, when prefer-
ential allocations were introduced in the post-independence 
period most benefits went to the state bureaucracy. Secondly, 
we argue that urban planning laws consolidated the limita-
tions on access set by the land disposal system, and served 
to maintain the benefits going to the state bureaucracy. 
Finally, we show that the association between the class of 
land and levels of service provision resulted in unequal 
access to basic municipal services. By virtue of their place 
in the land classification system, poor families qualified 
for sub-standard levels of services. We will consider first 
the land disposal laws and regulations, then we will examine 
critically certain aspects of the urban planning laws and 
regulations; and finally, we will assess the impact of land 
and planning laws on levels of provision of basic urban ser-
vices in the city. 
5.3.2 Land Disposal Laws and Regulations 
Urban land in the Sudan is classified into three classes 
that vary according to location, space and building specifi-
cations (see sub-section 5.3.3. below). Land disposal was 
governed until 1982 by the 1923 Land Rules. According to 
these Rules eight regulations were i~sued, under the colonial 
state, to control and organise the disposal of govern~ental 
land for towns, villages, religious places, clubs, petrol 
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stations, private schools, private hospitals and cinemas. 
The basic rule for disposing of town lands for resi-
dential, commercial, industrial or leisure uses was that 
land must be put up for sale in a public auction, after 
being approved by the Central Town Planning Board. Until 
1947, government land was disposed of through a variety of 
special arrangements according to the particular uses 
applied for. A national scheme was introduced in 1947 to 
control and organise urban land disposal for different uses. 
This scheme continued in operation, with important modifi-
cations- until the time of my research (1982). 
The Towns Lands Scheme 1947 
The 1947 scheme cancelled previous land disposal 
arrangements. The most important change the scheme intro-
duced was that it established the leasehold system as the 
main basis for land disposal (see Chapter Four, Section 
4.4.2(a) above). The terms of leases were worked out accord-
ing to the class of land. Thus three different tenures were 
provided in the scheme: 
First Class land: 50 years renewable for 30 years. 
Second Class land: 30 years renewable for two periods, 
20 years each. 
Third Class land: 20 years renewable for two periods, 
10 years each. 
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Variation in tenure was based on the durability of 
buildings in each class of land. Building specifications 
vary from one class to another as we explain in sub-section 
5.3.3 below. 
The main thrust of the 1947 scheme, however, was the 
organising of land-disposal on a market basis. An over-
view of the text of the scheme shows that it was more con-
cerned with boosting government revenues from sales of 
public land than it was with how the land disposal process 
contributed to solving housing problems. 
Paragraphs 9 to 16 and 21 to 30, in the text of the 
scheme, focused entirely on the auction procedures. In 
paragraph 12 the legislator requested that" ... in general, 
plots should not be dribbled onto the market so as to force 
h igh premium bids". Paragraph 29 warned that "too many plots 
should not be offered at a single auction". 
On entry conditions, paragraph 15 provided that a bicde r 
must prove his financial ability to build according to the 
specifications associated with the particular class of l and. 
The Land Inspector in charge was required to verify the afore-
mentioned condition and exclude those who seemed ineligible. 
While one of the main aims of this scheme was to regulate 
the disposal of government land for residential use, the em-
phasis on financ ial returns seemed to dissociate land allo-
cation from the housing question . Obviously, the scheme 
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anticipated that recipients of land would be financially 
capable of building for themselves and for others. It 
was, therefore, basically designed to promote urban 
developments on capitalist lines with the state simply 
disposing of land to private developers. The latter would 
resolve the housing problem through putting more dwellings 
on the market. This strategy was particularly attractive 
in the light of a marked economic prosperity and rising 
housing demand in the capital in the immediate post-World 
War II period. 
Given the above perspective about the aims of land 
disposal, the 1947 scheme contained a limited concept of 
preferential allocation. 1 Preferential allocation was 
deemed permissible only in two situations: 
(a) "For persons who, in the interest of planning, 
are giving up some interest in l and .. " and 
(b) for cooperative societies ... (para 1 7) . 
It is obvious from the foregoing review that the con-
cept of state-subsidised housing or subsidised reside ntial 
plots was completely absent in the scheme. Provision of 
urban housing was left to the market system and the financial 
ability of consumers. This approach to land disposal pro-
vided the foundation for other legislation relating to urban 
development , such as the regulation of physical plannins and 
1. Paragraph 16 reads "In no case will auctions be restricted 
by Lands Inspector requiring a financial or other qualifi-
cation unless the consent of the Commissioner of Lands is 
first obtained . Such consent will only be given in v e ry 
exceptional circumstances" . (1947 Towns Lands Scheme) . 
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service provision as we explain below. 
The system of land disposal was changed in the post-
independence period and a closed-auction system was intro-
duced which subsequently became the predominant system (see 
Chapter Four Section 4.3.2). However, the differentials in 
land classes and associated advantages central to the pre-
vious land disposal system (i.e. Market system) were kept 
intact. Thus, both the urban planning laws and the regula-
tions of levels of service provision still maintained the 
same structure of advantages and disadvantages inherited 
from the 1923 Land Rules and 1947 scheme. The main differ-
ence was that the criteria of land disposal were no longer 
mainly economic as we explain in the following sub-section. 
As the 1947 scheme focused mainly on land disposal 
through public auctions it included no provisions for con-
ditions of entry to closed-auctions. Although the closed-
auction became the main system of land disposal during the 
post-independence period, there was still no consensus on 
entry rules as we find out in Section 5.4 below. We will 
argue that the absence of legislation on these rules and 
their vagueness made them open to differing interpretations 
and manipulation. 
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5.3.3 Urban Planning Laws and Regulations 
We argue in this sub-section that urban planning laws 
and regulations did not facilitate equal access to resi-
dential land for all the urban population. The differential 
access generated can be traced in the quality of sites and 
the size of plots. Although the underlying capitalist basis 
of the land disposal system (discussed above) was modified 
in the post-independence period, the discriminating aspects 
of the previous system of land disposal were maintained in 
the planning legislations. State bureaucracy benefited most 
from the presence of these differentials. 
Three basic laws govern urban planning in the Sudan. 
These are: the Town and Village Planning Ordinance 1956, 
the Town Replanning Ordinance 1950, and the Town Planning 
Regulations 1957. The 1956 Ordinance defines the planning 
aims and objectives, and specifies the planning authority, 
its powers and functions. The 1957 regulations, on the 
other hand, spell out the details of land-use, residential 
classes, and plot and street spaces. We will examine below 
the distributive effect that planning regulations fostered 
in relation to residential location and plot space. 
(a) The Effect of Planning Regulation on Site Quality 
According to the provisions of the 1957 Town Planning 
Regulations urban land is classified into three classes: 
First, second and third class land. Site location has been 
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one of the underlying criteria of classification, along 
with plot space and building specification (see point (b) 
below in this sub-section). 1 
The location of various classes of land in Greater 
Khartoum was basically determined by two criteria: the 
relative proximity of land to the waterfront and land 
altitude. Both first and second class land in Khartoum 
were located close to the waterfront of the Blue Nile 
2 
and extended south easterly. Third and fourth (slum and 
illegal settlements) class land mostly occupied the west 
and south-western part of the city. The same crite ria 
applied to site distribution in the cities of Khartoum 
North and Omdurman. In the l atter city, first a nd second 
class categories were only introduced during the 1940s. 
Thus, first and second class land were located near t he 
wa t erfront of the main Nile,whereas third and fourth class 
land spread mainly to the west, south-west and north-west 
of the city. 
As for the criterion of a ltitude it is more visible 
in Khartoum city which was the object of early p l anning 
legislation . 3 The land to the north and east is higher 
(about 378 metres) and thus better drained and healthy. 
Land in the west and south-west of the city, on the other 
1. The initial rationale for classifying land according to 
these criteria is examined critically in Chapter Seven 
Section 7.3.3(b) below. 
2. See map on location of residential classes, Appendix 5 .1. 
3. See map on altitude, Appendix 5.2. 
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hand, is low, shallow, muddy and subject to inundation by 
high floods of the White Nile (Hamdan, G., 1960, in Pons, 
op.cit., p.235). It is also exposed to the devastating 
autumn torrents and to the strong winds and sandstorms of 
summer. The criterion of altitude applied equally to the 
city of Khartoum North, but not to Omdurman city where land 
is relatively flat and dry. 
A basic feature of the Sudanese system of land classi-
fication, therefore, is that the class of land indicates the 
physical quality of the site and determines its economic 
value. We noted in the preceding sub-section that access 
to better quality land was linked to the economic ability of 
applicants. After independence, land disposal has been con-
ducted in closed auctions in which access to first and second 
class land depended, in the main, on occupation. Civil 
servants and, to a lesser extent, private sector managers 
were the main beneficiaries of high class land allocations 
during the period 1960-1973, as the following cases illustrate. 
Rules of access discriminated against merchants, traders and 
those employed in the 11 informal" sector, as we discover in 
Section 5.4 below. 
In 1960, the Khartoum New Extension was planned as first 
and second class residential quarters. The project consisted 
of 1,312 plots allocate d in a closed auction exclusively for 
senior civil servants, and 810 plots offered for market allo-
cation in an open auction (Memo. Hinistry of Housing, 1975). 
Another high class residential scheme carried out in the 
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capital in 1972 included 1,380 first and second class plots. 
Most of these went to senior civil servants and private 
sector managers. While 68.8% of allocated plots went to 
the two latter groups, only 31.2% of plots were offered to 
merchants and businessmen(ibid). 
Preferential treatment for the State burJea~racy generated 
obvious limitations on the access of other groups as far as 
better quality sites were concerned. Such subsidised access 
land had two further specific implications for housing oppor-
tunities for lower income groups in the city. 
The first implication concerns the effect of the policy 
of preferential treatment for bureaucracy on budgetary allo-
cations for low-income housing. Because of the high cost of 
construction in first and second class residential areas, bene-
ficiaries in closed auctions often sought construction loans, 
either from the government or from commercial banks. 1 Housing 
loans given by the government in the Ten Year Plan (1961/ 62-
1970/71 amounted to 36.2% of the public sector housing budget 
(see Table 4.9, p. 198 above). These housing loans went to 
2 
civil servants only. Such a large allocation to housing loans 
has reduced the finance available for other aspects of housing, 
p a rticularly those relating to provision of the infrastructural 
l. The 1957 Planning Regulations stipulate that all buildings 
on first class land and at least the perimeters of buildings 
on second class land must be built of brick, stone or concrete. 
Buildings on third class land may be built of mud. 
2. The other main source of housing finance was the Estate Bank. 
It was reported that about 70% of its housing loans went to 
civil servants (AID, 1978, para.lll-43); for the distribution 
of housing loans according to income level during the 1970s, 
see Appendix 5.3. 
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services in third and fourth class residential areas. 
Some of the beneficiaries of high class housing who 
failed to secure construction loans had to sell their 
plots and buy cheaper ones elsewhere. In this case sub-
sidised access to land was used by some civil servants to 
generate income. As this income was spent on buying land 
in the market it affected the prices of land in the city, 
and this brings us to the second implication of bureaucrats' 
preferential access for the housing opportunities of low-
income groups. 
House location is now an important status symbol in 
Greater Khartoum. Bias against merchants and businessmen 
in allocations of high class land stimulated a movement by 
the wealthy into middle and lower class areas adjacent to 
high class residential quarters. This process was particularly 
evident in Khartoum city in Al-Geraif neighbourhood, which is 
adjacent to Riyadh town, a peculiarly high class area (e.g. 
see El-Sahafa Daily, 26.10.82). It was also noticeable in 
the rapid spread of multi-storey buildings in the eastern 
flank of Eastern Deims (one of the poorest third class quarters 
in Khartoum) that faces Khartoum's New Extension, the first 
high class area built in the post-independence period. 
The result was an immediate rise in land prices during 
the 1970s in these third class areas. Some resident families 
were tempted to sell dear and move to outer zones. We argued 
in Chapter Four, Section 4.4.4, that the activation of the 
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land market has tightened the rental market and stimulated 
an outward movement to illegal settlements. 
From what has been said above, we may conclude that 
civil servants had preferential access to the best sites 
in the city. Their access to high class land qualified 
them for big housing loans at the expense of budgetary 
allocations to low income housing. We also noted that the 
bias against the business class in the distribution of 
high class housing impelled them to buy into middle and 
lower class areas that were adjacent to high class a reas. 
This process induced an upward rise in the land prices with 
negative implications for the housing opportunities of low 
i ncome families. 
(b) The Effect of Planning Regulation on Plot Space 
We point out in this subsectionthatplanning regulations 
determine plot space according to the class of land; the 
higher the class the larger the space. Preferential alloca-
tion of high class land t o civil servants gave them access to 
larger plots. This pattern of allocation seems to contradict 
both the earlier economic basis of land disposal and the 
criterion relating to the minimum space standards per person . 
The Town Planning Reg ulations 1957 provide for the follow-
ing minimum dimensions of plots: 
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First class area 
Second class area 
Third class area 
Planning experience both under the colonial state and in 
the post-independence period persistently maintained the 
differences in plot space between the three residential 
classes of land. On the other hand, no consensus has been 
reached about specific space standards for each residentia l 
class. 
In Khartoum's New ExtenSion, the plot spaces granted 
in 1960 for first and second class land were 873m2 and 600m2 
respectively. Twelve years later another high class allo-
cation carried out in Khartoum City provided plot spaces of 
880m2 and 65om2 respectively. 
By comparison, in Khartoum's Third Class Extension 
a llocated in 1963, plots of 300m2 were granted. Another 
project in third class land implemented in 1972 provided 
2 plot spaces of 360m . 
Most commentators on space standards in urban Sudan con-
sidered that the spaces granted were over-sized. Yet, while 
most of these studies have recommended a r eductio n in the 
minimum plot space, they seem to h ave approved of maintaining 
1 
space differentials between the three residential classes. 
l. Exceptions to this statement are Elias, E . 1970, and 
Hijazi, N. 1981. 
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An early study of the space standards in the Sudan was 
conducted by Doxiadis Associates (1960). The study was con-
cerned with the effect of the size and shape of urban plots 
on urban economics. It recommended the following table for 
determining minimum and maximum plot spaces for different 
income groups:-
Table 5.1 Relation of Plot Size to Income Groups 
Space in 
square 
metres 
Minimum 
Maximum 
Income 
groups 
Lowest Lower-Middle Higher-Middle Highest 
108 135 315 594+ 
135 252 594 
Source: Doxiadis Associates 1960, p.302. 
A subsequent study (Ahmed, 1974) provided another model 
for space determination. The same model was endorsed in the 
Interim Housing Plan 1975:-
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Fig. 5. 3 A Model for Space Determination 
Monthly Incane 
in £5 
Plot Space 
in sq.m. 
200 
228 
256 
320 
400 
480 
560 
640 
15 30 60 
30 60 90 
Source: Ministry of Housing, 1975. 
90 
120 
120 150 200 
150 200 200+ 
Both of these models initially based their calculations 
of space standards on family income. But the second model 
left the determination of the exact plot space to be fixed 
according to criteria of: 
(a) Family size, age and sex structure 
(b) Family growth propensity, and 
(c) Family income (National Housing Plan, 1975, 
p.23, Ministry of Housing). 
Although the latter model introduced new criteria for calcu-
lating plot space, nevertheless it grounded space determination, 
in the final analysis, on family income. Its proposed space 
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ranges, therefore, conformed to the established pattern of 
land classification. 
The above models seem to downplay or overlook family 
size as an important determinant of space standards. Average 
family size is usually larger among low-income families and 
therefore their space needs per family are more than those 
o f middle and upper income groups. However, according t o the 
p revail ing regulations, poor families still get less space as 
the following tables illustrate . 
Table 5.2a: Minimum Plot Space According to Land Class 
Class of Land Minimum Plot Average Family Area per 
Space (sq.m.) Size Person (sq . m. ) 
First Class 800 4 200 
Second Class 400 5 80 
Third Class 300 6 50 
Source: National Housing Plan, 1975, p.l9, Ministry of Housing 
Table 5. 2b Occupancy Rate 
Class of Land Persons per Room 
First and Second Class 2.6 
Third Class 3.2 
Fourth Class 3.7 
source: Six Year Plan, 1977, p.l80. 
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In practice, as a result of sharing and sub-letting most 
low-income families lived in areas far below the minimum 
standards. Given family size, it is obvious that low-income 
families qualify for larger plots if space standards were 
based on space needs per person. But low-income families 
cannot afford the economic price of larger plots, since 
these are designed as first and second class land whose 
price is high and building specifications are difficult to 
meet. 
Yet the preferential access of the bureaucracy to high 
class land contradicts the same economic logic that deprived 
low income families from having larger residential plots. 
First, civil servants acquired plots at subsidised prices 
either in closed auctions (as in the 1960 allocations) or in 
a lottery at a low fixed price (as in 1972 allocations). A 
study by the US Agency for International Development found 
the following differences between subsidised prices and the 
market value of government-allocated land in Greater Khartoum 
(1977). 
Table 5.3 Lost Revenue on the Sale of Land 
Class of Plot Price of1 Estimated Land £S Value £5 
First Class 150 1,150 
Second Class 70 570 
Third Class 10 210 
1. Excluding cost of development. 
Source: AID, 1978, Para.lll-7. 
Market Lost 
Revenue £S 
1,000 
500 
200 
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Second, civil servants were able to meet the building 
specifications as a result of state housing-loans. Thus, 
both land price and construction were most likely to be 
subsidised from public funds. 
We may conclude that limitations on access to better 
sites and larger plots were rooted in the underlying 
economic bases of planning regulations. But these criteria 
did not apply to civil servants in the post-independence 
period. The above limitations mostly affected the access 
of urban poor families. 
5.3.4 Impact of Urban Planning on Access to Municipal 
Services 
We will focus in this sub-section on the eff ect of the 
land classification system on the levels of service provision 
for different groups of urban families. We note that levels 
of provision decline, the lower the class of land. Whereas 
the basis of service provision is essentially economic , the 
preferentia l access of the state bureaucracy to high class 
land guaranteed it a further advantage of higher levels of 
service provision. On the other hand, because of their p lace 
in the land classification system, lowe r income g r oups were 
assigned lower levels o f provision. Actual provision l e vels 
seldom reached the official standards. We shall examine first 
the official standards of provision and then consider actual 
performance. 
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(a) Official Standards of Services: 
By municipal services we mean the basic utilities such 
as water and electricity and the infrastructural services 
such as site preparation, drainage system and roads. In 
Sudan all these services are part of the housing package 
and their cost is usually paid in advance by beneficiaries 
before they receive their plots. Each class of land is 
associated with a specific level of service. These services 
vary from one class to another. For instance, third-class 
land is assigned the following services: 
1. Preparation of the site for construction; 
2. Construction of embankments; 
3. Digging of open drains; 
4. Installation of lights in main streets and public parks; 
5. Connecting water mains to plots; 
6. Installation of electricity lines; 
7. Compacting main roads; 
All the above services obtain in second class residential 
areas plus:-
8. Paving all main streets and compacting internal roads; 
9. Provision of sewerage network or construction of a 
common septic tank for every two houses; 
All the aforementioned services apply to first class areas 
in addition to the following:-
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10. Compacting and paving of all streets; 
11. Construction of covered drainage network, and, 
12. Compacting and paving of pedestrian precincts (National 
Housing Plan 1975, pp.25,26, Ministry of Housing). 
The above enumeration shows how levels of provision 
change with the class of land. We may note that only the 
early economic basis underlying the land disposal system 
can explain these differential levels of services provision. 
Yet the bureaucracy was exempted from those economic condi-
tions by virtue of its preferential access to high class 
land. In fact, the real levels of provision in first and 
second class land were higher than those stipulated above 
(ibid). The 1975 Housing Plan deliberately reduced them in 
order to bring down the service costs to the financial abili-
ties of civil servants. At the same time, the prescribed 
levels of provision for third class areas were markedly higher 
than what was actually provided, as we find out below. 
(b) The Actual Levels of Services Provision 
We noted above that the regulations earmarked a low level 
of services to low income groups. However, actual levels of 
provision seldom reached even these official standards. Limit-
ations on performance occurred mainly due to lack of coordina-
tion among respective agencies and financial difficulties in 
meeting the cost of services. The outcome was that third 
class areas often had to wait for many years before they got 
basic services, as the following case illustrates. 
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In early 1967 some 22,000 third class residential plots 
were allocated in Greater Khartoum. The cost of the urban 
services within this development was put at £S 9,380,168 in-
cluding water, electricity, drainage, roads, health and 
security services. Since these services were normally pro-
vided by several agencies costs were supposed to have been 
budgeted separately by each department and then submitted 
to the Ministry of Finance for approval. However, the res-
pective agencies did not include the project's cost in their 
budgetary estimates, and the allocated plots remained with-
out services until the early 1970s (Five Year Plan, 1970, 
pp .2-4). 
Such coordination problems increased during the 1970s 
following the process of the administrative reorganisation 
which we referred to in Section 5.2 above. There were cases 
of overlap between agencies. One implication was that bene-
ficiaries were double charged for urban services. For instance, 
the Water and Electricity Corporation demanded that bene-
ficiaries in a Khartoum low-cost housing project (1978) paid 
a sum of £S 89,000 prior to installing water and e l ectricity 
networks. In the meantime, beneficiaries had already paid 
these costs, though at a lower rate, to the Housing Department 
as part of the initial land price. After heated communications 
between the two agencies and protests from beneficiaries, it 
was decided that the beneficiaries should pay the outstanding 
bill (Memo. Ministry of Housing, undated). 
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Another source of difficulties on the provision of 
the prescribed levels of urban services was their rising 
cost and the decline in the municipal revenues since the 
early 1970s. The expansion in the structure of local 
government during the 1970s inflated the bill of administra-
tive costs and fostered a decline in the expenditure on 
urban services. This trend is illustrated by the following 
table. 
Table 5.4 
Year 
Category 
Personnel 
Services 
Local Government Expenditure in Khartoum 
Province (in £ millions) 
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 
4.7 12.0 12.8 
4.1 3.2 2.8 
Source: From El-Reyeh, M. {1978), p.45. 
The decline in the municipal revenues and the rise in the 
cost of urban services called for a reconsideration of revenue 
sources and for a review of the costing arrangements of urban 
services. As early as 1970, the deputy ender-Secretary of 
Local Government warned that neither the central nor the Local 
Government had the funds to subsidise the level of urban servic es 
that was envisaged in the Five Year Housing Plan (Memo. Ministry 
of Local Government, 1970). In a joint letter to provincial 
c ommissioners, the ~inisters of Housing and Loca l Governme n t 
l ai d down a policy that beneficiaries in land allocations must 
pay the full economic cost of basic services {Ministry of 
- 271 -
nousing 1970) . In contrast to a system of subsidised urban 
services that prevailed during the 1950s and the 1960s a 
new trend towards cost-conscious housing policy emerged 
during the early 1970s. 
This "economic" approach to urban services was sub-
sequently reflected in the Interim Housing Policy 1975 
(Ministry of Housing, 1975, p.25) and following housing pro-
grammes (see eg. Report of the Housing National Committee 
1981, p.55). This latter committee recommended tha t the 
average annual inflation rate should be added as a percentage 
to the total economic cost of urban services and charged to 
beneficiaries. The trend towards rationalising urban services 
brought a new dimension to the problem of the low level of 
urban services assigned to third and fourth class ~s. Within 
the specified level of services, access came to depend o n the 
economic ability of different wards or neighbourhoods to pay 
collectively for the installation of the service network. 
But as the provision of urban services was increasingly 
required to meet costs, the preferential access of civil ser-
vants to high class housing and subsidised services came 
increasingly into contradiction with the trend t owards cost-
effective service provision. The 1975 Interim Housing Policy 
highlighted this contradiction when it stated tha t levels of 
services in first and second class areas were deliberately 
reduced in order to bring down their cost to the financial 
abilities of civil servants (National Housing Plan 197 5 , pp.25, 
26) . The standard of infrastructural services provided in 
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high class housing areas undoubtedly absorbed scarce funds 
and contained a high foreign component. Because of this 
latter point the subsidy on urban services going to civil 
servants had a further inequitable effect in the dispropor-
tionate allocation of hard currency to the needs of higher 
income groups. 
We may conclude from the foregoing discussion that the 
l evel of provision of urban services for different income 
g roups in the city was predetermined by the class of land 
rather than by the relative need of individual families. 
This pattern of distribution was prescribed by the official 
service provision regulations. The preferential access of 
the state bureaucracy to high class land gave it subsidised 
access to better urban services. As access to services 
became increasingly based on economic ability, low income 
fami lies would find it difficult to sustain a minimum leve l 
of urban services. On the other hand, the subsidised access 
of bureaucracy to these services contradicted the new policy 
of rationalising service provision on a cost-effective basis. 
5 . 3 . 5 Conclusion 
We argued in this section that limitations on access to 
residential land in Greater Khartoum were basically r ooted 
in the content of the allocation rules. We selected for 
detai led examination rules relating to land disposal, urban 
planning and service provision. 
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Focusing on the land disposal system, we outlined how 
it was initially set up to allocate residential land along 
capitalist lines and provided the foundation for other legis-
lation on urban planning and service provision. Despite the 
introduction of the closed auction system in the post-
independence period, the structure of advantage and disadvan-
tage of the old system survived. The state bureaucracy bene-
fited from the existence of differential access to residential 
land. 
The rules of urban planning generated differential access 
in relation to the quality of sites and sizes of plots. We 
noted that better quality sites and larger plots mostly went 
to the state-bureaucracy. Low-income families, on the other 
hand, were frequently assigned smaller plots located in in-
f e rior sites. Moreover, the preferential access of the 
bureaucracy to high class land gave it access to large housing 
loans at the expense of budgetary allocations to low-income 
housing. 
The level of service provision varied according to the 
class of land; the higher the class of land the better services 
it received. By virtue of its access to high class land, the 
state bureaucracy enjoyed higher levels of urban services. By 
contrast , residents in the third and fourth class areas were 
assigned lower levels of services, and actual provision levels 
l agged behind the official standards. Moreover, the rece nt 
trend towards rationalising services ~revision on an economic 
basis would make it difficult for many lovl-income families to 
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maintain a minimum level of urban services. 
The above analysis showed that the limitations on access 
to residential land were rooted in the content of the alloca-
tion rules. These limitations were not devoid of social 
meaning as they consistently operated to the advantage of a 
particular social group - the state bureaucracy - and to the 
disadvantage of a multiplicity of other social groups and 
classes. The limitations on access generated at this level, 
can be seen as internal to the allocation rules themselves -
ie. rules governing land disposal, urban planning and the 
provision of basic urban services. 
5.4 ALLOCATION PROCESS AND THE GENERATION OF BIAS 
5.4.1 General 
In the preceding section we outlined how the land classi-
fication system organised access to land along income lines, 
associating each income group with a certain package of housing 
benefits or penalties. The resulting limitations on acce ss to 
land operated between different income groups, a lthough the 
state bureaucra cy got most benefits on a non-income basis. 
In this section we will focus on the operation of the 
allocation structure in practice and investigate whe ther any 
furth e r limitations on access were generated in the process. 
Firstly, we will argue tha t further limitations on access are 
ide ntifiable, and that these ope rated mainly within income 
g roups or ho using classes rather than between the m. Thus, 
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the main effect of these limitations was to improv e or 
obstruct the access o f applicants in a certain c a tegory of 
housing such as first, second or third class housing . These 
limitations related to the interpretation and app lication of 
the entry rules, and to the organisation of the reception 
desk. Secondly, we will examine whether there was any s ystem-
atic basis t o the discrimination in a ccess to residential land . 
Besides the dominance of the state bureaucracy in the alloca -
tion of benefits, we note the increasing influe nce of the 
merchant class. Among those who least benefited from land 
allocations in the capital the majority was ori ginally from 
Western Sudan. 
5.4.2 Bias in Eligibility Rules 
We noted in Section 5.3.2 above that the 1947 Towns' 
Lands Scheme did not specify the conditions f o r e ntry to 
close d auctions. These rules were formulated in the post-
independence period and increasingly relied on p r ecedent, 
prevailing circumstances and the discretionary power of the 
Director o f Lands and his deputies. ~hese rule s 
kep t chang ing over the years, as we explain sho rtly. They 
manifested a continually running bias toward applicants in 
formal employment. 
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(a) Bias to Formal Employment 
He mentioned above the absence of permanent rules for 
entry to housing allocations. So, in order to explain the 
bias toward fornal employment we will refer to specific 
housing programmes to illustrate the point. 
1 - The New Deims Settlement, 1949- 1953 
In the absence of permanent eligibility rules it seems 
that precedent increasingly influenced the formation of the 
entry rules in the post-independence period. The resettle-
ment of the New Deims of Khartoum during the period 1949-
1953 is illustrative in this respect because it was the first 
non-market allocation of government land to be carried out 
in the post-World War II period. 1 As the old settlement was 
r e located into a new site, plots were allocated to:-
( 1) All owner-occupiers 
( 2) All tenants who ( i) had been residing in the 
Old Deims for the previous ten years, and (ii) 
had their families living with them, and 
(3) Those who had permanent employment in Khartoum 
(Fawzi, S. 1954, p.519). 
According to Fawzi, most of those residents were " e ssentially 
T,.,orkers . . • in government departments and private establishments" 
(ibid, p.515). 
1. Since the turn of the century only two similar allocations 
we re carried out in the capital in 1912 and 1930. See 
FaT .. rzi (1954), and Arther (1954), both in Pons, 1980. 
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The condition of permanent employment was introduced to 
control the demand for land. Against 5,777 dwellings in 
the old settlement, housing 30,000 persons, only 3,873 
plots were allocated in New Deims (Arthur, 1954, pp.527, 
532). It was also meant to check on the massive wave of 
migration that began following the end of the war. In 
fact many people were repatriated during this period (eg. 
McLoughlin, 1970, 117). We may, therefore, argue that the 
eligibility conditions were largely influenced by the 
government's labour policy. 1 This emphasis on employment 
seems to have influenced the entry rules in the post-1956 
period as it became central to the allocation rules in sub-
sequent housing programmes. Yet it was less so in the 
1947 Towns' Lands Scheme and other previous land disposal 
arrangements. 
2 . The Khartoum North Low-Cos t Housing Proj ect 
This project was carried out in the period 1963-1967. 
Its purpose was to provide housing for low-income farc,ilies 
on a hire purchase basis. 2 The entry conditions stipulated, 
among other things, that the applicant must be an employee 
of the gove rnme nt, industrial firm, bank or commercial company , 
receiving a monthly s alary , provided tha t the r emain ing years 
o f his service did not f a ll s ho rt o f ten years at the time o f 
applicat ion (I bid) . 
1 . The project was initiated in the Department of La bo ur. 
2 . The project produced 1,000 uni t s at a cos t of £S 0.9 million 
( 2arghali, 197 7, pp.93,97). 
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Given the hire-purchase aspect of the project t he 
financial considerations for the repayment had priority 
in deciding who should benefit. Low-income families in 
"informal" employment were not, therefore, eligible to 
apply. 
3. Khartoum North Middle Income Housing Project: 
This project was carried out in 1967 to provide resi-
dential plots to middle-income families in the capital. The 
entry rules provided that: the applicant must be a permanent 
official in government or in a private company, among other 
conditions (see eg. Minutes, Permanent Town Planning Committee, 
19 6 7) • 
Emphasis on the condition of formal employment was 
central to the allocation rules of the high class housing 
until the early 1970s. This condition mostly operated in 
favour of civil servants and private sector managers. It 
discriminated against small scale traders and those employed 
in the "informal" sector. As this condition was relaxed in 
the allocations of third c l ass land during the 1960s, most 
of those whose income level qualified them for high class 
housing but could not apply because of the condition of 
formal employment competed for third class allocations (ibid). 
This often resulted in tense competition and narrowing of the 
housing opportunities for low-income families. The persistence 
of the condition of formal employment in the entry rules may 
be related to: 
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(1) The precedent of colonial housing policy; 
(2) Administrative convenience in processing 
information on applicants in formal 
employment; 
(3) The small size of the urban "informal" 
sector compared to the (formal) governmental 
sector might have influenced administrative 
definitions of housing demand and its inci-
dence among different groups. 1 
(4) The political strength of white collar groups 
and the weak political leverage of those 
employed in the "informal" sector. 
(b) Changing Nature of the Content of Eligibility Rules 
We have already noted above the absence of permanent 
entry rules. As these rules kept changing under different 
regimes, emphasis also shifted in relation to the criteria 
for ordering applicants and determining their eligibility. 
This changing pattern in the content of eligibility rules 
made them open to differing interpretations and susceptible 
t o manipulation. 
It has been the tradition in the Sudan that a p o ints 
system is employed for deciding priority among applicants 
(Mohamoud, F., 1974, p.Sl). Each criterion in the eligibility 
rules is assigned a certain number of points such that those 
l. The ILO Report (1976) estimated the "informal" sector em-
ployment in Greater Khartoum to range from a lmv of 52,500 
to a high of 58,000 (1976, p.332). By contrast, the ''modern" 
sector employment was put at 100,000 (ibid, p.365). One 
expects that the size of the "informal" sector was much 
s maller during the 1950s and the 1960s. 
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applicants with the highest score of points had priority 
over others. The structure of the point system kept 
changing over time, as the following table illustrates. 
Table 5.5 Change in the Structure of the Points System 
1965 1970 1978 
Criteria Points Criteria Points Criteria Pain 
Husband 2 Husband 5 Marital Status 5 
Wife 2 Wife 5 Other Y.7ife 3 
Each Child 2 Each other wife 3 Each Child 2 
Each dependent l Each child 3 Bachelor Status 2 
Eligibility Score 9+ Each dependent l Renting or living 
10 years to in government 
retirement 5 premises 3 
Sources: Herno . Ministry 15 years to Choice of home town 3 
of Housing, 29 June, 
1969; retirement l Choice of town of 
Choice of hane permanent residence 2 M=rro, Ministry of 
town 5 Eligibility score 23+ Housing, 1975; and 
Adam, M., 1979, p.27. Choice of town 
of residence 3 
Eligibility score 23+ 
The change in the structure of the points system from the 
1960s through the 1970s underlies two trends. First, the 
uplifting of the condition on formal employment at the end 
of the 1960s was compensated for by points on the number of 
years left before retirement as the preceding table showed. 
Points accrued as a result only benefited those in "formal" 
employment, as those employed in the "informal" sector cannot 
produce similar evidence. Since private sector firms, generall} 
did not have retirement policies akin to those in government, 
the state bureaucracy was the sole beneficiary of points given 
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for this reason. Second, the inclusion of points for choice 
of home town reflected the government's concern about rural-
urban migration from the late 1960's onwards. By awarding 
more points to those who chose to apply for land in their 
place of origin, the government hoped to discourage migration 
to the capital. It rewarded those who were born in the 
Greater Khartoum area and put those originating in other 
areas at a disadvantage . 1 However, this does not seem to 
have the desired effect, because house ownership had little 
effect on the decision to migrate to the capital (eg. see 
M.El-A. G. El-Din, 1974, pp.20-22). 
The above discussion shows that the entry rules as well 
as the methods of determining eligibility contained certain 
biases against those employed in the "informal" sector and 
those originating outside Khartoum Province. The main bene-
ficiary group was that of the civil servants. 
5.4.3 Difficulties at the Reception Desk 
Apart from problems of the entry rules and those relating 
to the content of the eligibility rules, another set of limits 
on access arose at the reception desk. These limits related 
mainly to the manner in which the reception desks were organ-
ised. The organisational instability discussed above (5.2) 
had a direct effect on the way the allocation rules were 
implemented. Two main phases of the institutional change 
may be delineated to trace the impact of the institutional 
1 . We will consider the r egional bias in the allocation struc-
ture in sub-section 5.4.3 below. 
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context on the operation of the allocation rules and pro-
cedures. 
The first phase of organisational change started 
shortly before the introduction of the 1971 Local Government 
Act and extended up to 1977/78. At the beginning of this 
period, "ward committees, consisting of politically non-
infected citizens" (Memo. Ministry of Housing, 1970) were 
established to process application forms at the local level. 
At that stage, the political party (SSU) was not yet formed 
and there was no other political organisation that guided 
or controlled the work of those committees. Their work was, 
therefore, open both to political and personal initiative. 
By the promulgation of the 1971 Act responsibility for 
urban housing passed into the hands of the provincial admin-
istration (see Section 5.2 above). The political circumstances 
which surrounded the 1971 local government reorganisation are 
important for understanding the mechanisms of inclusion and 
exclusion that were built into the structure of the local 
government system (eg. see Howell, J., 1974, pp.65,75). The 
pattern of representation was geared to be responsive to cer-
tain interests, namely those who were not associated with past 
political parties and who were willing to give political 
support to the regime. Thus, from the outset, specific insti-
tutional constraints were built into the structure of the 
1 
allocation agencies at the local level. 
1. A senior participant in the reorganisation of the local 
government system noted that "it requires considerable acro-
batic skill for a local citizen to escalate upward from his 
village or neighbourhood to acquire membership of a Province 
Executive Council, or even a loc~l council ~t District level 
or rural or town level" (Khalifa, M.O., 1980, p.44, in Norris 
and Pi~kerina. lqRn) _ 
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Besides the politicisation of the local government 
system, there were considerable organisational limitations 
on access to allocation agencies. The organisational struc-
ture of the new local government system (Fig. 5.1 above) 
ngenerated a large volume of administrative, financial and 
accounting traffic along unidentified and not always straight 
lines across the different administrative levels, which makes 
the whole (administrative) process complicated, unpredictable 
and confused", (Khalifa, M.O., 1980, p.42). Furthermore, 
the characteristic vagueness of the 1971 Act on the division 
of labour between administrative and political roles, on the 
one hand, and the unclarity of the "ordering" rules, on the 
other hand, provided ample opportunity for dominant interests 
in local councils to interpret the rules to suit themselves. 
The numerical strength and leading positions that coun-
cillors acquired under the 1971 Act gave them a dominant role 
in the implementation process. On balance, they often acted 
in alliance with the administrative officers to the near 
exclusion of the technical officers (Sidahmed, 1974, p.59). 
The councillors' power was manifest during the implementation 
of the 1977 Housing Plan. Local councils were assigned the 
distribution, collection and endorsement of application forms 
and their supporting documents. The operation gave the local 
councils a patronage asset that turned them, at on e time, into 
centres for local conflict. The housing stake drew many local 
agencie s and groups into a t e nse competition (e.g. see Chapter 
Six) . Cases of misallocation were widely reported in many parts 
1 
of the country. 
1 . eg. see E l-Sahafa Daily, 21st May 1978, 5th May 1980 and 16th 
December 1981; and El-Ayam Daily, 13th Julv 1978 , lOth August, 
lQQ? ~~~ h~h ~~~~h~- 10 0~ 
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Limitations on access during this phase were mainly 
due to the politicisation of the allocation agencies, the 
fragmentation of the administrative system, and the multi-
plicity of decision centres. In the absence or weakness 
of local representation, citizens would try to mobilise extra 
resources to help them to relate to the allocation agencies. 
The multiplicity of administrative levels and a gencies was 
an advantage to those applicants who had sufficient bureau-
cratic connections. But it could be an insurmountable ob-
stacle for those who, lacking bureaucratic connections, had 
to follow the official access channels. 
The second phase of the reorganisation of the urban 
administration started in 1977/78 , when the planning, housing 
and land disposal jurisdictions were taken by the central 
government (see Section 5.2 above). The allocation process 
which was previously carried out by 27 town and village coun-
cils and six district councils, and controlled by the Province 
Executive Council, had to be undertaken by the Central Direct-
orate of Lands. The massive demand for residential land that 
was stimulated during the 1970s put heavy pressure on the 
already meagre manpower resources of the Directorate. 1 
During my fieldwork in 1982 the Lands Directorate embarked 
o n the implementation of the second phase of the 1977 Housing 
Plan which involved processing 20,000 applications, competing 
1. The administrative instability of the housing agencies under-
mined career expectations and lowered staff morale. As much 
as 65 % of the manpower employed in housing and town planning 
migrated to oil-rich Arab countries during the last decade 
(Sudanow, 1983, Jan., p.44). 
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for some 14,000 residential plots. The project included 
applicants who had already filled applications in the 1977/78 
housing programme, but their names failed to appear at the 
time. They were required now to identify their names in the 
displayed lists, fill a new landform and come before an inter-
viewing committee to establish their eligibility to land. I 
compiled the following observations about the difficulties 
that faced applicants at the reception desks. 
Names of the applicants were displayed on three separate 
sets of lists. Each set included the names of the applicant 
from one of the three cities that make up Greater Khartoum. 
In each set, names were classified into three separate lists, 
each corresponding to one class of land i.e. first, second and 
third class. 
There were three reception desks and applicants from each 
city were assigned a separate counter. These were open from 
9.00 am to 1.00 pm. Each applicant was required to quote his/ 
her seri41 number in the displayed lists, present identity 
papers and pay a certain fee before collecting the application 
form. 
The major problem that faced the applicants was how to 
locate names on the advertised lists. There was no general 
serialisation of names, neither for the three sets of lists 
combined nor for each separate set. Names were only serial-
ised for each class of land. Thus, in every set of lists 
there were three serialistions corresponding to the three 
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classes of land ie. nine serialisations for the project. 
Thus, the most commonly recurring difficulty was that of 
duplication of names and serial numbers between applicants. 
A second source of inconvenience was the way the lists 
of names were displayed. There was no special display board. 
Lists of names were displayed without protection on outside 
walls of buildings and on broken pieces of wood laid in the 
open air under a tree. Unprotected from rain, wind and 
human contact some lists faded quickly and became unreadable. 
Those applicants who could not locate their names because 
lists were unreadable,or those whose names were incorrectly 
written or those seeking any other information faced con-
siderable difficulty in finding out the right source of 
information. There was no general enquiry desk. The three 
reception desks noted earlier only dealt with those whose 
names were included. In search for information, hopefuls were 
storming every office in the building including the Director's. 
Difficulties observed at the reception desk may be summarised 
as the following: 
(1) The near absence of an information service 
which would help the ordinary, illiterate 
citizen through the ~aze of regulation and 
procedures. 
(2) The confusing nature of the advertised lists 
of names, both in terms of the ~anner of 
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compilation of the names and the method 
of display. 
(3) The overlapping of responsibility between 
the central Directorate of Lands, the 
Provincial Lands Section and the District 
Council. 
These organisational difficulties caused considerable 
pressure on the limited human resources of the Lands Direct-
orate. They opened a door for bureaucratic corruption and 
fostered an army of brokers, dealing between applicants and 
allocattu~ agencies. 1 These difficulties often victimised 
those who lacked financial resources, information and bureau-
cratic connections. 
5.4.4 Basis of Discrimination in the Allocation Structure 
We identified above two sets of limitations on 
access to residential land in Greater Khartoum. The first 
set related to the content of the allocation rules: the land-
disposal, urban planning, and the service provision laws and 
regulations (Section 5.3). The second set of limitations 
derived from the way allocation rules were implemented, as 
we outlined in the preceding sub-sections. Given these 
limitations, we will examine in this sub-section whether 
there was any systematic basis to these inequalities in access. 
1. Traffic in illegally produced documents was widespread 
around land offices and only the economically weak were 
less able to benefit from it (eg. see El-Sahafa Daily, 30th 
October, 1982). 
- 288 -
We argued in Section 5.3 above that the allocation 
rules generated differential access to residential land 
in terms of quality of sites, size of plots and levels 
of urban services. Until the early 1970s the state 
bureaucracy, particularly in its middle and upper levels, 
benefited most from the presence of these differentials. 
It a lso used its preferential access to land to obtain 
further access to state loans. Considering the second 
set of limitations on access relating to elig i b ility rules 
and reception desks, the state bureaucracy was l east 
affected. We noted that most eligibility rules suited 
civil servants more than other groups of applicants . 
Besides their advantage over other applicants in 
public programmes, civil servants had access to special 
hous ing programmes restricted to influential institutions 
such as the army, the Judiciary , the university , t he public 
corporat ions, the Party, the National Assembly and certain 
ministries. These special allocations were in operation 
until 1982 (see El-Ayam Daily, 29th December 1981) . This 
marked influence of civil servants on the benefits of land 
al l ocation suggests that occupation and income, and there-
fore education, were t he main bases of discrimination in 
the allocation of residential land in Greater Khartoum. 
The dominance of bureaucrats in the allocation of r esi -
dential land has been increasingly challenged from the earl y 
1970s by the business class. There were two indicators for 
this trend. First, the monopoly of the bureaucracy over 
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closed auctions of high class land came to an end from 
1972 onwards, and businessmen and merchants were allowed 
to compete in closed auctions. Secondly, the trend toward 
rationalising urban housing policy on a cost-effective 
basis led to a marked increase in the price of high class 
land. We referred in Chapter Four (4.4.4) to the marked 
increase in prices of construction materials during the 
1970s. Thus, fewer civil servants have been able to afford 
the land price and the construction costs. And,due to the 
deteriorating financial situation of the country, fewer 
housing loans were made available. We anticipated that many 
of the civil servants who acquired land in high class areas 
were tempted either to sell to businessmen and move out, or 
to sell part of the plot and live in the remainder. As 
businessmen replace civil servants asthemain beneficiaries 
of the land programmes, economic ability, we argue, will 
constitute the main basis for access to residential land. 
The allocation rules discriminated against urban lower 
classes in relation to the quality of sites, size of plots 
and levels of urban services, as we pointed out in Section 
5.3 above. Further limitations on access occurred in relation 
to the eligibility rules and at the reception desks. Most of 
those discriminated against were employed in the "informal 
sector", who probably had little or no education, least bureau-
cratic connections and lower incomes. 
- 290 -
Another basis for discrimination in the allocation 
of residential land in the capital was regional origin. 
There was a trend towards a high representation of bene-
ficiaries from central Sudan in high class allocations 
compared with a low representation for those originating 
in Western and Southern Sudan. The opposite trend occurred 
in illegal settlements in the capital where the majority of 
residents were originally from Western Sudan (and to a lesser 
extent, from Southern Sudan at least in the city of Khartoum) . 
A comparison of regional origin between the beneficiaries in 
the allocations of high class land (1970) and residents of 
the National Unity Illegal Settlement will illustrate the 
above point (Table 5.9). 
Table 5.6 
Region 
Northe rn 
Eastern 
Distribution of Regional Origin Between Two 
Residential Areas 
Beneficiaries in High Class1 
Land Allocaticns (1970) % 
First Class Second Class 
31.4 47.3 
Residznts in National 
Unity Settlement (1982) 
4.3 
1.3 
Khartoum 41.6 36.3 12.7 
Central 18.3 10.0 21.7 
Kordofan) 8.5 6.4 29.0 
--------y~ter.n-----------------------------------------------------
oartur )Recions - - 29.3 
-~-------------------------------------------------------------------
Southern 
Total s 
Sources: 1. 
2. 
99.8 lOO 
Memo. Ministry of Housing, 1975, p.l4. 
Sample Survey 1982, (See Chapter Six below) . 
1.7 
/ad.o 
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The underlying basis for discrimination in the allocation 
structure was mainly income and occupational status. Most 
people who earned high incomes and held prestigious occupa-
tions tended to come from central Sudan. Thus, the country's 
senior civil servants, ministers, army officers and business-
men of substance overwhelmingly have their origins in the 
~orthern Province (Hale, 1981, mentioned in: Shepherd, A., 
1982). On the other hand, the majority of those who least 
benefited from the allocation structure worked in the "in-
formal" sector, had little or no education and predominantly 
originated in 't'lestern Sudan. 
5.4.5 Conclusion 
We examined in this section the limitations on access 
that arose during the allocation process, and considered the 
underlying bases of discrimination in access to residential 
land in Greater Khartoum. 
We noted that the difficulties in access to land that 
arose from the allocation procedures operated mainly within 
the housing classes or income groups rather than between 
them. In this sense they did not affect the content of ~hat 
was allocated but mainly limited the access of certain indivi-
duals or groups to an already predetermined package of housing. 
We classified these limitations into two categories, one 
related to the eligibility rules and the other related to the 
organisation of the reception desk. 
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Finally, we considered the underlying basis of dis-
crimination in access to residential land in the capital. 
We suggested that income and occupational status were the 
main criteria for access to urban residential land. We 
noted that most of those who satisfied this requirement 
came from central Sudan. Lower income,low occupational 
status and minimal education were common characteristics 
among those who least benefited from the allocation opera-
tions. Most of the latter group originally came from 
Western Sudan. 
5.5 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
We set out in this chapter to analyse the allocation 
structure of residential land in Greater Khartoum and to 
uncover how it affected the access of different urban groups 
to land. We proposed that the allocation structure did not 
provide access for all urban families. Two sources of con-
straints were identified: at one level constraints on access 
derived from the content of the allocation rules, and at 
another level they arose from the implementation process. 
The chapter was organised into three main sections. 
In the second section we presented an overview of the 
institutional context of the housing agencies. We delineated 
two major institutional changes during the 1970's which had 
an important impact on the powers, functions and problems of 
the housing agencies. The first change came in 1971 when the 
jurisdictions of land, housing and urban planning were delegated 
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to the provincial administration. The second change occurred 
in 1977/78 as these jurisdictions were recovered by central 
government. The policy implications of these changes in 
relation to access to residential land were considered in 
the fourth section of the chapter. 
We examined critically, in the third section, the allo-
cation rules relating to land, urban planning and service 
provision. The land disposal system, initially introduced 
under the colonial state, established a differential access to 
land based on the economic ability of applicants. Despite a 
change in the system of land disposal in the post-independence 
period, the structure of advantages and disadvantages of the 
old system was maintained in the rules and regulations of 
urban planning and service provision. 
We found that the rules of urban planning generated dif-
ferential access in relation to the quality of sites and size 
of plots. High class housing was located in better sites and 
assigned spacious plots. By contrast third and fourth class 
housing was located in inferior sites and assigned smaller 
plots. The provision of services followed closely the class 
of land. The higher the class, the more urban services it 
received. Low income families were provided with lower levels 
of services. The state bureaucracy benefited most from these 
differentials in access to residential land and associated 
services. We argued, therefore, that the limitations on access 
were rooted in the rules of land, urban planning and service 
provision. 
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We examined another source of limitation on access -
the allocation process - in the fourth section of the 
chapter. We argued that the limitation occurring at this 
level operated within housing classes rather than between 
them. We identified two types of limitations: those 
emanating from the content of the eligibility rules, and 
those relating to the organisation of the reception desks. 
We found that the state bureaucracy was least affected by 
the existence of these limitations. 
Finally, we considered the underlying basis of dis-
crimination in access to residential land in the capital. 
We suggested that income, occupation and regional origin were 
important determinants for access to residential l and. Most 
of those who met these criteria were originally from Central 
Sudan. Those who least benefited from the prevailing allo-
cation structure of residential land had low incomes, worked 
in t he "informal" sector. had minimal education and predom-
inantly came from Western Sudan. 
We may conclude that the allocation structure contained 
two mechanisms that operated in a biased way against certain 
urban groups: the content of the allocation rules i.e. rules 
of land disposal, urban planning and service provision; and 
t he rules of procedure which organised access at the distri-
bution points. The bias generated by the former mechanisms 
was more detrimental to the least benefited groups than that 
of the latter mechanism. 
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The import of the foregoing analysis poses two further 
considerations. First, to the extent that the allocation 
rules and techniques were used to mediate certain social 
interests in the allocation process then their "conventional" 
status as "objective 11 and "rational" organisational tech-
niques becomesuntenable. We will examine critically the 
assumption of the neutrality of these techniques in Chapter 
Seven below. Second, we argued that the allocation structure 
had been used by the state bureaucracy to protect its housing 
benefits by blocking the access of other social groups and 
classes. We may also consider the possibility that the allo-
cation structure might be used to achieve objectives other 
than housing benefits. In the following chapter we consider 
whether the housing problem in illegal settlements was used 
for political purposes. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE CASE OF THE UPGRADING PROJECT IN THE 
NATIONAL UNITY SETTLEMENT OF OMDUR~AN (1982) 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter focuses on a case study of an upgrading 
project in the National Unity Settlement of Omdurman City. 
The case study will be used to illustrate three dimensions 
of the limitations on access to residential land in the 
capital. 
First, we will argue that regional ori0ins of the 
residents reveal a close link between the model of regional 
development (Chapter Four) and the growth of illegal settle-
ments on the outskirts of the capital. We will also argue 
that housing conditions in the settlement illustrate the 
inadequacies in the allocation structure which were already 
outlined in the preceding chapter. Second, the case study 
will be used to illustrate the constraining effect of poli-
tical intervention in housing policy on the access of low 
income families to legal housing. Third, it will be shown 
that administering of the upgrading process generates a 
variety of other obstacles on access at the distribution 
points. 
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6.2 THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SETTLEMENT 
6.2.1 General 
The growth of illegal settlements in the Sudan mostly 
took place in the post-war period (see F. Zahir, 1972; and 
Elias and Bedawi, 1972, both in El-Bushra, 1972). As the 
rate of urban growth picked up during the second half of 
the 1960s and because of difficult access to official 
housing programmes, illegal settlements began to constitute 
a fundamental means to urban shelter. By 1975 they housed 
about 29% of the capital's population. 
The process of development of these illegal settlements 
in Greater Khartoum followed different patterns. For instance, 
in Khartoum and Khartoum North cities, "cardboard" settlements 
developed during the 1960s through direct occupation of vacant 
Government Land around industrial areas. In Omdurman city, 
the National Unity Settlement grew as an offshoot of the 
larger settlement of Umbudda during the 1970s on village 
communal land through a process of illegal land transaction. 
However, despite the variations in their patterns of growth 
there were important common characteristics between most of 
the residents in these settlements relating to their regional 
origins and socio-economic attributes. These common features 
will be highlighted below. 
The National Unity Settlement is located on the western 
boundaries of Greater Khartoum (see Map, Appendix 6.1). It 
stretches in a north-south direction on the western border 
o f Umbudda town. The growth of the settlement followed closely 
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that of neighbouring Umbudda, which was itself an illegal 
settlement until 1968. As the replanning process was under-
way in the settlement of Umbudda during the late 1960s 
people began to move into the location of the oresent dav 
~ ~ 
Unity Settlement. The replanning of Umbudda stimulated the 
growth of the Unity Settlement in two ways: first, the de-
marcation of the western boundary of Umbudda settlement 
resulted in the exclusion of some residents who had expected 
their plots to be included in the replanned area. This group 
of residents constituted the hard core of the Unity Settlenent. 
Second, the replanning of the settlement of Umbudda encouraged 
many people to take up land in the Unity Settlement in antici-
pation of replanning. Thus, the settlement grew from some 
500 dwellings in 1970 to about 24,000 dwellings in 1982. This 
section of the Chapter will examine the socio-economic profiles 
of the population and the housing conditions in the settlement. 1 
6.2.2 The Socio-Economic Pro!iles of the Population 
(a) The Origins of the Residents 
According to our sample survey (1982) the majority of 
the residents in the settlement originally cane from the 
western reqion of the country. As Table 6.1 shows, the two 
western provinces of Kordofan and Darfur provided 58.3% of 
the residents. This ratio could even be higher because some 
of those who came from the central region were originally 
frorr western Sudan. Historically, the western region supplied 
1. The following information is based on a sample survey con-
ducted by the writer in the settlement during the period 
October-December 1982. For the survey procedure and the 
interview schedule see Appendices 6.2 and 6.3. 
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and continued to supply agricultural labour to the agri-
culturally rich areas of central Sudan from the time of 
colonial rule. 1 
Table 6.1 The Regional Origins of the Residents in the 
Settlement (%) 
Place of Origin g. 0 of Household Heads 
Northern Region 4. 3 
Eastern Region 1.3 
Khartoum Province 12.7 
Central Region 21.7 
Kordofa.n Region 29.0 
Darfur Region 29.3 
Southern Region 1.7 
Total lOO 
The high proportion of residents in the settlement coming 
from the western region conformed to the results of the re-
search conducted in the "cardboard" settlement in the city 
of Khartoum North (Zahir, op.cit., p.229). Illegal settle-
ments in the south of Khartoum city and in Al-Ghamayir and 
Zagaluna in the city of Omdurman reflected a similar pattern 
of regional origins thouqh this is not yet documented. The 
high representation of residents coming from the western 
region in illegal settlements corresponds closely to the pat-
tern of rural-urban migration and the high incidence of erni-
gration from the western region, which we noted in Chapter Four. 
1. For the history of the movement of agricultural labou~ from 
the western region to central Sudan see El-Din, M., l~7C. 
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Although the southern region is considered an 
economically depressed area, only 1.7% of the respondents 
came from there. Historically, colonial educational policy 
in the south, colonial restrictive measures on population 
movements and difficult transport routes discouraged south-
ern labour from migrating northward. Secondly, the con-
temporary migratory trend from the southern region has often 
been of a circular type. Thirdly, southern emigrants in the 
capital mostly worked in the construction industry and lived 
on the construction sites too (see Kamir, El-W., 1980, on 
the southern emigrants in the capital, in Pons., op.cit., 
pp.449-485). 
The National Unity Settlement attracted residents from 
various di stricts of Greater Khartoum. Most of the respond-
ents in the sample came from Omdur~an city (73.4 %) whereas 
fewer residents came from the cities of Khartoum and Khartoum 
North (12.3%). Within the city of Omdurman, the majority 
of the respondents last lived in the neighbouYing town of 
Umbudda (48.3%). The relatively low rents in the area, com-
pared with inner city areas, the presence of r elatives and 
the availability of information about access to land wer e 
important factors underlying the high p roportion of residents 
corring from Umbudda town. Most of the residents in Umbudda 
town it.it .Lally moved in from the inner areas of Omdurman city 
during the 1960s (Abdel-Rahman, 1977) . We found that 17.8% 
of the respondents in the Unity Settlement had previously 
lived in the inner city areas of Greater Khartoum. The move-
ment from these areas into illegal settlements part ly signi f ied 
- 302 -
t he impact of the process of property develo pment in the 
forme r areas on the housing markets, which we empha sised 
in Chapter Four. Table 6.2 shows the distribution o f the 
respondents according to the previous place of residence . 
Table 6.2 The Distribution of the Sample According t o 
the Previous P lace o f Residence (%) 
cm:lurrnan City Khart01Jl1 City Khartoum Outside the No 
North City Capital RespJnse 
Unity 8.7 Khartoum 3.7 Al- 1.7 14.0 0 .3 
Settlement No.3 Sha'abiya 
U'nbudda 48.3 Al-Rimailah 1.0 Shambat 0.3 
ll.bbassiya 2.7 Al-Shajarah 1.3 Hillat 0.3 
Kuh.-u 
Al-I>Dradah 1.7 Al-Usharah 0.3 
Al- A'rddah 1.0 Arkaweet o. 7 
cm::lunnan 4.7 Al-E'shash o. 7 
City Centre 
~vad-Nubawi 2.3 Burri 2.3 
Al-Thourah 2.7 
Zagalona 1.3 I 
Total 73.4 Total o.o Total 2.3 Total 14.0 0 . 3 
I 
(See t h e map for the location of these areas ) . 
The fact that 14% o f the respondents came f rom out s ide 
Grand 
Tot al 
I 
\ 
I 
I 
I 
! 
\ 
1 1CO I 
t h e cap ital points to the significa nce of the Unity Settlement 
a s a first stop to some emigrants. 
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(b) The Family Characteristics 
Out of 300 heads of households 264 were males and 36 
were females. Over 86% of the interviewees were married. 
About 53% of the respondents had families with six to 
eleven members, as the following table illustrates. 
Table 6.3 Sex, Marital Status and Family Size (%) 
I 
' 
Sex % Harital Status % Family Size 
Male 88 Single 7.0 Less than three 
r,lembers 
Farale 12 .r-1arried 86.3 3-5 members 
1
Total lOO Widowed 4.0 6-S rrernbers 
9-11 members Divorced 2.7 
Total 100.0 12-14 rrernbers 
Hare than 14 
members 
No response 
I 
% I 
I 
I 
I 12.0 
I 
I 
' 
31.0 
I 
I 
36.q 
; 
' 16.~ 
I 3.q 
I 
I 
l.d 
i O.l 
1------------ -; 
Total 100.9 
(c) Education, Occupation and Income 
As regards education, we found that 40.7% of the house-
hold heads were illiterate, 19.7% had religious education 
below the elementary level and 29.0% had elementary education 
(four years of schooling). Only 10.7% had post-elementary 
education (Ta~le 5.5). 
Table 6.4 
- 304 -
Educational Attainment of the Heads of 
Households (%) 
-- I Educational Illiterate Khalwa Elerrentary Inter- Secondary University TotalJ 
Level mediate I 
' ; 
% of heads I 
of house- 40.7 19.7 29.0 5.7 4.3 o. 7 100.0 i 
holds ' I 1 -
Asked about the number of working members in their house-
holds, 77.3% reported having only one earning me~ber, 14.3% 
had two earning members, and 6.7% reported more than two 
working members. 
The pattern of occupational distribution of the heaGs 
of households indicates that the majority were in the categories 
of self-employed, skilled and unskilled labour. Most of the 
recurring occupations in the sample belonged to the tertiary 
sector of the urban economy,particularly the "informal" sector. 
Few respondents were employed in the "formal" sector in public 
administration, manufacturing, construction and transport. 
The occupational distribution is produced in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 
! Category of 
! Employment 
; 
! 
% of Heads 
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Occupational Distribution of the Heads of 
Household (%) 1 
Professional, Small Self Skilled Semi- Un-
Managerial & Industrial Employed Labour Skilled skilled 
Clerical jobs or Can- Labour labour 
rrercial 
errployers 
Others Total ' I ) 
1 
I 
I 
I 
of House- 5.3 3.0 27.0 26.7 17.0 17.7 3.3 lCO.O I holds 
-- ·- .. - . 
l. The following describes the jobs in each of the above categories: 
(a) The category of professional, managerial and clerical jobs included 
those with secondary and post-secondary school training such as 
teachers, managers, clerks and bookkeepers. 
(b) Small employers were those who employed less than fifty workers such 
as <Pmers of small canmercial stores, industrial workshops, bakeries 
and livestock merchants. 
(c) The self-employed were those who employed no workers and were not 
us.iJJ.g expensive capital equipnents. They included tailors, barbers, 
small grocers, carpenters, butchers, drivers of horse-drawn carts and 
street vendors. 
(d) Skilled labour refers to those in manual activities, which require 
train.iJJ.g and experience. Most res!X)ndents in this category attained 
sorre elementary education. It included workers in factories, oon-
struction and services sectors such as drivers, electricians, builders, 
soldiers (same) and semi-technical workers in veterinary and medical 
professions. 
(e) SEmi--skilled labour inlcuded those whose VJOrk involved some minimum 
of training; it refers to semi -skilled 'lrJOrkers in factories and con-
struction, watclnnen, messengers, machine attendants in filling stations 
and soldiers (roost) . 
(f) Unskilled labour refers to those whose jobs required no special training 
such as construction labour, !X)rters etc. 
(g) The category of others m:::>stly refers to the housewives and the unemployed. 
In arranging these occupational groups I drew on the classifications 
rrentioned in Stacey, M., 1969, Chapter Four. 
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The stated income of households ranged from under 
1 £S 50 to over £5 600 per month. About 60% of the sample 
had their monthly incomes in the range of £8 50 - £S 150. 
Only 25 respondents reported below £5 50 monthly income. 
Thirteen respondents reported over £5 250 monthly income 
and three respondents had more than £8 400 income per month 
(Table 5 . 7 ) . 
Table 6.6 Distribution of Monthly Income in the Sampl~ (%) 
~~-
I i I 
£8 251-' £5 401- no · N/A 1 Total under £5 50-· £8 101- £5 151- Over ; Income 
i Range ES 50 £5 100 £5 150 £s 250 £5 400 £5 600 £8 600 Response f 
! 
I% of 
Heads 
i of 8.2 36.3 23.0 18.3 3.3 0.3 0. 7 1.3 8.3199.8 
i House- I 
\holds I I ·, 
Com?ared with the officially prescribed minimum monthly wage 
(£S 23) , the majority of the respondents did not seem to be 
worse off. However, given the continuous rise in the cost 
of living and the fact that the residents were paying More 
for basic services than those in other neighbourhoods, they 
could only with great difficulty sustain a minimum standard 
f 1 . . 2 o. ~v~ng. 
1. $ l ~ £S 1.3 (November 1982). 
2. The cost of living index for low income groups in the capital 
increased from lOO in 1970 to 643.5 in 1981 (Economic Survey, 
1981/82 p.9l). 
; 
I 
I 
' 
i 
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6.2.3 The Housing Conditions in the Unity Settlement 
(a) Type of Accommodation 
Most of the households in the sample were owner-occupiers 
(88%), while the rest were either tenants or non-rent paying 
lodgers (Table 6.7). 
Table 6.7 Type of Accommodation (%) 
--
Type of Owner- Staying in other type No ! 
-
Accamodation Occupier Tenants Relatives ie. 
i 
charity response Total 
Propertv or guard 
-
% of house- 88.0 8.3 2.0 1.3 o. 3 99 . 9 holds 
Ne asked owner-occupiers about the method they had adopted 
to acquire land. Most of theM (81.3%) said they acquired land 
through squatting, and only 6.7 % said that they acquired land 
through other methods. According to our investigation, land 
was nostly acquired through purchase from other residents who 
subdivided their plots, or from landbrokers. Rented and lodging 
accommodation, 11.6% of the dvlellings in t he sample v1e re mostly 
owned by either landbrokers or by landlords who, for lack of 
services in the settlement, lived in better serviced resi-
dential areas. Most of the owner-occupier respondents claimed 
that they acquired land through squatting, knowing that ob-
taining land through purchase would disqualify their claim to 
O'-•.rnership. 
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(b) Housing Conditions 
Dwellings in the Unity Settlement were built with sun-
burnt mud bricks and clay soil, and roofed with thatch and 
wood. The construction process was usually carried out 
and mostly completed during weekends or public holidays to 
escape detention by watchmen of the local authority. Family 
labour was widely used as the following table illustrates. 
Table 6.8 Method of Construction(%) 
'I".rpe of Family Self-help and Not No Total 
Labour Labour Hired Labour Applicable Response 
% of 
House- 65.7 9.7 12.0 0 .6 lOO 
holds 
51.6 % of the households in the sample lived in one-room 
dwellings, 29.7% had two rooms, 14.7% had three rooms and 3% 
lived in four·-room dwellings. 
Only 33.3% of the households ha~ private pit latrines, 
and 9 % had both latrine and bathrooms. 57.7% had no t oilets. 
Some of these used their neighbours' toilets whereas the 
majority used a nearby dry ~;ater course as a public toilet. 
- 309 -
(c) Urban Services 
The most outstanding feature of the Unity Settlement 
was its lack of basic urban services. There was virtually 
no piped water, electricity, health service, transport 
service nor security service in the settlement. 
Until 1978, water was brought by private distributors 
to the settlement from five public taps installed on the 
western boundary of Umbudda Town. Water prices in the 
settlement oscillated according to the intensity of con-
struction and frequency of demolition campaigns in the 
settlement. Following the establishment of the Committee 
for s~ontaneous Housing Project (CSHP) in 1978, and the 
formation of the Party local branch in the settlement 
during the same period, 1 the residents made successful demands 
for the installation of three water tanks in the settlement. 
Two of these were in operation in 1982. Water was sold by 
the authorities to distributors at a rate of 20 piastre for 
a 44-gallon barrel. 2 The distributors sold it to residents 
for one pound a barrel in normal circumstances. 
The settle~ent did not have health centres and residents 
either walked to Umbudda Town (about one to two km.) or tra-
velled to the city centre (about four to five km.) for ~edical 
treatment. We asked the respondents where their families 
1. The relevance of these developments to the case study is 
explained in the following section. 
2. lOO piastres = one pound. 
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normally went for medical treatment. The following table 
shows their response. 
Table 6.9 Place of Medical Treatment 
; 
t:Jmbudda I i Place of Orndurman Khartoum & The Total: I Treatment Town City Khartoum Settlement I 
I : North Cities l I 
% of 
-t--·- -1 
56.3 36.7 0.6 6.4 lOO I Households I I 
Five unlicensed clinics operated by nurses or medical 
assistants were reported in the Settlement. The above table 
reflects the heavy pressure which the residents in the Unity 
Settlements out on the few health centres in neighbouring 
Umbudda Town. 
There were only three elementary schools in the settle-
ment, built by self-help and lacking in staff and in equipment 
; 
; 
such as books and furniture. Only 16% of the respondents had 
their children studying in the settlement. The majority of 
the households sent the ir children to schools outside the 
settlement (Table 6.10). 
Table 6.10 Place of Schooling of the Children 
-
Location The Unbudda <Xrdurrnan Khartoun & Outside Not !To tal! i 
I 
I of schools Settlarent Town City Khartoum the Applicablei 
North Cities Capital I 
_j 
I 
% of I 
House- 16.0 14.7 13.7 2.4 5.7 I 47.5 
1100 I 
holds ' 
I 
- --- -
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There was no regular transport service in the settle-
~ent. Residents walked 1-2 km. daily to neighbouring 
Umbudda Town where the transport routes terminated. The 
settlement had no police station. In fact, it was often 
depicted by the media as harbouring criminals, thus becoming 
a target for police raids as we see in the next section. 
6 .2.4 Conclusion 
We highlighted in this section the process of develop-
ment of the Unity Settlement, the socio-economic profiles 
of the residents and their housing conditions. We found 
that a high proportion of the residents originally came 
from the western provinces of Kordofan and Darfur. The 
large number of residents from the latter provinces con-
formed to the regional pattern of rural-urban migration, 
which we noted in Chapter Four. Most of the residents moved 
into the settlement from Umbudda town and from the inner 
city areas of Greater Khartoum. The movement from the inner 
city areas generally reflects the impact of the policy of 
urban development on the housing market. 
The majority of the households in the sample had fami-
lies with six to eleven members. The level of education 
of most respondents did not exceed the elementary school. 
Looking at the occupational distribution, the majority of 
the respondents fell into the categories of the self-employed, 
skilled and unskilled labour. The recurring occupations 
belonged to the tertiary sector of the urban economy. Monthly 
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earnings ranged from under £S 50 to over £S 600 with about 
60% of the respondents falling in the income range of 50-
150 pounds per month. 
We found that mostofthe households in the sample were 
owner-occupiers (88%). They built their dwellings from 
locally made materials using mostly family labour. Over 
half of the households lived in one-room dwellings and over 
one quarter had two-room dwellings. The majority of the 
households had no private toilets. Public urban services 
such as piped water, electricity, health, transport and 
security services were lacking. The residents suffered both 
physically and financially to provide for some of these basic 
necessities. 
6.3 POLITICAL SETTING OF THE UPGRADING PROJECT 
6.3.1 General 
The preceding analysis indicated that the access of dif-
ferent urban groups to urban residence was structured, on the 
one hand, by some broader issues relating to models of national 
and urban development, and on the other hand, by the content 
of housing policy. Another factor affecting access to housing 
was the degree of political support or opposition which a 
particular housing project could attract. In this section we 
look at the political bases of government action in the National 
Unity Settlement. We argue that the absence of a clearly 
defined policy on squatter housing made administrative action 
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in the settlement increasingly contingent on the political 
will of the incumbent regime. The process of the develop-
ment of the settlement duringtheperiod 1970-1982 reflected 
few occasions when government action was initiated by admin-
istrative agencies on the basis of an independent admin-
istrative assessment. The following discussion is organised 
in a chronological order, starting with the efforts t o l egalise 
the settlement in 1970, the freezing of the administrative 
action during the period 1971-1981, and concludes the section 
by considering the political implications of administrative 
inaction. 
6.3 .2 The Fight for Legitimation 1970/71 
Historically government policy on illegal housing assumed 
a r eact ive and eclectic approach. During the 1960s, unauthor-
ised housing was considered by the authorities as an encr oach-
ment on public land and often called into action the agencies 
in charge of protecting public property (e.g. Elias and Bedawi 
op.cit., p.221; Zahir, op.cit. p.229). The promptness of 
government action depended primarily on the administrative 
agencies involved, on the location of the encroachment a nd 
whether it was under an urban or rural jurisdiction, and on 
the prevailing balance of power at national and local levels. 
In the absence of a clearly defined policy on illegal settle-
ments politics came to play a dominant role in shaping the 
ad~inistrative response. The impact of politics can be seen 
in the differential administrative response to the "Cardboard'' 
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settle~ent in the city of Khartoum North and to Umbudda 
Settlement in Omdurman city during the 1960s (for the 
location of these settlements see map, Appendix 6.1). 
Whereas the squatters in the former settlement were 
predominantly drawn from the western region, the strong-
hold of the Umma Party (UP), the residents in the planned 
area surrounding the settlement as well as the members of 
the town council were mostly supporters of the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP) . 1 The second half of the 1960s wit-
nessed an unprecedented contest between the two parties to 
win squatters' votes (see Mahmoud, F., 1974, pp.67ff; Elias 
and Bedawi, op.cit. pp.213,221; Zahir, op.cit., p.238). 
The persistence of demolition campaigns directed at the 
"Cardboard" settlement and the delay in deciding on upgrading 
or resettlement was partly because the DUP-controlled town 
council had no interest in serving the squatters who supported 
') 
its opponent, the Umma Party.~ 
By contrast the r e side nts in Umbudda settlement were 
originally drawn from central and northern Sudan (Abdel Rahman, 
op.cit. p.31). The local power structure was dominated by the 
1. The UP and the DUP dominated the parliamentary politics in 
Sudan. The UP was associated with a semi-feudal class of 
private scheme owners, sectarian leaders, tribal leaders 
and top bureaucrats. The DUP mainly comprised merchants, 
middle-class peasants, small prope rty holde rs and the 
intelligentsia (see Nugdalla, S., 1973, p.l60). While the 
political support of the two parties in the rural areas was 
more evenly spread, the DUP had more su~port than the UP in 
urban areas, and particularly in the capital. 
2. When the municipal council was conside ring relocating the 
settlement in an area belonging to the Khartoum rural dis-
trict council the representative of the latter council in 
the municipal counc il opposed the proposal arguing that his 
district was under customary court jurisdiction which would 
be difficult to apply to these "strangers" (ibid, pp.239,240) · 
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supporters of the DUP. The area MP was a top party func-
tionary and a senior minister during the second half of 
the 1960s. In 1967 Umbudda was granted approval for up-
grading, thereby escaping the application of the Town and 
Village Planning Act (Mah•moud, F., OP.cit. p.70). The 
"Cardboard" settlement had to wait until 1970/71 to obtain 
official recognition under a new political regime. 
We noted in the previous section that the population 
in the National Unity Settlement was predominantly drawn 
from the Nestern Sudan. However, being an offshoot of 
Umbudda Settlement, the local power structure in the r,.rhole 
area during the 1960s was dominated by the "native admin-
istration", merchants and religious leaders,who represented 
the local base of the DUP. The growth of the Unity Settle-
ment provided the "native administration" with a lucrative 
source of money from the clandestine sales of land. However, 
the rising proportion of settlers from the western region 
was likely to improve the political strength of the UP in a 
constituency which traditionally had been the domain of the 
DUP. The local power structure did not, therefore, encourage 
support for the residents in the Unity Settlement as far as 
upgrading was concerned. The site of the settlement was 
earmarked by the land authorities as a relocation area for 
those who were affected by the replanning process in Umbudda 
Settlement (Report of the Deputy Replanning Officer of Umbudda, 
19 70) • 
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The inception of the May regi~e in 1969 created a 
radically different situation in the Unity Settlement. 
First, the new regime promised a shift in the social base 
of the state from one traditionally anchored to tribal, 
sectarian and partisan support to a new social base in 
the popular sectors of Sudanese society. 1 The''liquidation" 
of "native administrations" by the new regime represented 
for the residents in the settlement a break away from the 
control of an antagonistic local power structure. Second, 
as early opposition to the May regime came from the rural 
areas, the urban middle and lower classes became the regime's 
target for political mobilisation. Urban popular support was 
urgently needed in the wake of souring relations between the 
regime and both the Right and Left in 1970/71. Since urban 
housing was one of the resources which could be used for poli-
tical patronage, a valuable opportunity was availed to the 
residents of the settlement to establish clientelist relations 
with the new regime. The proclamation of a massive urban 
housing programme in 1970 and the progress in the replanning 
of Umbudda Settlement raised expectations of the residents in 
the National Unity settlement and enticed them to enlist their 
support to the May regime. 2 
I. The ideology of the May regi.n'e is outlined in Chapter Three. 
2. 'Ihe irrrrediate housing benefits which the reginE of::ered to the urban 
population in 1970 included:-
(a) A reduction in l1ouse rents; 
(b) Earmarking of 60% of the 1969/70 budget of the n~,,ly formed Ministry 
of Housing for the improverent of urban services; 
(c) The immediate release of the names of eligible applicants to same 
10,000 residential plots in a project of low-incame urban housing; 
(d) The consideration of the middle and upper incane housing project in 
the capital, (Merro. Ministry of Housing, 17th March, 1970) . 
(e) The decision to upgrade and resettle "cardboard" settlel'e!1ts of 
Khartoum and Khartoun North cities (A Statement on I.J:::M, Middle and 
Upper Incane Housing, Ministry of Housing, April 1970). 
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The progress in the replanning operation in Umbudda 
Settlement encouraged many land seekers to move into the 
Unity Settlement. As construction intensified, the Khartoum 
Commissioner sent his bulldozers into the settlement and 
began a demolition campaign in mid-1970. Meanwhile a counter 
camraign was organised by the residents and protesters 
travelled in trucks across the white Nile to the Presidential 
1 Palace in Khartoum City. A seven-man delegation represent-
ing the residents was received by a member of the Revolution-
ary Command Council who was, at the time, the Minister of 
Local Government. The meeting resulted in: (a) an immediate 
halt to demolition; and (b) a promise to upgrade the settle-
ment on condition that the residents shouldered the costs of 
the upgrading operation. By 1971 replanning teams arrived in 
the settlement. 2 A field survey was conducted in which 
dwellings were numerated and registered. This survey later 
became the principal official reference to eligibility to 
land in the settlement. 
What is significant in the above account is that the 
decision to upgrade the settlement originated at the top of 
the political executive and was initiated by someone who was 
not in charge of the housing portfolio. The assumption that 
the May regime wanted to use squatter housing for political 
gain was plausible for two reasons:- First, following a 
1. From an interview with the leader of the SSU section in the 
Unity Settlement. 
2. Rural develonment committees were assigned the task of col-
lecting a replanning fee of ten pounds per dwelling from 
residents. Payment of this fee later became a principal 
condition for inclusion in the subsequent stages of the up-
gradins process. Some residents did not pay the replanning 
fee because they did not have money at the time. Others were 
politically opposed to the collecting agencies. A third group 
thought that the develo~ment committees were not serious enough 
or honest to be entrusted with public money. 
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bloody confrontation between the regime and right-wing 
opposition in March 1970, the regime was anxious to p re-
vent the squatter population (who were predominantly from 
the Western Sudan, the stronghold of the UP) from being 
mobilised by the right-wing opposition. Second, the regime 
perceived that the break in its relations with the left 
in August 1970 would cost it the mass support which the 
Communist Party (SCP) commanded in the capital. The regime 
sought to build up its own social support beginning with the 
middle and lower urban classes. We already noted in Chapter 
Three the massive institution-building strategy which the 
May regime envisaged to generate political support. 
The response of the urban population to this mobilisation 
campaign varied between enthusiasm, scepticism, and rej ection . 
Residents in the Unity Settlement generally sought to secure 
maximum advantage from the prevailing opportunity. In the 
process of forming their local organisations they managed to 
bring into the settlement senior political leaders of the 
regime. 1 They succeeded for a time in establishing a vertical 
structure of clientelism with the regime. The newly esta-
blished links by-passed both the previous local power structure 
and the existing housing agencies. The residents managed to 
halt the demolition campaigns and to obtain a political support 
for upgrading. However, the implementation of the upgrading 
1. The residents were allowed to form rural developme nt com-
mittees, as affiliates of the Party, but not local Party 
units or local councils as was the case in other areas 
of the city. Compared with local Party units, development 
committees had little impact in effectively promoting local 
interests through the Party organisation. 
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took over ten years to be realised, as we explain below. 
6.3.3 The Stalemate 1971-1981 
The above discussion sought to emphasise the political 
nature of the initial administrative action in the Unity 
Settlement. The housing problem was defined more in con-
formity with the legitimacy needs of the May regime than 
according to the actual shelter needs of the residents. 
Absence of a positive adMinistrative action in the settle-
ment during the period 1971-1981 followed closely a decline 
in the political appeal of the squatter problem and its 
eventual recession into the realm of local administration. 
However, occasionallv it surfaced on the national political 
scene as a security problem engendering penalties on resi-
dents. 
Following the communist-supported abortive coup of July 
1971, state legitimacy came to depend more on organised force 
than on social support. This basic shift in the pattern of 
political activity meant that the politics of clientelism of 
1969-71 in which squatters support assumed certain political 
weight was over. As the implementation of the 1971 Local 
Government Act was in progress, housing and illegal settle-
ments came under the control of the Commissioner of Khartoum 
and the previous demolition policy was revived. 1 
1. The Comnissioner of Khartoum told the 7th Heeting of the Secretariat of 
the Party for the Khartoum District that local councillors and popular 
organisations were party to encroachments on government land, and that 
his policy of demolition would not discriminate between councillors and 
ordinary citizens occupying public pror:erty (Hinutes of the General 
Secretariat of SSU, Khartoum District, 3.7.1973). 
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The period 1974-1976 marked a resurgence in government 
action in the National Unity Settlement. The right-wing 
opposition mounted a series of attempts to topple the regime 
in 1974, 1975 and 1976 (see Wai, D., 1979, pp.86-87). In 
most of these attempts the Unity Settlement was accused of 
harbouring dissidents. After the July 1976 abortive attempt, 
t h e settlement \'Tas cordoned off by the army and door-to-door 
searches were conducted. The media portrayed a picture of 
the settlement as a centre of subve rsion in the capital. 
The upshot of these events was that the reg i me 's pol icy of 
incorporation of 1969-71 gave way to one of exclusion from 
the political system. 
The 1971 housing survey in the settlement was not 
followed by a serious move towards upgrading until 1976. 
Starting his election campaign for his second term in office 
in October 1976, the President promised in a public rally 
in Omdurman, that he would solve the prob l em of illegal 
hous ing within one year (Sudanow, Nov ember 1976, p .8). Even-
tually a committee was formed by the Commissioner to process 
claims to land in the settlement (Abdel-Rahman, op.cit.). 
Conditions of eligibil it~ were s e t up and a housing survey 
was carried out in the settlement. Names of e lig ible candi-
dates were published in a special supplement in the local 
press. By mid-1977 the incumbent Commissioner wa s remove d 
and the whole project came to a standst ill. 
Another national event which, in our view , had sone 
bearing on administrative action in the sett l ement was the 
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~ational Reconciliation Agreement (NRA) of 1977/78 between 
the regime and the right-wing opposition. 1 The Agreement 
transformed the atmosphere of confrontation as members of 
the National Front were absorbed into the Party and a size-
able group was elected in 1978 to the National Assembly. 
The Unity Settlement benefited from the apparent re-
opening of the political system. It was allowed, for the 
first time, to form its own local units of the Party and 
to send delegates to section conferences. It was also in 
1978 that the Commissioner of Khartoum set up a committee 
to settle the claims of candidates established as eligible 
by the 1976 survey. A permanent Land Office was opened in 
the settlement to house the Committee for the Project of 
Spontaneous Housing (CPSB) and eligible applicants were 
asked to come before the committee to verify their claims. 
8,000 names were later declared eligible to their plots but 
no distribution of titles took place. The project was post-
poned until June 1982. 
One explanation for the postponement of the 1978 housing 
project in the Unity Settlement was the beginning of the 
reorganisation process of the metropolitan administration 
during the period 1978-1980 which culminated in the Khartoum 
1. The NRA was signed 
Front in 1977. It 
measures which the 
the support of the 
government were: 
between the regime and the Nationa l 
provided for a number of liberalising 
regime would institute in return f or 
opposition. The key elements in the 
(a) the release of all political prisoners; 
(b) the revision of the Party structure to allow elections 
a t every leve l and permit more debate and participation; 
(c) the revision of the Constitution; a nd 
(d) A more neutral foreign polic~ 
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Administration Act 1980. 1 The new Act returned the 
jurisdictions of urban planning, housing and land dis-
posa l back to central government. The Ministry of Con-
struction and Public Works replaced the provincial 
administration as the agency responsible for urban housing. 
The 1978 housing programme in the Unity Settlement was 
therefore stopped pending an initiative from the new housing 
agency, the Ministry of Construction and Public Works. 
Meanwhile another national event brought renewed politi-
cal attention to the National Unity Settlement. In September 
1981 news broke out that a large opposition force had infil-
trated the country from a neighbouring state in order to bring 
down the Government. 2 Eventually a mass-arrest campaign 
started, directly mainly towards those whose origin was in 
western Sudan. In October, a "Committee for Evacuating the 
Capital of the Unemployed and Idle Persons", was formed t o 
deal with some 14,000 detainees. 3 Following the arrest, a 
1. See Chapter Five, Section 5.2. 
2. Besides the official version of events, there were other theories : one 
theory asserted that because of a deteriorating econa:uc situation and 
a desperate need for external aid, the story of an external invasion was 
created to attract the attention of the Reagan Administration and solicit 
USA aid. Another interpretation was that the threat of an external invasion 
was a cover-up for a policy to reduce population pressure and hence con-
sumer demand in the capital, especially since the retrenchment progr~ 
initiated in 1979, at the behest of the IMF, began to have adverse social 
and political effects by mid-1981. A third explanation was that the 
Septerri:>er events were staged by the National Security Administration to 
promote its position in a power struggle among state institutions . 
3. OVer 50% of the detainees came fran the western Region as the follCMing 
table shavs: 
Table 5.11 
;Place of Origin Number 
!Northern Region 350 
~entral Region 3393 
astern Region 1443 
!Kordofan Region 5CXX) 
~)arfur Region 2383 
~uthem Region 1140 
!I'otal 13709 
% 
2.6 
24.8 
10.5 
36.5 
17.4 
8.3 
100.0 
I 
I 
Source: An 
interJ'iew with 
the Police Can-
missioner of 
Khartoum in 
E 1-Ayyam Daily, 
20.9.1982. 
- 323 -
demolition campaign was started in Wards 16 and 17 o f the 
Unity Settlement in mid-November 1981. 1 About 3,000 
families faced the winter of 1981 without shelter. 
Political and administrative factors interacted to 
facilitate the demolition operation of November 1981 in the 
Unity Settlement. At the administrative level, the corn-
mittee responsible for rehousing those who were affecte d by 
the replanning in U~budda Town (fo rmed in 1975) earmarked a 
strip of land cutting across Wards 16 and 17 of the Unity 
Se ttlement as a relocation area in January 1978. Although 
that decision was approved by the Planning Committee of the 
province (for Omdurman area), implementation was deferre d by 
the Cornrnissioner. 2 The process o f returning housing and lands 
jurisdictions to central government during the perio d 197 8-1980 
partly contributed to the delay in the implementation of t he 
d . . 3 ec~s~on. 
The issue of national security which engendered the evacu-
ation campaign created a favourable atmosphere for demolition. 
Agencies involved in the evacuation campaign communicated to 
the public a distasteful picture about residents in the 
1. 4,201 rooms, 1,363 structures and 788 toilets were demo lished. 
El-Ayyam Daily, 11.12.1981 . 
2. Residents in the affected wards tried to pre-empt the deci-
sion b y appealing to the Party o rganisations, to the area MP 
and to the President in October 1977. The residents collected 
documented evidence about their right to have equal treatment 
with the rest of the residents in the settlement, and o n the 
impropriety of the compensation list for which their wards 
were demolished. (An interview with the leader of the resi-
dents committee in the demolished wards, 15.12.1982). 
3 . It is also possible that the Government postponed the decision 
under pressure of the residents and in an attempt t o avo id 
jeopardising the national reconciliation process which was 
underway. 
- 324 -
demolished areas. The media consistently presented the 
area as harbouring criminals, prostitution and an illegal 
liquor industry {eg. El-Ayyam Daily, 11.12.1981). On 
these occasions the press mostly collected information 
from the police. The Inspector-General of the Police who 
was the Chairman of the Evacuation Committee, maintained 
that residents of the settlement, " ... from there ... move 
about the three towns {ie. the capital) committing theft, 
robbery or even extortion 11 (Sudanow, January 4, 19 82) . 1 
The above claims strengthened the argument of the land 
authorities for demolition. Asked what had become of the 
residents in the demolished areas, the Deputy Director of 
the Lands Directorate replied that "the demolition campaign 
should continue daily •.. All these people (ie. the resi-
dents) came from their own villages. They must go back" 
(ibid). Implicit in this reply is the admission that the 
demolition was undertaken not only to protect public pro-· 
perty but also to force illegal settlers back to their 
villages. It is not difficult to see how the presumed 
security problem permeated the perceptions of the housing 
agencies and shaped their definitions of the housing pro-
blem in the Unity Settlement. For the Minister in charge 
of housing, the eradication of the illegal housing was the 
main prerequisite to guaranteeing proper land-use planning 
in Greater Khartoum. 2 The period 1970-1931 saw little 
1. A member of the residents camri.ttee in the derrolished areas rejected 
this claim by saying: "it is expected that he would say so. We are 
working, alrrost all of us have working papers" {ibid). 
2. An interview with the Assistant Director of the Housing Research Unit, 
Housing Department, the Ministry of Construction and Public Works, 
Khartoum, 25.8.1982. 
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progress toward giving land titles to the residents in the 
Unity Settlement. Some of the families in vvards 16 and 17 
had their dwellings demolished and their breadwinners 
detained or expelled from the capital. 
6.3.4 The Political Significance of Administrative 
Process 
The development of the National Unity Settlement was 
marked by considerable political intervention under the May 
regime. At the beginning the regime was bent on incorporating 
squatters' support, thus enabling them to secure immunity 
from demolition and to gain an initial promise of upgrading. 
Following the 1971 abortive coup, the development of the 
settlement became increasingly depe ndent on the confrontation 
between the regime and the right-wing opposition. The regional 
origin and sectarian loyalties of residents rather than their 
she lter need mostly shaped government action in the settlement. 
Political criteria for inclusion in state benefits replaced 
administrative ones as the housing service was used to reward 
s upporters a nd pena lise opposition groups. Apart from denying 
the residents access to land titles, administrative action (or 
inaction) was bound t o have further implications:- F irst, the 
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administrative exercises in the settlement in 1971, 1976 
and 1978 were likely to have increased the vulnerability 
of residents to political demands of the regime. The 
process ofnumerating dwellings, filling forms, publishing 
names, interviewing candidates, etc., were effective ways 
of raising expectations, of creating credibility for admin-
istrative action and of perpetuating the dependency of resi-
dents on the incumbent regime and on its political initiatives. 
Thus, while the difficult housing situation of residents made 
them susceptible to political mobilisation, the administrative 
process was an important mechanism \tlhereby their dependency 
on the May regime was institutionalised and consolidated. 
Second, the stalemate ueriod 1971-1981 allowed the state 
a moratorium on social spending. Had land titles been awarded 
in 1971 the state would have been obliged to finance an exten-
sive and costly network of urban services in the settlement. 
The administrative exercises noted above helped in different 
ways to contain social demand for urban services:-
(i) The assignment of the collection of replannins 
fees in 1971 to the regime's political organ-
isations - rural development committees -
instead of to a specialised administrative 
agency amounted to forcing residents to enrol 
in party organisations. The implication of 
this policy was to replace the then existing 
social organisations (political, socia l, reli-
gious or otherwise) with the regime 's own 
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i . 1 organ sat1ons. Eventually this process 
would have deprived residents of their 
initial sources of identification and 
solidarity which had inspired them in the 
first place to settle in the Unity Settle-
ment. Once disconnected fron their previous 
forms of organisation and enrolled in the 
Party local units, the capacity of residents 
to initiate a serious social protest for 
social services would be considerably reduced. 
One implication of this incorporation process 
was the depoliticisation of the housing pro-
blem (see Schaffer, B., 1977, pp.38-44). The 
administrative process was bound to convey to 
residents, rightly or wrongly, a sense of fair-
ness, objectivity and justice. As these per-
ceptions of the administrative process were 
deepened and ingrained among residents the Dro-
pensity of housing problems to generate political 
protest would be defused. 
(ii) Following the emasculation of the previous forms 
of social organisation through legislation and 
the incorporation process, administrative action 
in the settlement served to individuate the 
collective power of residents through the simple 
operation of administra tive !.;:rocess. For the 
1. This orocess conformed to the regime's conception and strategy 
of social change which we discussed in Cha?ter Three, Section 
3.2 above. 
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purpose of upgrading residents were 
classified into different categories such 
as, O\v.ners of rooms and those of structures; 
of registered rooms and of non-registered 
ones; those who attended the 1971 survey 
and those who did not; those whose names were 
published following the 1976 and 1978 pro-
grammes and those whose names were not; those 
who were in the appeal list and those who 
failed to appeal; etc. Each of these cate-
gories carried with it specific would-be 
rights and penalties. Stratifying residents 
into a structure of advantage and disadvantages, 
the administrative process made inroads into 
communal strength and solidarity in the settle-
ment. 
The above process was vividly portrayed in Ward 16, the 
sample ward of this study. In contrast to the peaks of 
militancy of 1970/71, the residents in the demolished areas 
found themselves in the winter of 1981 fighting alone the 
might of the state. They failed to obtain effective support 
of the political organisations in the settlement because 
on ly parts o f two wards out of the settlement's eight wards 
were affected. Representatives of the six other wards did 
not want to jeopardise their chances of legalisation. Even 
within Ward 16 the politica l organisations split over the 
issue of demolition along geographical lines. Being over-
represented fro~ the eastern part of the ward which was 
- 329 -
outside the affected area, the local Party unit declined 
to stand against demolition. Members of the parent coun-
cil and of the committee of the cooperative society 
followed suit. Only the Youth Unit, with its membership 
being mostly drawn from the affected area, stood firmly 
against demolition. Eventually residents in the demolished 
area found themselves cut off from the local power struc-
ture and from popular support in the settlement which sus-
tained their contacts with the regime during the early 1970s. 
They had to rely on their own efforts to fight demolition 
without success. 
6.3.5 Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion about the political setting 
of government action in the Unity Settlement showed how the 
issue of squatter housing was used by the May regime to 
extract political support. The administrative process was 
instrumental in serving the political aims of the regime. 
It served to individuate the collective action in the settle-
ment and depoliticise the housing problem; but it also gave 
the residents the false impression that their interests were 
being considered. The above analysis sensitises us to the 
political significance of the administrative process. As 
Clea ves suggested: "The analyst ne eds to be sensitive to 
the extent to which policies serve as symbols rat her t han 
de sign for execution ... as a means of system p r e servation 
despite the negative effe ct (this) ... may ha ve on achieving 
s tated p o licy goals" (Cleaves, 1980 , p.286). 
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6.4 THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
6.4.1 General 
We outlined in Chapter F~U~ the limitations on the 
access of low income groups to housing which arose during 
the allocation process. The discussion in that chapter 
has been broad and general. In order to specify the con-
straining affects of those procedures we need to have a 
close look at their operation in practice. In this section 
we describe the implementation process of the upgrading 
project in the Unity Settlement. 1 We begin by outlining 
the organisational structure of the project and the rules 
of allocation. Then we examine the resulting access arrange-
ments and consider the sources of constraints. 
6.4.2 The Structure of the Project 
The upgrading project in the Unity Settlement was closely 
associated with the new Minister of Construction and Public 
Works,who took office in December 1981 shortly after the 
demolition measures in the settlement. The project, further-
more, followed the return of urban planning and land alloca-
tion powers from provincial administration to central government. 
1. The following information is based on (a) the Ministerial 
Order No. (4) 1982, the Minister's Office, the Ministry of 
Construction and Public Works; (b) Minutes of the Steering 
Committee of the Project of New Omdurman Housing, National 
Unity Extension; and other relevant records in the local 
Land Office in the settlement; (c) the Report of the Second 
Work Committee, 25.10.1982, Research Unit, Housing Depa rtment, 
Ministrv of Construction and Public Works; (d) Interviews 
with various participants in the project, and the results 
of the sample s urvey (1982); and (e) Direct observation of 
the administrative process. 
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The project represented, therefore, a centralist approach 
to the problem of illegal housing in contrast to the poli-
cies of provincial administrations during the period 1971-
1978. 
(a) The Administrative Organisation: 
On 6th June 1982 the Minister issued an order establish-
ing six committees to implement the Ministry's plan for 
resolving the problem of unauthorised housing in Greater 
Khartoum, within the general framework of the national hous-
ing plan. The ministerial order specifically required the 
committees: 
"(1) To commence their work after taking the oath. 
(2) To use a particular land form in discharging 
their responsibility. 
(3) To examine, scrutinise and sift application 
forms, and compare them with lists of previous 
housing programmes in order to exclude any 
person who owned land in Greater Khartoum. 
(4) To report cases of fraud to courts. 
(5) To seek help from the following persons:-
(a) The Chief Land Inspector of the 
City of Omdurman. 
(b) The Replanning Officer of Umbudda 
Town. 
(c) The Chairman of the Committee on corn-
batting unauthorised housing. 
(d) A number of local representatives". 
Five committees were set up to carry out the Plain task 
of deciding the eligibility of applicants. The sixth corn-
mittee considered appeals and controversial cases that came 
before the five other committees. A small "Publicity and 
Guidance" unit was formed later. The local Land Office, 
which was opened in the settlement in 1978, was chosen 4f 
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as the project headquarters and its staff provided clerical 
support to the project. At the apex of the project there 
was a small steering committee which reported d irectly to 
the Minister. The following diagram depicts the formal 
organisation of the project (Figure 6.1). 
The composition of the project administration was 
weighted to technical officers as opposed to the generalist 
administrators and councillors who dominated housing pro-
grammes during the period 1971-1978. The steering committee 
was chaired by the Minister's adviser on housing, and con-
sisted of the leaders of the six other committees as members. 
Each work committee consisted of six members. Except for 
one , all the committees were chaired by engineers drawn from 
the headquarters of the Ministry of Construction and Public 
Works. Membership of each work committee included a town 
planner, a housing researcher, a l and inspector and two l ocal 
repr esentatives, o ne from the district council and the other 
representing the Party branch in the settlement. The appeals 
committee included a representative from the Attorney General's 
chamber, a housing researcher, two social care officers and 
a representative of the Party's Omdurman branch. The pub-
licity unit was predominantly drawn from the Research Unit 
of the Housing Department. The local Land Jffice was headed 
by a Land Inspector and included two land officers and f our 
clerica l staff . In addition, e ach work committee had two 
clerical staff, a clerk and a bookkeeper, who were seconde d 
to the project from the headquarters of the Ministry of Con-
struction and Public Works. There were five policemen and 
>j Publicity 
l Unit 
~·--..... : ..... - .._ . ..... . . .... 
,rdination. 
the project did not 
land. It was left 
·ting group of experts 
.e end of July 19 82 
rllowing conditions: 
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,. (1) The applicant must be Sudanese 
(2) He/she should be supporting a family 
(3) He/she should be living in the same 
plot applied for 
(4) He/she must demonstrate a connection 
with Khartoum province 
(5) Neither applicant nor his wife should 
be in ownership of a residential plot 
in the Khartoum province 
(6) Where the applicant was a female she 
must be either divorced or a widow". 
Having decided the eligibility conditions, the 
steering committee then set rules of procedure accordins 
to which applicants saw interview committees. These con-
sisted of the following: 
~(a) The applicant should be present in person 
before the respective committee. 
(b) If the applicant was absent a proxy should 
produce a valid authoris ation from the 
relevant Shar'a court or from a Sudanese 
Embassy if the applicant is abroad. 
(c) Proxy certificates issued on or after the 
15th June 1982 would be considered invalid, 
particularly tho se issue d in Khartoum pro-
vince. 
(d) The applicant should swear an oath as to the 
validity of the informa t ion given in t he 
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application form except for that concerning 
personal income. 
(e) Each applicant should be accompanied by the 
witness mentioned in the form. 
(f) Each applicant should come before the com-
mittee according to his/her priority in the 
list of names. 
(g) Where husband and wife were linked together 
in the general list and a divorce had taken 
place subsequently, both should come before 
the respective committee. 
(h) Where husband and wife were linked together 
in the general list and one of them later 
died a death certificate should be produced". 
(c) Volume of the Project Work 
According to official statistics, there were 24,800 
claimants to plots in the settlement. 12,800 of these 
were classified as owners of rooms, and the remaining 
12,000 were owners of structures. The project was to be 
executed in two phases. The first one dealt with listed 
room-owners. Out of 12,800 listed room-owners 9,300 were 
selected as eligible candidat e s whose claims to land were 
to be processed in the first pha se. 
As the settlement consisted of eight wards the work-
load was divided among the work committees,such that three 
committees were assigned two wards each, and the two 
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remaining committees took one ward each. The administra-
tive process was organised into four main stages. In the 
first stage the names of candidates were displayed on the 
noticeboard in the local Land Office and candidates were 
asked to collect a particular land form, complete it and 
return it at a later date. The second stage consisted of 
receiving completed land forms and of checking on support-
ing documents. In the third stage, applicants were inter-
viewed by their respective committees. Finally, each corn-
mittee reviewed in a closed session, information on each 
case and decided on its eligibility to land. 
6.4.3 The Administration of Access 
The project was officially launched on 15th June 1982 
but there was no i~ediate response from applicants. Resi-
dents had certain doubts about the credibility of the project. 
First, there was uneasiness about the requirement to fill in 
a new land form. Residents argued that they had already 
filled in forms in 1971, 1976 and 1978 programmes in the 
settlement. They believed any further demands for filing 
another landform were tantamount either to questioning their 
eligibility or creating more obstacles on their way to land. 
Second, the residents were not happy about the contents 
1 of the land form. They were particularly sceptical about 
its reference to the home origin of applicants in Section 
A(3) of the form. They took it to imply a possible intention 
by the Government to exclude those applicants whose origin 
l. A translated copy of the land form is available in 
~ppendix 6.1. 
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was outside Khartoum province. 1 They suspected that 
Section (E) on whether an applicant or a member o f h i s / 
her family had a dwelling anywhere in the country would 
be used to disqualify those who owned dwellings outside 
Greater Khartoum. Obviously some applicants owned houses 
or part of houses in their home towns and villages. 
Section (E) required that applicants swear an oath as to 
the validity of information given in the form . Irrespect-
ive of whether an applicant gave true or false information, 
3t-,rearing on the ~~~oran" is considered by many Sudanese mos-
lems an unpleasant act which should be avoided. 2 
Third, land authorities recommended a plot size of 
250 2 m • But, during the 1971 survey the layout of the 
settlement was designed such that each plot had an area of 
2 500 m . Residents believed that the project should provide 
f o r a 500m2 area for a plot. 3 
Fourth, the residents considered the l and price un-
realistic and beyond their means. In the 1971 survey the 
1. These fears were probably grounded in the evacuation a nd 
demolition measures,which we highlighted in the preceding 
s ect ion. 
2 . One committee reported that oath-taking enhanced its per-
formance and forced applicants t o t ell the truth even when 
it was against their interests. Altho ugh oath-taking has a 
long tradition in Sudanese legal practice it is a r ecent 
import in the administration of social service. 
2 3. The 1977 Housing Plan recommended an area of 128- 200 m 
for 3rd and 4th class areas (see Chapter 5 , Section 5 . 3 . 3 
(B)). Residents had on their minds the experience of the 
replanning in ~eighbouring Umbudda town where ~ini~um plot 
area was ~00 m and where many residents were g r ante d p lots 
of 1000 m . (S ee the memo of Umbudda Replanning Officer, 
undated (1970? )). 
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recommended price was £S 75 per plot. The same price was 
reiterated during the 1976 and 1978 programmes. Now the 
recommended land price in the project was £S 783 per plot. 
These problem areas kept many applicants away from 
the Land Office. Thus some publicity work had to be done. 
Besides advertising on public noticeboards, in the press 
and on the radio, the Minister appeared Many times on the 
television to convince residents that urban services would 
not be forthcoming except through a successful implementa-
tion of the project. By early August 1982 the work began. 
In the description of the project which follows, we focus 
mainly on situations where access to the project was con-
strained or blocked. Constraints were monitored at the 
following levels:-
(a) The Organisation of the Recertion Desk 
There were five work c ommittees and therefore five 
reception desks. The rules of p rocedure stipulate d that 
each a pplicant should come before the respective committee 
a ccording to his/her priority on t he list. Howe ver, appli -
c a nts did not arrive in the Land Office according to the 
orde r of names on the advertised list, and much time was 
wa sted calling for hundreds o f people who did no t turn up . 
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A second organisational formula was devised to facili-
tate the smooth operation of the reception desk. Names 
of candidates were allocated over weekdays such that each 
group of applicants was assigned a specific day in the week. 
This strategy had two problems: First, a candidate had to 
pay an initial visit to the Land Office to know the particular 
day when he should see the committee. Second, if a candidate 
failed to come on the prescribed day he/she had to wait until 
the work-table was completed, which often took a period of 
three to five weeks. Three out of the five work committees 
adopted this strategy for organising their reception desks. 
A third strategy was to receive applicants according 
to their order of arrival - first come first served. Two 
work committees employed this strategy. 
In fact, the three strategies had problems. The 
first one of receiving applicants according to their priority 
in the advertised list presumed that the displayed list was 
ava ilable to all applicants. This was not true because, 
having been displayed without protection on an inside wall 
or the perimeter of the Land Office the lists of names were 
soon erased and became unrea dable. The first strategy also 
presumed that applicants could easily identify their priority 
on the list. We found in our sample survey over 40% illiteracy 
among the respondents. Thus, many applicants we re not able 
to identify their names in the displayed list and had to seek 
the help of the clerical unit. Later, we consider the res -
ponse of the clerical unit. In the second strategy, some of 
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those who lost their priority because they were late or 
absent often tried to ameliorate their position by bre~k­
ing the queue through personal contacts. Though seemingly 
smooth and practical, the third strategy placed undue 
authority in the person who organised the queue, the police-
man. Whereas the first and second strategies placed the 
organisation of access on the "impersonal" priority list, 
the third strategy located it in the hands of a visible 
''gatekeeper", and ultimately in the nature of his pro-
fession. 
The organisation of access to the project presupposed 
that applicants had more or less equal resources to reach 
the reception desks. However, applicants varied considerably 
in terms of their awareness of the rules of access and o f 
their ability to use these rules. Differential access 
deriving from the operation of different organising strate-
gies at reception desks encouraged some applicants to employ 
extra-administrative resources to improve their access. The 
patte rn of administrative arrangements at reception desks 
was, therefore, an inportant factor in facilitating or con-
straining access t o the project. Imbalances in access c reated 
at this leve l of the adminis tra tive proc ess were likely to 
r e flect on the subsequent stages of the upgrading programme. 
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(b) The Operation of the Allocation Rules 
As the project went on it put under test a number of 
eligibility and counter rules. Some of these rules 
antagonised soMe applicants and had to be waived. Some 
rules were differently interpreted by work committees. 
Another set of rules, though causing inconvenience to 
some applicants, remained unchanged. We refer below t o 
some illustrations of these cases. 
The most important change in the allocation rules 
occurred in relation to the third rule of eligibility which 
r equired applicants to be living in the same plot that they 
claimed. All work committees waived this condition and 
accepted rent certificates from non-resident applicants as 
evidence that they did not own the residence where they 
were living. 1 Many absentee landlords who lived in better 
serviced neighbourhoods (mostly in the city of Omdurman and 
in Umbudda Town) were treated on an equal basis as residents 
in the settlement. In fact, absentee landlords had a better 
chance than residents on a list of structure-owners who would 
be considered in the second phase of the project (in January 
198 5 this phase had not yet started). We estimated the g roup 
of absentee landlords to have represented 11.7% 
of our saMple as the following table shows: 
1. A committee member objected in writing that accepting candida-
ture of non-resident applicants contravened the provisions 
of eligibility. But her objection was refused byilie appeal 
committee. 
Table 6.12 
Category 
of 
Residents 
% of 
Residents 
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The Distribution of Residents According 
to Tenure and Eligibility (%) 
Eligible Non-Eligible Non-Eligible No 
Owner- Owner- Residents Response 
Occupiers Occupiers (Tenants and 
Non-Rent 
Paying Lodgers) 
21.7 66.3 11.7 0. 3 
Total 
lCO.O 
However, since 13% of dwellings infue ward were found unoccu-
pied we estimate that the number of absentee landlords could 
be much higher. 
Difficulties arose in relation to the rules of procedure. 
For instance, in the case of an absent applicant his/her 
proxy had to provide a valid authorisation. But proxy certifi-
cates issued on or after the 15th of June, the date when the 
project commenced, were considered invalid. In fact, this 
particular provision was issued two weeks after the project 
started. (Letter of the Rapporteur of the Steering Committee 
to members, 31st August, 1982}. Apparently the backdating 
of this provision was meant to deter applicants who did not 
want, for some reason, to take an oath and would rathe r pay 
somebody to replace them as proxy. 
While recognising the effort of the project administra-
tion to prevent foul play, this particular provision over-
looked genuine cases where applicants for legitimate reasons, 
(such as ill health, age and absence from the capital) could 
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not come before the committees. The lack of effective 
administrative procedure for verifying information made 
oath-taking a central mechanism for checking statements 
of applicants. Those applicants who failed to come in 
person became suspects. The stringency created by the 
above provision led one committee to accept proxy certifi-
cates issued beyond the prescribed date outside the Khartoum 
province. 
In the case of an emigrant applican t a proxy had to 
have a valid document from a Sudanese Embassy in the country 
of residence. We observed in a number of cases that the 
project clerk insisted that such documents should also be 
certified by the Ministry of Fore ign Affairs, a l thoush this 
demand was not so specified in the rule s of procedure . It 
was extremely difficult for families of emigrants to reach 
the Certification Department of the said Ministry in the 
city of Khartoum at a time when an influx of Sudanese workers 
migrating to oil-producing Arab countries were flooding the 
Ministry to certify their papers. 
The main import of the foregoing discussion is that 
the allocation rules underwent certain changes as the project 
came into operation . These changes affected both formal 
authority structure and access arrangements and opportunities 
in the project. To this point we now turn. 
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(c) The Restructuring of Administrative Process 
and Access Op~ortunities 
The formal structure of the project, discussed in 
Section 6.4.2 above, implied a pattern of access arra nge-
ment in which applicants would comfortably identify their 
priority in the candidates' list, approach the relevant 
r eception desk, collect landforms, complete and return 
them, and finally present themselves for interview on the 
prescribed date. In practice, the structure of the pro ject 
operated differently producing important changes in access 
a rrangements. 
With the increase in the volume of T..mrk following the 
beginning of the second and third stages of the administra-
tive process in September/October 1982, the workload of the 
committees began to overflow into the clerical unit. As 
work committees became increasingly involved in the inter-
viewing stage, the distribution and collection of land forms 
gradually came to be handled by the clerical office. The 
overspill was not only caused by the increase in the volume 
of work. The work committees became less regular in working 
a full week. Sometimes members of the teams abstained =or 
1 personal reasons. At other times all committees failed to 
2 turn up because of lack of transport, leaving the clerical 
1. Two members of different committees reported that a ttendance 
on their committees was on average 50%. This estimate t,Jas 
confirmed by the results of our sample survey. 
2. Shortage of petrol in Greater Khartoum was particularly 
acute during the period June-December 1982 . 
- 345 -
unit as the only authority available. 1 
With the recurrence of absenteeism among members and 
committees it was difficult to obtain quorum sessions in 
work committees. As a result of fewer working sessions 
and declining output, a backlog built up disrupting the 
usual work shedule and inviting pressures from applicants. 
In a number of cases we observed individual members of 
some work committees processing cases, while their corn-
mittees were in recess, with help from the clerical unit. 
Meanwhile, members of the clerical unit also became involved 
in processing work in the absence of supervision by the 
2 
work committees. The looseness of control and supervision 
was so noticeable that at times the policeman in charge and 
even the officer worker, had the opportunity to check files 
and answer applicants' inquiries quietly outside the of f ice. 
The increasing involvement of the clerical unit in 
executive work was a manifestation of a restructuring process 
in the project organisation. Although formally work committees 
were in charge of the final decision on eligibility to land, 
that decision depended primarily on information available on 
application forms, on supporting documents, and on information 
recorded from the 1971, 1976 and 1978 programmes. This inform-
ation was normally kept in the clerical unit. With the 
1. Most members of work committees lived in Khartoum city and 
assembled every morning in the Housing Department in Khartoum 
to be transported by a Government vehicle to the project site. 
Members of the clerical unit mostly lived in neighbouring 
Umbudda town or in Omdurman city. 
2. In an interview with one committee member he rejected the 
possibility that the clerical unit could distribute or 
collect a land form without instructions from the relevant 
committee. 
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deconcentration of some executive powers to that unit, extra 
access channels to the project were opened up. But this 
extra access was not o rganised in the way reception desks 
were. It was mostly dependent on the discretion of the 
clerical unit and on the ability of applicants to make con-
tact with them, as we point out below. 
Access to the clerical unit was supposed to have been 
open for all persons because, in ideal circumstances, it 
was the general information desk. Given the fact that most 
lists of eligible candidates which were displayed on the 
office perimeter were either unreadable or completely damaged, 
the clerical office was the last resort where an applicant 
could find relevant information. But this was not usually 
the case. We noticed that the policeman often p revented entry 
into the office without any instruction from clerks and acco rd-
ing to his own timing. He frequently told applicants that a 
meeting was in progress in the office , whereas there was not 
any meeting at those particular times . Resident-applicants 
often needed one of three r esources to reach the clerical 
office : 1 (a) a connection with the policeman; (b) a connect ion 
with a member of the clerical unit; {c) a connection with one 
of the local representatives. Non-resident applicants often 
l. Building connections with bureaucracy is now an important 
aspect of the administrative culture in Suda n. Zein K., 
identified the following as the prevail ing attitudes of 
citizens towards administrators in Sudan: -
(1) "(the citizen) knows that he has no access to bureau-
cratic rules and regulations ... 
(2) He is aware that the administrator has discretional 
authority. 
(3) He believes in influencing the administrator's decision 
through another person who has authority, status or relation-
ship with the administrator" . (Zein, K., 1978, pp .205, 206 ). 
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approached members of work committees especially land 
officers to connect them with the clerical unit. The 
need of both categories of applicants to reach the cleri-
cal unit did not necessarily have to be for unscrupulous 
purposes because applicants sometimes wanted answers to 
simple questions about the project. 
The significance of the restructurins of the project 
organisation lies in the fact that the clerical unit, 
because of its newly acquired powers, relegated its primary 
function of supplying free information to the public to a 
secondary place. As it became involved in executive work, 
access to it was restricted. Whereas access to work corn-
mittees was, at least formally, organised according to speci-
fie criteria, this did not apply to the clerical unit. The 
criteria of entry into the clerical unit depended on the 
discretionary power of the staff and the ability of applicants 
1 to bring in extra administrative res o urces. To sum up this 
point, the restructuring process produced two possibilities 
for access opportunities: 
First, the involvement of the clerical unit in executive 
decisions was likely to influence the agenda of the work corn-
mittees and affect decisions on eligibility. 
1. The literature on street-level bureaucracy points to control 
of information by street-level bureaucrats as a source of 
power that renders them relat ively immune from hierarchi ca l 
control, e.g., M. Lipsky 1980, and J. Prottas, 1979, men-
tioned by S. Barrett and M. Hill, 1984, pp .227,22 8 . 
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Second, the clerical unit was in a position to use the 
servicing of general information to the public for patronage 
or for bargaining in return for certain benefits. 
We do not propose here a conspiracy theory to analyse 
administrative behaviour. Rather, we have been trying to 
establish a point about how the formal structure of the 
project was reconstructed and moulded in the daily practices 
and mundane activities of participants. Access arrangements 
provided for in the formal organisational structure were 
disturbed as a result of the restructuring process. Questions 
of why the restructuring process took place and who was likely 
to benefit or lose and on what basis relate to the balance 
of power and interests inside and outside the implementing 
agency. 
6.4.4 Conclusion 
We described in this section the implementation process 
of the upgrading project in the National Unity Settlement. 
First, we outlined the formal structure of the project look-
ing at the administrative organisation, the allocation rules, 
the rules of procedure and the volume of the project work. 
Then we examined the operation of the administrative 
process and its impact on access arrangements. We identified 
a number of limitations on access at the leve l s of the 
reception desk and of t he operation of allocation rules. We 
interpreted changes in the counter and entry rules as 
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indicators of a restructuring process in administrative 
and access arrangements away from the arrangements pre-
scribed by the formal structure of the project. The 
involvement of the clerical unit in executive work con-
travened the officially prescribed authority structure. 
The impact of the restructuring process on access 
opportunities was delineated in two areas: Firstly, the 
clerical unit was able to indirectly influence decisions 
on eligibility to land, thus disturbing the balance of 
access established by the formal structure of the project. 
Secondly, the access of individual applicants to general 
information on the rules of access was restricted, thus 
affecting their opportunities in subse~uent stages of the 
. 1 prOJect. 
We conclude from this section that in addition to the 
limitations of the allocation rules already discussed in 
Chapter Five above, further constraints on access arose 
at the level of project implementation. The organisation 
of reception desks and the manner of interpreting and 
applying allocation rules produced differential access 
opportunities. Constraints arising at this level of the 
allocation structure turned administrative implementation 
2 into yet another net through which only those applicants 
1. By the end of my field work in December 1982, the project 
was not yet throughistages of demarcating plots, opening 
through-roads and awarding titles were yet to be accomplished. 
2. Other nets include the structural factors operating at the 
level of the national and urban economies discussed in 
Chapters Three and Four respectively; and the nature of the 
allocation rules outlined in Chapter Five. 
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who had adequate information, bureaucratic connections 
and resources could ffl!er through. 
6.5 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The main objective of this chapter has been to 
examine the implementation process of the upgrading pro-
ject in the National Unity Settlement of the City of 
Omdurman. 
We looked first at the socio-economic profiles of 
the population and at the housing conditions in the settle-
ment. We found that a high proportion of residents originally 
came from the western regions of the country. The regional 
origin of residents in the settlement was in line with pat-
terns of regional emigration to the capital. The majority 
of respondents in the sample had families of six to eleven 
members. The level of educational attainment in the settle-
ment was low. Most of the respondents were either self-
employed or worked for others in manual jobs in the service 
sector. Their monthly earnings ranged from under £S 50 to 
over £S 600 with about 60% of respondents falling in the 
income range of 50-150 pounds per month. 
Most heads of households in the sample were owner-
occupiers (88%). Over half of the households lived in one-
room dwellings and over one quarter had two-room dwellings. 
Most of these dwellings had no toilets . Services of piped 
water,electricity, health, transport and security were non-
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existent in the settlement. Residents had to pay a lot 
more than those living in officially planned residential 
areas to provide for some urban services. The land tenure 
of these citizens seemed to be the immediate obstacle 
blocking their access to urban services. 
In the third section of the chapter we examined the 
political background of governmental action in the settle-
ment. We argued that the absence of a clearly defined 
policy on illegal settlements made administrative actions 
increasingly contingent on political initiatives and on 
the prevailing balance of power at the national and local 
levels. The development of the Unity Settlement in the 
early 1970s was partly stimulated by the regime•s policy 
of political incorporation. Administrative actions in the 
settlement were influenced by the political conflict between 
the regime and the right-winq opposition groups. It was 
partly due to this conflict that positive administrative 
act ion in the settlement was held up for over ten years . 
The political undercurrents of administrative action seemed, 
therefore, to be more important in defining the housing pro-
blem in the settlement than were the actual shelte r needs of 
the population . We argued that the administrative process 
r epr esented an important mechanism whereby policies of in-
corporation and exclusion we re operated. The content of 
administrative procedures and routines was of considerable 
importance in controlling demand for social services as well 
as in individuating and breaking protests in the settlement. 
- 352 -
The examination of the actual administrative process 
in the upgrading project was conducted in the fourth sec-
tion of the chapter. We described first the organisational 
structure of the project, outlining the administrative 
organisation, the allocation rules and the volume of work 
in the project. We noted a high representation of technical 
officers in the project administration and a centralist 
approach to the upgrading process. 
Then we proceeded to examine the administrative process 
and its impact on access opportunities. We identified some 
problem areas at the levels of counter and allocation rules. 
As these rules came into operation they were differently 
interpreted or reconstructed or changed. We interpreted 
changes in rules as a manifestation of a restructuring pro-
cess in the project administration . There was a deconcentra-
tion of power from work committees to the clerical unit which 
was not provided for in the formal structure of the project. 
We then suggested the possible implications of the restruc-
turing process for the access of applicants. We concluded 
that the administrative process represented an important source 
of constraints on access of applicants to urban land. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONSTRAINTS ON BUREAUCRATIC ACTION: 
TOWARDS AN ADEQUATE EXPLANATION 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The main focus of this study has been the constraints 
on the allocation of urban residential land in the Sudan. 
We have outlined in the first chapter a number of theoretical 
positions which purport to explain inadequacies in the 
implementation of public policy and pointed out their limit-
ations. We then conducted an exposition of a variety of 
factors, at different levels of state policy, which seemed 
to constrain the bureaucratic allocation of residential 
plots in Greater Khartoum. (Chapters Two, Three, Four, Five 
and Six). These factors ranged from limitations in national 
planning policy, to pressures arising from the urban political 
economy, to incompatibilities in the organisational struc-
tures and processes of housing agencies. 
We proposed above to move the analysis beyond the iden-
tification of unrelated sets of constraints on policy imple-
mentation toward constructing an integrated explanation; one 
that is capable of accounting for the social forces and pro-
cesses underlying these constraints, and of explaining how 
they effectively impinge on administrative process. In this 
chapter, we pull together the threads of the preceding 
analysis of constraints, and synthesise them in a broad 
integrated explanation to problems of policy implementation. 
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This will be conducted in two stages. First, using the 
material presented in preceding chapters, we will 
summarise constraints on housing policy into three cate-
gories: organisational problems, problems deriving from 
the urban political economy, and those originating in 
the national political economy. Second, we will advance 
a broad interpretation of the source and incidence of 
constraints on urban policy implementation. Our explana-
tion will consist of two main ingredients:- the identifi-
cation of the social forces underlying the political 
economy, and the discovery of the mechanisms whereby 
social interests act upon administrative process. Com-
bining structural and institutional analysis we hope to 
contribute to an adequate understanding of problems of 
policy implementation. 
7.2 SOURCES OF CONSTRAINTS ON HOUSING POLICY 
7.2.1 General 
The preceding analysis sought to expose the basic 
limitations on access to residential land in Greater Khartoum. 
Several problem areas were identified, relating to different 
spheres of state policy. We will summarise below the basic 
limitations on access to residential land according to the 
level of their incidence. Three levels of the state's activity 
are delineated: the institutional level, the urban political 
economy level, and the level of national planning policy. 
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7.2.2 The Institutional Setting 
At the level of housing agencies we identified above 
a number of aspects which seemed to limit access to resi-
dential land in the capital. These aspects related to the 
organisational structure, technology, and the operational 
process of housing agencies. We will briefly re-state 
these aspects. 
(a) The Organisation Structure 
Three main aspects were identified at this level: 
First, the administrative fragmentation which character-
ised the first phase of the post-independence period pre-
cluded the evolution of a clearly defined housing policy. 
The content of the colonial social policy was mostly carried 
over, with little alteration from the point of view of social 
need and equity. As a result, a socially stratified housing 
system has been sustained. Public bureaucracy remained the 
prime beneficiary of the housing service throughout that 
period. 
Second, the reorganisation of local government in 1971 
affected the structure and operation of the housing agencies 
in two ways: firstly, the previously centrally-controlled 
functions of housing were devolved to the provincial admin-
istrat~ ~ns. The political motives behind the reorganisation 
scheme fostered the institutionalisation of certain 
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exclusionary measures in the system of representation in 
the local administrations. These discriminatory mechanisms 
gave councillors, Party functiona~es and their friends, 
access to the administrative process. Secondly, the reorgan-
isation process generated numerous levels of decision-making 
without adequately specifying the powers and responsibilities 
at each level. As a result of the unclarity of the authority 
structure of the new local councils and of the rules govern-
ing land allocation (Chapter Five) dominant interests in 
local administrations, who were mainly drawn from merchants, 
small-traders and professionals, were able to interpret 
allocation rules to their own liking. 
Third, the administrative instability of the housing 
agencies within the structure of the Government, moving 
at one time between different central ministries and at 
another time between central and local governments, affected 
negatively the morale of the staff and undermined career 
expectations. It also stimulated departmental and profes-
sional rivalries within the housing agencies and between 
them and other related departments. Such an uneasy atmos-
phere overshadowed the evolution of genuine concern about 
inequities in the distribution of residential land. 
Administrative fragmentation, instability and political 
intervention represented a danger to the institutional via-
bility of the housing agencies. Their activity domain came 
under attack from local councils, central departments and 
public corporations. Each of these institutions competed, 
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in their different ways, to claim a share in housing activity. 
This inter-organisational competition brought heavy pressures 
on the system of land distribution. 1 
(b) Organisational Technology 
By organisational technology we refer to urban planning 
codes relating to land classification, plot size, and level 
of municipal service. These are the technical methods 
whereby housing demand is processed into standardised housing 
packages. Each package relates to a specific class of land 
with standard plot space and standard level of urban service. 
A number of limitations arose from these standardised housing 
packages. 
(1) As the class of land indicated the physical quality 
of the site and determined its economic value, resi-
dents on third and fourth class land in Khartoum 
and Khartoum North towns were located in sites of 
inferior quality and bad drainage. By contrast, 
most of those who gained access to better quality 
sites in these towns did so more on the basis of 
their occupation in Government than because of their 
economic ability. The criteria for access to good 
sites was biased towards civil servants, until 1970 
1. For example, as we argued in Chapter Five, local councils 
distributed urban land according to their own criteria 
and without coordination with other planning institutions 
such as in the famous case of Khartoum industrial area 
land. At the level of central government, ministries and 
public corporations competed for land for employees' 
housing and frequently used political pressure to gain 
access to land. 
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when merchants were permitted to apply for high 
class housing. 
(2) The class of land determined the plot size and 
larger plots were usually assigned to first and 
second class land. Although poor applicants 
usually have larger families than rich ones the 
former could not gain access to large plots. The 
determinants of space needs were based on income 
and occupation criteria with less consideration 
for the family size. 
(3) The level of urban service was associated with 
the class of land. The higher the class of land 
the more the service provided. Despite the pre-
sumed economic rationale governing the provision 
of urban service, the convenient access of the 
civil servants to high class land guaranteed them 
higher levels of service at a subsidised cost. 
These three aspects, i.e. the classification of land 
according to income and occupation, the differential plot 
space and differential levels of urban service, constituted 
the core of the organisational technology of housing agencies. 
Our discussion in Chapter Five revealed a strong commitment 
by these agencies to the aforementioned planning principles 
despite their apparent contradiction both with economic 
rationale and with the imperatives of social need and equity. 
The land classification system and its implications for plot 
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size and for the levels of service provision have been 
often accepted by the housing agencies and the public 
as an unquestioned technical necessity. In Section 7.3.3 
(b) below we examine critically these claims and suggest 
an alternative interpretation to the technical rational-
isation of differential access to urban land. 
(c) The Organisational Process 
The way the housing agencies operated represented 
another source of limitations on access: 
(1) The absence of basic information affected the capacity 
of applicants to understand the access situation, 
namely eligibility rules, method and place of forward-
ing applications, and ways of follow-up. 
(2) The vagueness of rules governing the "ordering'' of 
applications and their openness to different inter-
pretations gave some applicants better access to land 
than others. 
(3} The operational strategies employed by the housing 
agencies at reception desks resulted in differentia l 
access opportunities. 
(4) The poor staffing of the housing agencies and the 
excessive centralisation of the allocation operations 
in the headquarters of the Lands Directorate created 
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considerable difficulties b o th for the staff and 
applicants, and stimulated the growth of an army 
of brokers acting between officials and applicants 
at the various levels of the allocation operation. 
Obviously some of these operational difficulties are 
common features of most public bureaucracies. Others, 
however, were related to the institutional contex t o f 
housing agencies. For instance, difficulties a rising 
from poor staffing, centralisation of land operations and 
unclarity of the "ordering" rules cannot be isolated from 
the reorganisation process of the local government system 
in 1971 and 1977, and its political undercurrents. Simi-
larly, the heavy pressure of applicants on housing a g enc ies 
a r o se from the rapidly growing urban property m~ket wh ich 
wa s closely associated with the 1974 new l and po licy a s we ll 
a s from the meagre organisational resources of the se agen-
c i e s. Adequate understandi ng of these operational pr oblems 
r equire s, therefore, the careful isola tion of independent 
factors from those contingent on other processes interna l 
o r external to the organisation. 
7 . 2 . 3 The Urban Po litica l Economy 
The pattern of urba n po lit i c s under the May r egi me 
t ook the form of an increasing use of state resources -
inc luding physical force - t o mobilise political support, 
c r eat e acquiescence, or punish opponents. Thi s was mani-
fes t e d in two policy a r e as: s quatter housing a n d c omme r c i a l-
isatio n o f governme n t a l l a nd. I n the former case , upgrading 
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policy was used at one time to generate political support 
for the regime and to punish its opponents at a later 
time. In the latter case, the policy of land commercial-
isation was partly introduced to stimulate political 
support among the propertifdclasses at a time when the 
regime broke its relation with the radical movement, while 
the merchant classes were hesitant to give it support. 
Both policies generated constraints on access to urban 
housing in the capital. 
(a) The Politics of Housing 
We have argued in Chapter Six that from the mid-l%0s 
onwards, the provision of housing in the capital was in-
creasingly used by the political parties to reward supporters 
or penalise opposing groups. This trend has intensified 
under the May regime, in the sphere of squatter housing. 
According to our earlier analysis political intervention 
in the provision of urban housing had two profound implica-
tions for access opportunities: first, it made planning 
decisions on where, when and how much resources to allocate 
for urban housing more dependent on the political needs of 
the regime than either on the administrative criteria of 
provision or on the urgency of the shelter problem. 
The political intervention in housing was vividly 
depicted by the zigzagging pattern of the relations between 
residents in the Unity Settlement of Omdurman and the 
housing agencies during the period 1970-1982. Although 
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the Settlement won official approval of upgrading in 1 970 
its subsequent development became increasingly contingent 
on the regime's political conflict with the right-wing 
opposition groups, with whom the majority of the Settle-
ment's population had strong regional and sectarian ties. 
Only after a political accommodation between the May regime 
and these opposition groups was reached in 1978, was a 
serious effort made to upgrade the settlement. 
The constraints on access arose from the use of admin-
istrative process for narrow political objectives. The 
outcome was the denial of access to shelter and to basic 
urban services for a sizeable section of the urban popula-
tion because of their ideological beliefs and regional 
background. 
(b) The Policy of Prope rty Development 
A second source of constraints on access to residentia l 
land, at the level of the urban political economy , was the 
policy of land commercialisation, introduced in 1974. Broadly 
speaking , there were three areas where the commercialisation 
process seemed to have constrained the access of low income 
groups to urban shelter. 
(1) The sale of public l a n d for investment purposes 
reduced the stock of land to be al loca t ed for 
low-income housing. The cost of reclaiming 
privately-held lands in the future outweighed 
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the revenue gained from the current land 
sales. Moreover, the disposing of central 
locations resulted in high transport costs 
in locations assigned to lower-income housing. 
(2) The commercialisation process fostered a sharp 
increase in land values and the market price 
reached ten times that of the government sub-
sidised plots in third-class residential areas. 1 
High land values tempted some beneficiaries in 
government-sponsored housing programmes to sell 
their plots and move into cheap property, mostly 
in illegal settlements. The commercialisation 
process seems, therefore, to have undermined 
the capacity of low-income groups to consolidate 
their ownership. 
(3) The illegal settlements provided a fundamental 
means of access to shelter for the urban poor, 
housing 29 per cent of the capital's population 
in 1975. The commercialisation process accelerated 
the movement from the inner city areas into illegal 
settlements, thereby increasing overcrowding over 
already meagre services. The penetration of the 
informal land market by commercial speculators had 
two other effects : it increased rents, thus 
encouraging the subdivision of plots at the expense 
1. Land values were partly accelerated by the strong demand 
for residential plots from Sudanese expatriates working 
in oil-producing Arab countries , and also due to imper-
fections in the property market. 
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of space standards and an overall decline in 
the standards of living. Secondly, it stimu-
lated encroachment into communal lands to the 
loss of the "traditional" landholder. 
Officially the policy of land commercialisation was 
intended to increase Government revenue in order to finance 
low income housing. In practice the resulting property 
boom put more strain on official and non-official housing 
markets. As both markets became steadily commercialised 
more low-income groups had progressively less access to 
urban shelter. 
The politics of housing and the policy of land com-
mercialisation generated real limits on the access of some 
urban groups to residential land. Yet the processes under-
lying both policies belonged to forces outside the organ-
isation responsible for the allocation of residential land, 
as we explain in the next section of this chapter. 
7.2.4 The National Policy Model 
We examined in Chapter Three the Sudanese model of 
socio-economic planning. According to our analysis, this 
model portrayed the following features: 
(1) Moral issues and social values underlying 
societal goals were incorporated as develop-
mental objectives to the extent that they 
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lent themselves to technical analysis. 
(2) Development was defined in terms of economic 
growth in the modern sector of the economy, 
with minimal consideration for other develop-
mental goals such as equity in the distribution 
of resources. 
(3) Emphases were laid on technology and modern 
management systems as the most appropriate 
methods for modernising the society, parti-
cularly the "traditional" sector of the economy. 
This planning strategy relates to our analysis of the 
constraints on access to urban shelter in two ways: first, 
the emphasis on economic growth to the neglect of the 
'externalities• of development alert us to the inte rrela tions 
between the planning model, regional development, migration, 
urban growth and shelter problems in the capital. Second, 
the model's preoccupation with growth and productivity appear 
to have underlain the government's approach to social policy. 
The policy of land commercialisation and the cost-effective 
approach to urban services was analysed in that context. We 
will consider these two points below. 
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(a) Regional Development and the Shelter Problems 
in the Capital 
The pattern of economic planning in the Sudan has 
been biased towards "modern" sector agriculture in central 
Sudan to the neglect of the peasant economy in the western 
and the southern regions of the country. The subsequent 
expansion of mechanised agriculture in western Sudan had 
adverse effects on the peasant economy. Social spending, 
on the other hand, followed closely the pattern of develop-
ment expenditure, concentrating much of the infrastructural 
services in central Sudan. 
The resulting regional disparities in incomes and 
social services stimulated a strong migratory process from 
the western region to the capital from the second half of 
the 1960s, as we pointed out in Chapter Four. Because of 
their employment situation and the difficulty of gaining 
access to official housing (Chapter Five) the majority of 
the migrants from that region joined the illegal settlements 
on the outskirts of the capital (Chapter Six). Any adequate 
explanation of the housing situation of these citizens and 
of the failure of administrative action to cater for them 
must, therefore, take into account the political and economic 
processes underlying the economic planning model (see Section 
7.3 below). 
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(b) The Trend of Rationalising Urban Social Policy 
The concern for economic growth and productivity , 
characteristic of the Sudanese model of planning, s eems 
to have considerably influenced urban social policy during 
the 1970s. In contrast to predominantly centrally financed 
urban services in the pre-1969 period, the 1970s witnessed 
the move towards making these services self-financing. The 
new trend was exemplified by the 1974 land policy and that 
of pricing urban services on a cost effective basis. 
We have outlined in Chapter Four the reasons behind 
the policy of land commercialisation. Because of the rising 
cost of urban government due to the expansion in the state 
administration, and a decline in local government r evenue, 
it was thought that urban governmental land could help 
finance the housing budget and possibly contribute to the 
general budget. Hence, the 1974 land policy was launched. 
We noted in Chapter Four that the government began to 
review the costing arrangement and the financial sources of 
urban services in 1970. Subsequent housing programmes 
reflected this trend. Although, when compared with their 
actual economic costs the rates of these services were still 
subsidised , the underlying trend was to remove the subsidy 
in line with the government's progr&~e of economic austerity 
which was launched in 1977. However, the state's indirect 
subsidy to the bureaucracy in the form of larger plots and 
higher levels of urban service contradicted the policy of 
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rationalisation. The continuity of this indirect subsidy 
to the bureaucracy also meant unequal distribution of the 
negative effects of the rationalisation process. 
The above analysis emphasised that shelter problems 
in Greater Khartoum were intricately related to the pre-
vailing model of national planning. The pattern of 
national planning seems to have limited the capacity of 
certain social and regional groups to qualify for the 
requirements of official housing. It is ironical that 
those regional groups most affected by the negative effects 
of the "development" model in rural areas benefited the 
least from the process of rationalising social policy in 
urban areas. This particular outcome of the state's policy 
underlines the significance of the relation between the 
prevailing planning models and social interests to the study 
of constraints on policy implementation. 
7.2.5 Conclusion 
We have classified above the main constraints on access 
to residential land according to the level of their occurrence. 
These levels were the institutional setting, the urban poli-
tical economy and the national political economy. We noted 
a number of examples where the constraints at one level were 
underwritten by processes at another level of the state's 
activity. At the institutional level the problems arising 
from the organisational structure and technology were closely 
related to political and historical processes external to 
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the housing agencies. At the level of the urban political 
economy, the constrai~ts on access derived from the poli-
tics of housing and the policy of property development, 
both of which belonged more to the national political 
economy than to the housing agencies per se. The prevail-
ing model of planning at the national level was insensitive 
to the social implications of 11 development" both in rural 
and urban areas. 
It should be clear by now that any investigation of 
the constraints on access to residential land which is 
limited to one level of the anlaysis or that stops short 
of dealing adequately with the other levels will be un-
satisfactory. What is needed is a broad perspective of 
the ecology of administrative action; one that accounts 
for the interdependencies between economy, social structure 
and the state, as far as public administration is concerned. 
7.3 AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTRAINTS ON 
HOUSING POLICY 
7.3.1 General 
In our exposition of dominant approaches to policy 
implementation in Chapter One, we concluded that they did 
not give adequate consideration to the impact of wider 
environment - namely power and social structure - on policy 
process. Hence their explanations of constraints on policy 
implementation were considered unsatisfactory. The analysis 
we conducted in Chapters Two to Six revealed a number of 
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factors and processes which constrained urban social policy. 
These were summarised into three categories in the preceding 
section of this chapter. 
Two aspects of constraints on policy implementation 
remained to be clarified. First, we need to outline system-
atic links between the three aforementioned categories of 
constraints, and point out the way they operate in practice. 
Second, we need to establish how constraints on policy 
relate to the social structure. Put differently, we intend 
to clarify the source and incidence of constraints on urban 
social policy. We shall deal with the above question in 
two parts. First, we will consider the relation between 
the abovementioned categories of constraints and the social 
structure. Second, we will outline how constraints effect-
ively impinge on the implementation process of urban social 
policy: the allocation of urban residential land. 
7.3.2 Urban Housing Policy and the Social Structure 
We classified above the main constraints on urban 
housing policy according to three levels of state activity: 
national political economy, urban political economy,and 
the organisational level of allocation agencies. At each 
level we singled out specific processes and policies as 
positive sources of constraints on housing policy. We pro-
posed earlier to move analysis of policy implementation 
beyond identification of separate sets of constraints at 
various policy levels, toward constructing an integrated 
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explanation that accounts for links and interdependencies 
between different levels of public policy, as in Diagram 
1.1. 
(a) The Impact of Political Economy 
A first step towards an integrated explanation of 
policy problems is to specify the link between the economy, 
housing problems and administrative response. Our exposition 
of the country's political economy has revealed that speci-
fic structural features in the economy led to an intensive 
specialisation in capitalist production of primary agri-
cultural products, a disarticulation between non-capitalist 
and capitalist parts of the economy, and weak intersectoral 
linkages in the capitalist sector. As a consequence, 
development spending concentrated disproportionately on 
central Sudan, the capacity of the peasant economy to support 
its population was weakened, and the schism between the city 
and countryside widened, weighing heavily in favour of urban 
areas. The implications of these developments for urban 
housing were manifold: rapid urban growth; soaring housing 
demand; a trend to cut down state-subsidy to housing and 
urban service; a policy to commercialise government land to 
raise money to pay for the rising cost of urban administration ; 
and a trend of political intervention in housing policy to 
regulate and/or control demand. 
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(b) The Social Structure 
The exposition of structural features of the economy 
allowed us to understand how broad economic processes 
circumscribed urban housing. Addressing the links between 
housing policy and the social structure should clarify the 
source of constraints on policy and explain why they 
occurred and what were the underlying forces and social 
interests. 
Looking at the national political economy, three 
principal categories of dominant interests can be identi-
fied. 
First, there were the interests of international capi-
tal in sustaining the production of primary agricultural 
products and securing markets for goods produced abroad. 
Second , there were the interests of agro-commercial classes 
in mechanised farming, import and export trade, and real 
estate. Third, there were the interests of the state 
bureaucracy in sustaining stable and reliable sources of 
revenue, through irrigated agriculture, supporting private 
rainfed capitalist farming to provide food (i.e . national 
security), and foreign earnings, managing astable level of 
public spending in urban areas, and maintaining mutual re-
lations with private sector, international aid agencies and 
donor countries. 
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Despite the multiplicity of these interests, they 
were skilfully accommodated at the political level by 
the May regime, as we suggested in Chapter Two. Economic 
analysis of the technocratic policy model - analysed in 
Chapter Three - coincided conveniently with the economic 
interests of both foreign and indigenous capital. It can 
be safely argued that dominant economic interests were 
mediated through the policy planning machinery and were 
institutionalised in the policy process. The social impli-
cations of the consequent development patterns were disas-
trous in both rural and urban areas as we arg ued in Ch apter 
Four. 
At the level of urban political economy, the spectrum 
of relevant interests included: (a) commercial interests 
in property development, building materials trade, con-
struction and bank finance. Both foreign and indigenous 
capital invested in these fields. (b) The interest of the 
state bureaucracy in raising money to meet rising c osts o f 
urban government, in reducing urban housing pressures, in 
encouraging the private sector to invest in property 
development, in mainta ining the housing benefits o f bureau-
cracy, and in seeking revenue-gene rating o pportunities f or 
individual bureaucrats in real estate, trade etc. 
Urban housing policy trie d to respond t o these interests. 
At one level, the t ~onventional policy of releasing, occa sio n-
a lly, g overnment land to reduce housing pressures was foll owe d 
Large -sc ale site and services s c hemes were l aunched in the 
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capital in 1970, 1972, 1977 and 1982, as we explained in 
Chapter Four. Merchants were permitted, for the first 
time, to apply forhigh class land in closed-auction 
allocations, previously monopolised by bureaucracy. At 
another level, the idea of raising money from government 
land, and, at the same time, encouraging the private 
sector into property development, became a reality in the 
1974 Land Policy. At a third l e vel, the state subsidy 
to land price and to urban services was relatively reduced. 
Finally, political intervention in urban ho using intensi-
fied during the 1970s and the ear l y 1980s to control dema nd 
and depoliticise social protest in lower class areas; at 
times residents in illegal settlements were forcefully 
evacuated from the capital (1981). 
We have already presented the main features of urba n 
housing policy in Chapter Four. We may note here that the 
shift from bureaucracy to the merchants as the main bene -
fi c iaries of the allocation system generally reflected the 
national trend in which agro-commercial interests increasingly 
dominated the state during the 1970s. Howeve r, bureaucrac y 
managed to preserve most of its benefits, e g . through the 
provision of a special land allocation to senior employ ees 
of certain state departments. But generally the conflict 
of interests betwee n merchants and bureaucrats was not pro -
nounced, and some bureaucrats were moving into trade and 
business. 
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The foregoing discussion indicates that the social 
forces and interests underlying national and urban 
political economies were, more or less, the same. The 
strong presence of these interests in the state explains 
why, despite their obvious harmful social implications, 
national and urban development models were sustained. 
It explains the interrelatedness between constraints on 
housing policy arising from the national economy and those 
deriving from the urban economy. In the following section, 
we will outline how these constraints were internalised 
in the structure of housing agencies and sustained in admin-
istrative process. 
7.3.3 Reconceptualising the Organisational Structure 
The preceding discussion established that access to 
residential land in Greater Khartoum was contingent on 
specific processes flowing from national and urban political 
economies. What is central now is the manner whereby these 
contingencies impinged on administrative action. It would 
be difficult to envisage a situation where we can record 
a direct visible encounter between these constraints and 
administrative action. This is simply because the most 
basic of these constraints occurs at levels distantly 
located from the locus of administrative action. 
An alternative approach to the study of the incidence 
of constraints may be developed, following the recent work 
of radical organisational sociology which we presented in 
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Chapter One, Section 1.3.3. The central theme in that 
work is that major organisational features should be 
seen, not as inherently rational entities, but as socially 
constructed devices which are capable of reflecting patterns 
of interactions and conflict, andthebalance of power within 
organisations and across society. Thus, organisational 
goals, design, technology and process, all could be tactics 
and resources in a contest between competing social interests. 
By conceiving of organisational structure as an out-
come of conflicting social processes and interests, it is 
possible to enquire about the nature of social interests 
which are predominantly represented in housing agencies and 
to uncover how they managed to reproduce and sustain their 
interest in administrative process. In what follows, we 
will re-examine the institutional structure and organisa-
tional technology of housing agencies in the Sudan. 
(a) The Institutional Structure of Housing Agencies 
We outlined the critique of mainstream organisation 
theory in Chapter One Section 1.2.4. The import of that 
critique is that the presumed rationality of organisational 
structure is unwarranted. Organisational structures are 
socially produced and as such they contain multiple rational-
ities corresponding to the number of social interests involvec 
ie. owners of capital, managers, professionals, workers etc. 
Two implications arise from this proposed pattern of analysis. 
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(1) Organisational structures are to be analysed 
as an outcome of a social process involving 
conflicting interests inside and outside 
organisations. 
(2) The presumed rationality of organisational 
structures is a partial one, hence the actual 
criteria underlying the formation of these 
structures are yet to be discovered. 
A first step in examining the social construction 
process of the institutional structure of Sudanese housing 
agencies is to establish the "modes of rationalities" 
(Clegg and Dunkerley, op.cit., pp.502,511) underlying 
their formation. The second step will be to isolate the 
prevailing social context of these agencies from the 
historical one, to find out whether the existing insti-
tutional structures have been maintained, reconstructed 
or changed and to specify the processes, mechanisms and 
interests involved. 
Social policy in general and urban housing in parti-
cular did not have a significant place in the agenda of the 
Condominium state. Conceived as structures of advantage 
and disadvantage, the institutional structures of the hous-
ing agencies, their technical rules, and the legislation 
controlling urban planning, housing provision and land tenure 
were primarily created to meet the needs of the expatriate 
community and, later, of the small westernised indigenous 
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elite. Extension of housing services to the indigenous 
population would have: 
a. increased social expenditure at the expense 
of capitalist investment, 
b. encouraged urban growth and stimulated demand 
for more social spending, 
c. had undesirable political implications since 
more social spending would improve political 
consciousness and stimulate the growth of 
political protest movements. The basic under-
lying rationale of housing provision was, 
therefore, discriminatory as we explain below. 
With its limited scope and narrow institutional base 
the colonial housing policy was carried unchanged into the 
post-independence period, except for the introduction of 
the closed auction system which gave the bureaucracy easy 
access to residential land (Chapter Five) . Housing expendi-
ture as a percentage of total government expenditure was 
small (two per cent of the GDP during the 1960s). The effects 
of the expansion on the economy, of the growing rate of urban 
growth and of the expansion in the state's apparatus during 
the post-independence period, on urban housing did not become 
manifest until the late 1960s. The marked spread of the 
squatter settlements and the proliferation of clandestine 
sales of the government's urban land revealed the insensitivity 
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of housing agencies to the rising urban housing problems 
as much as the strength of the social interests repre-
sented in them. The institutional structures of the 
housing agencies continued,throughout the 1950s and the 
1960s, to sustain the colonial bias to the state's 
employees as against other social groups. 
A radical change in the institutional structure of 
the housing agencies occurred in the post-1969 period. A 
number of questions arise here in relation to the reasons 
behind that change, whether it altered the "mode of rational-
ity" inherited from the colonial state, and if it did, what 
was the resulting balance of social interests in the housing 
agencies. 
In contrast to the relative political insignificance 
of urban housing under the colonial and the first phase of 
the post-colonial state, the 1969-regime sought the political 
support of the urban masses using, among other things, the 
issue of housing. Both housing policy and housing insti-
tutions were used for political gain, as we explained in 
Chapter Six. Under the 1971 reorganisation of the local 
government system the institutional structure of the housing 
agencies was arranged to provide the maximum possible mobili-
sation of the urban rank and file. Local councils were 
engaged in the implementation of the 1977 Housing Plan 
(Chapter Four) . 
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As urban housing became politically attractive to 
the Nay regime, certain modificatio ns in the 11mode of 
rationality" of housing institutions were entailed. 
First, the near monopoly of bureaucracy over high 
class housing was reduced, although some of its benefits 
were maintained through special allocations earmarke d t o 
specific departments of the state. Second, access to 
closed-auction housing was opened for the business c om-
munity who were not allowed to compete in the pre-1969 
period. Third, the 1974 land policy provided ample acc e ss 
to private developers. Fourth, upgrading projects in 
illegal settlements provided an opportunity for a few more 
people to own urban property. 
The balance of social interests in housing agencies 
seemed, therefore, to have changed in the post-1969 perio d 
to include business interests. Increased local represen-
tation in housing agencies and the implementation of s ome 
upgrading programmes in illegal settlements provided 
"conditioned" access to some low-income urban groups too. 
The "mode of rationality" g overning the institutional 
structure of housing agencies was, therefore, modified t o 
accommodate business interests and interests of the petty 
bourgeois elements who enrolled in the Party and in loca l 
councils. However,the technical rules that strat i fied be ne-
ficiaries of land allocations into three housing classes, 
remained unchanged. To this point we now turn. 
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(b) The Organisation's Technology 
Organisational technology is often regarded in 
conventional administrative studies as essentially a 
socially-neutral device. Its relevance to the study of 
constraints on administrative action mostly arises in 
relation to its applicability to a set of problems. The 
propensity of these techniques to mediate social interests 
and hence acquire some explanatory significance in the 
study of social constraints on administration is scarcely 
addressed in the literature. 
We have outlined earlier the objections to the con-
ventional view that accepts organisational features as 
objective scientific categories (Benson, 1977(a)) . A 
parallel criticism of close relevance arose in the fie ld 
of urban planning (eg. Marc Los, 1981; J. Simmie, 1974). 
The acceptance of the objectivity of facts, problems, 
models and theories of urban planning has been equally 
challenged. 
The positivist view of urban planning, the subject 
of the above critique, is f airly characteristic of Sudanese 
urban planning, in which planning techniques have often 
been taken for granted as inherently objective and un-
problematic in themselves. Following the perspective of 
radical organisation theory outlined above, we may re-
interpret these techniques as historical constructs that 
were originally produced to satisfy a specific social need. 
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By uncovering the processes underlying their formation 
it would be possible to reconstruct the historical 
situation which produced them, define their social 
character and establish how they mediated social interests 
despite their seemingly neutral character. 
The limitations on the access of urban lower classes 
to better quality sites, to adequate plot space and to a 
"reasonable" level of urban service basically originated 
in the land classification system, the kernel of Sudanese 
urban planning. To understand the rationale behind this 
differential access to urban housing one must refer to 
the initial assumptions of the classification system itself. 
Contemporary urban planning in the Sudan grew out of 
the planning structures and practices of the colonial state. 
The present pattern of land classification was first intra-
duced in the layout of Khartoum town, designed in 1898. 
Three main factors influenced the then emerging pattern of 
land classification. 
The first factor was the climate and the 
"fact that .•. a portion of the population are 
not in their natural zone, and are not there-
for in adjustment with the environment" (McLean, 
19 13 , pp . 2 2 5 ) . 
According to Dr McLean, the first municipal engineer of 
Khartoum town, the effect of tropical sun on whitemen was 
injurious. It was, therefore, thought that the proximity 
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from the water front, high altitude, the presence of 
gardens (ie. larger plots}, green open spaces, and wide 
shaded streets in the European quarter would modify the 
harsh climate of Khartoum. By contrast, since the 
"natives" were in their natural envirunment, it was 
thought that they could live comfortably in much more 
crowded circumstances (ibid, 226). 
A second factor was the need to segregate the 
"native" population to avert the incidence of tropical 
diseases and epidemics. The high standards required by 
the new building regulations deterred the indigenous 
population from building in the newly designated high 
class areas. Most of them sold out, benefiting from the 
then prevailing property boom, and moved elsewhere. 
Eventually, the "native lodging areas" were laid out in 
1912 on the outskirts of the town to house the overspill. 
Thirdly, the colonial state wanted to increase its 
revenues through the sale of its urban land during the 
period 1900-1905 (Warburg, 1970, pp.l61, 163). The classi-
fication system was instrumental in the regulation and en-
hancement of land values and generally for stimulating the 
1 growth of the urban property market. 
l. In contrast to the functional values of urban land which 
had prevailed in 19th century Sudan, the 1900-1905 land 
policy could be the earliest attempt in the Sudan to 
commoditise urban land and assign it an ascriptional value, 
c ontingent on location and rent. (For a c omparison of 
land values between pre-capitalist and capitalist cities 
see Vance, 1970). 
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Although the land classification system was initially 
premised on the variations in the shelter needs of different 
ethnic communities economic criteria gradually became the 
main basis of access to the best sites, large plots and 
high levels of service provision. The post-independence 
era witnessed a significant departure from the established 
economic basis of access to land, as civil servants began 
to gain more access than other social groups. The implica -
tions of the classification system for the site, space a nd 
t he package of services associated with the class of land 
remained more or less the same thereafter {as in Chapter 
Five). 
The bases of the land classification system were not 
questioned by successive housing plans in the post-independence 
period. They were mostly accepted as technically necessary. 
The National Housing Committee (1979) explained the relevance 
of the prevailing land classification system by stating tha t 
first class housing should use c oncrete and since some p e ople 
could not afford this standard the third class was appropriate 
for them (The Report of the National Housing Committee, 1981, 
p.44). Another official view was that the segregating ele-
ment of the classification system was socially desirabl e , 
because if rich people built in a poor neighbourhood this 
would foster social disharmony in that neighbourhood. 1 
We may conclude that the basic premises of the land 
classification system were geared to narrow urban interests 
1. An interview with the Deputy Director of the Researc h 
Section of the Housing Department, Ministry of Construction 
and Public Works, Khartoum, 25th August 1982. 
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under the colonial state. The same classification system 
was carried into the post-independence period and has been 
maintained under the guise of technical imperatives. The 
unqualified preferential access to urban residence which 
the bureaucracy continued to enjoy under this system of 
land classification suggests that the technical rules, far 
from being socially neutral, were socially biased against 
lower urban classes. These planning techniques gave 
bureaucracy and later - in the post-1970 period - the 
merchants easy access tothebest quality sites, larger 
plots and high levels of urban service. 
7.3.4 Conclusion 
We proposed in this section an alternative approach 
to the study of constraints on urban housing policy. It 
consisted of two dimensions: identifying sources of con-
straints at the level of political economy, and establishing 
how constraints impinge effectively on housing agencies. 
Taking the first dimension, we outlined the relations 
between national political economy and housing problems in 
the capital. Dominant social forces at the levels of 
national and urban political economies were found to be 
similar. Circumscribed by the interests of commercial 
classes and the state bureaucracy, urban housing policy 
failed to provide all the urban population with access to 
residential land. 
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The second dimension in our approach addressed the 
way constraints acted upon housing policies. We employed 
the notion that organisational structures are socially 
constructed and are, therefore, capable of extending and 
internalising social interests into administrative process. 
Using this perspective, we investigated the criteria under-
lying the institutional structure and organisational tech-
nology of housing agencies. We concluded that the "rules 
of actionrr governing the institutional structure and the 
system of land classification operatedinthe interest of 
bureaucracy and, recently, merchant classes. The organ-
isational structure of housing agencies has acted, there-
fore, as mediator to those social interests that dominated 
at the level of urban political economy. 
7.4 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The specific objective of this thesis has been to 
analyse and explain the constraints on the allocation of 
urban residential land in Greater Khartoum, Sudan. We 
proposed in the first chapter to extend the study of con-
straints on policy implementation beyond the narrow focus 
of behavioural and organisational analysis, and to address 
other pertinent issues in the environment of implementation 
- namely the development pattern, power and the social 
structure. We promised to advance a broad and integrated 
explanation of why and how constraints on policy implementa-
tion occur. The framework of analysis we adopted blended 
structural analysis of the political economy with institQional 
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analysis of policy and organisational processes. 
We started our analysis by an exposition of the main 
features of the Sudanese economy and underlying social 
forces in the second chapter. We associated the persistence 
of particular features of the economy throughout the post-
independence period with the marked presence of agro-
commercial classes, bureaucracy and metropolitan capital at 
the political level. 
The link between social structure and policy output 
was explicated in the third chapter through a political 
analysis of the dominant model of policy planning, under 
the May regime. Examining the model against the ideology 
of the May regime, the institutional organisation of the 
state, and the social character of policy makers, we 
detected a technocratic orientation whose policy prescrip-
tions conformed with and fostered the pattern of develop-
ment we already outlined in Chapter Two. This conformity 
between the nature of the dominant model and policy output 
indicated that the social interests underlying the political 
economy were, by and large, institutionalised in policy-
making agencies. This seemed to be the case also in the 
policy of urban development, examined in Chapter Four. 
We proceeded from structural and political analysis to 
institutional analysis in Chapters Five and Six. The aim 
was to delineate organisational constraints on access to 
residential land, which related to institutional structures, 
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allocation rules and administrative process. We identified 
two main categories of constraints on access at this level: 
one category derived from the technical rules of allocation, 
and operated mainly between housing classes differentiating 
between one housing class and another. The other category 
derived from operational rules of allocation and differen-
tiated between applLcants within each housing class. 
After analysing constraints on housing policy at dif-
ferent levels of state policy, we classified them in this 
chapter, into three categories, relating to the institutional 
setting of housing agencies, urban political economy, and 
national political economy. Then we tried to synthesise 
these constraints in a broad explanation, which has two 
basic ingredients:- identification of social forces under-
lying the political economy of urbanisation; and explication 
of the institutional mechanisms through which social in-
fluence acted upon administrative process. 
The marked presence of commercial and bureaucratic 
interests at the political level was considered as a vital 
explanatory variable for the persistence of national and 
urban development models, despite their widely-known limit-
ations. Identifying these social interests was, therefore, 
necessary for understanding the link between the social 
structure and housing policy. Sociological analysis of 
policy models, organisational design, techniques and process 
was equally necessary to describe accurately how social 
forces managed to sustain their interests in administrative 
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process. Constraints on housing policy were therefore 
seen to emanate from the social structure and extend into 
the practice of organisations from within their structures. 
Appendix 2 .1 Composition of GDP by Economic Sectors 1 969/70 - 1979/80 (Percentages) 1 
* 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/ 73 1973/74 1974/ 75 1975/ 76 1976/ 77 1977/ 78 1978/ 79 
Agriculture 37.6 38.7 38.8 38.4 41.4 38.7 34. 35.2 36.4 35.3 
Commerce 14.6 14.9 16.9 15.9 14.1 16.2 17.0 19.0 19.2 19.7 
Manufacturing 9.3 8.9 8.9 8.9 8.6 9.4 8.7 8.2 7.5 8.2 
Transport & 7.3 6.7 6.2 6.9 6.0 5.9 10.4 9.7 9.7 10.0 Communications 
Construction 3.5 3.1 3.2 3.5 4.9 4.3 4.8 4.4 4.1 4.2 
Electricity & 2.4 2.3 2 .o 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.2 Water 
Mining and2 0.3 0.2 0. 4 0.3 Quarrying 0.3 0. 3 - - - -
Gove rnment 11. 6 11.5 11.8 11.7 12.9 10.0 9.3 9.3 9 .o 8.9 Services 
Other 13.5 13.9 11.8 12.4 10.3 13.9 14.1 12.6 12.5 12.3 Services 
---~ --- - - ----- -- -- - - --------
Figures do not add up to lOO. 1. 
2. 
* 
Percentage shares of mining and quarrying were added to "ot her services" from 1975/76 on. 
Provisional Figures. 
Source: Economic Survey 1979/80 , pp.l 5 , 6, a n d Bank o f Sudan Report, 1981, p.7. 
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Total Public Private and Total Public Private and 
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Sector Sector 
% % % % % % 
~griculture 120 21 90 32 30 16 106 28 80 37 27 16 
1 Manufacturing 107 19 42 15 65 35 60 16 36 l7 24 14 
Transport and 95 17 63 21 32 17 43 11 43 20 30 18 ~amn.mications 
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Totals 472 84 285 lOO 187 lOO 385 100 215 lOO 170 100 
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Grand Total 565 lOO - - - - 385 - - - -
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IPublic and 60% 40% 56% 44% !Private 
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Appendix 2.3 Imports, Exports and Balance of Trade 1970-1979 (ES million) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Exports 103.9 114.4 124.4 152.2 122 152.5 193 230.2 202.3 
Imports 100.1 115.4 117.9 151.3 247.6 360.1 341.3 376.5 449.5 
Balance 3.8 -1 6.5 0. 9 -125.5 -207.6 -148.3 -146.3 -247.2 of Trade 
--
Source: Economic Survey 1979/80, p.l53. 
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Appendix 3 .1 The Structure of the Political System in Sudan ( 19 76) 
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Appendix 3.2 Increase in the Size of Government 1970-1980 
(a) Increase of Civil Servants 1955-1977 (Selected Years) 1 
1955/56 1965/66 1976/77 
Central Government 12,127 31,283 119,115 
Public Corporations N.A. 65,125 132,144 
iLocal Government N.A. 80,000 157,457 
(for 
1966/67) 
!Total N.A. 176,408 408,716 
l. Defense and Police personnel are excluded. 
N.A. Not available. Source: Sudanow, December 1977,p.ll. 
(b) Growth in Government's Current Expenditure 1955-1981 
(Selected Years) (£S million) 
I i 1955/56 1965/66 1970/71 1975/76 1980/~ 
Defense and 2.6 14.6 37.7 45.5 132.8 Security 
Gen. Admin. 10.1 27.3 65.1 68.9 252.7 
)Economic 9.7 12.1 21.2 34.9 37.9 ! Services 
l 
!Social 
:Services 8.4 15.5 26.4 23.8 30.8 
Miscellaneous 1 92.5 287.8 
- -
-
.Debt Repayment - - - 37.5 130.3 
I! 
I 
:To tal 30.8 69.5 150.4 303.2 872.2 
l . These include: expenditure to meet deficit of some 
corporations; payments to universities; Price Stabilisa-
tion Fund; IMF; General Reserve (Chapter Two); Exchange 
Tax; and transfers to Southern Region. 
Sources: Hamid, G.a., 1977, p.l22; Economic Survey, 1981/82, 
p.224. 
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~aticns, and Sexvioes) 
1 
3 
1 
Ph.D. (Ecalanics) 
MA' s (f'..cacn.1cs) 
M!\ tMath.) 
3 !lA's (Eccn:rnics) 2 
1 MA (Engineering) l 
1 Dip. (Engineering) 4 
1 B.Sc. (Engineerin?l 2 
MA' s ~i. Eo:l'ls) 
MA. (Pol.~) 
Dip. {Planninq) 
University Degrees 
10 Seoordary 
School Level 
1--. -------t---------+---------+---------t-------t 
I' FoHcw--up and annual 2 MA' B (E=n::rnics) 1 Ranker J\c.c:OI.ntant 2 MA.'s (Econ.Stats.) 6 Seca"ldazy 
budget 1 Dip lema School Level 
3 University Degrees 
\------------------~-----------------4-----------------4------------------~--------------1 
: S !::o:Jnam.c Coordinatirn 
~~---~strative Office 
f _ of the Camdssicner 
17 Adrrun~stration and 
I Pei"Sa"L'"Iel 
1 
1 
MA (Ec:co:Jnics) lw>. (Econ::rnics) 
... 1 Ml\ (Ecalanics J 
Lhl ~ity Degree 2 tmiversity I:legnle.s 
1 MA (Eo::n::mics) 1 Seca1cWy 
Scn:x>l level 
1 University Degree 3 Secaldary 
School Level 
1 thivers1ty Degree 4 Seccodary 
Scrool Leve 1 
>-----------------t-----------------~-----------------+--------------------+------------~ :a 1'tpist 1 Llbrartan 
and others 
... . .. . .. 2 Sea:ndal:y 
Schcol 
Librarians 
5 Typists; 10 
Car Drivers 
and ):) W:Jrkers 
-------------------~------------------~---------------+------------------~~---------------
l3 14 JS I 9 J I 
__ j ------~----------------~------------------L_------------------L------------------~-----------
-~2~!-::e' ;,dapted fra!l MEFIT 1 Vol.l, Phase l, SeptE!llber 1974 I APP"'1dtx A, r:p. 41-43. 
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~J?.e.~!!~.0~~~-~ -~ Estate Bank Loans f~~ the Period 1970 - 1980 (£5 000 ) 
li::Jw Incx:ne Group ~ium and High Incare Groups Commercial Loans 
Beneficiaries 
No. of Percentage No. of Percentage No. of Percentage 
Year Loans Value of Total Loans Value of Total Loans Value of Total 
1970 379 323 85 28 54 15 
- - -
1971 1388 820 68 305 380 32 
- -
-
1972 600 585 70 128 254 30 
-
- -
1973 316 334 12 478 2519 78 
- -
-
1974 793 2225 69 676 809 25 261 196 6 
1975 797 992 42 460 1140 49 170 210 9 
1976 639 668 32 413 1036 49 184 390 19 
1977 648 668 24 563 1787 65 99 286 11 
1978 73 80 11 107 224 31 128 425 58 
1979 499 430 11 764 2168 57 244 1244 32 
1980 43 44 2 469 2189 79 101 535 19 
---·- - -
SOurces: Economic Surveys 1977/78; 1979/80; and 1981/82. 
Totals 
Total No. Total 
of Loans Value 
407 377 
1693 1200 
728 839 
808 2867 
1730 3230 
1427 2342 
1236 2094 
1310 2741 
308 729 
1507 3842 
613 2768 
-·· -
I 
I 
w 
~ 
\0 
- 4oo -
(1974) 
Khartoum 
- ------ -- .,., __ 
§ 
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Appendix 6.1 (continued) 
Khartoum City 
1. Soba West 
2. Al-Gereif 
3. Al-Riyadh, Al-Tayif, and 
Erkaweet 
4. Burri 
5. Nasir Extension (Burri) 
6. A1-Mogran 
7-8 Eddubasin and Wad Agib 
9. A1-Shajarah 
10. Al-Azozab 
lL Al-Lamab 
12. A1-Kalak1a 
13. Third Class Extension 
14. A1-Eshash 
15. Gabra 
16. Industrial Area 
17. Railways Complex 
18. Khartoum No.3 
19. Khartoum No.2 
20. Khartoum East 
21. Khartoum West 
22. Al-Saggana 
23. Al-Mygoma 
24. Deims 
25. Khartoum New Extension 
26. Tuti 
2 7. Al-Ushara 
28. Al-Sahafa Extension 
29. Khartoum Central 
30. Al-Qoz 
31. Al-Hilla A1-Gadida 
32. Al-Remaila 
Khartoum North City 
l. Docks and Barracks 
2. Hillat Hamad 
3. Hillat Khogali 
4. Al-Danagla 
5. Deims 
6. Al-Sha'abiya 
7. A1-Khatmiya 
8. A1-Amlak 
9. Al-Mazad 
10. A1-Safya 
11. Kober Deims 
12. Kober Extension 
13. Hillat Kuku 
14. Al Haj Yousif 
15. Al-Wihda Extension 
16. Carton Settlement 
17. Shambat 
Omdurman City 
l. Al-Thourah 
2. Al-Ma1ladiya 
3. Wad Nubawi 
4. Al Masalma, CBD and 
Al A'rda 
5. Beit Al-Mal and Abu Roaf 
6. Al-Mulazmin and Al Morada 
7. Abu Anga and Abbassiya 
8. Abu Si'id and Al-Fiteihab 
9. Umbudda and Unity 
Settlement 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Appendix 6.2 A Note on the Sample Survey 
The choice of National Unity Settlement for study was 
influenced by the research's twin objectives of examining 
the relation betweenthepolicy of regional development and 
the housing problem in the capital, and of studying the 
problems of policy implementation in a live allocation con-
text. As for the first objective, National Unity Settlement 
was the fastest growing in the capital during the 1970s, 
increasing from 500 dwellings in 1970 to some 24,000 dwellings 
in 1982. This rapid rate of growth was a manifestation of 
the general effect of rural-urban migration. Furthermore, 
the heterogeneity of the regional origins of resident, in 
contrast to the exclusive regional origins in other illegal 
settlements, enabled us to assess the impact of the "push" 
factors on the growth of the settlement. Second, the decision 
of the authorities to upgrade the settlement in June 1982, 
gave us a valuable opportunity to study closely the implemen-
tation process. 
There was no reliable official record of the names of 
the residents or of the owner-occupiers in the settlement 
from which we could have taken our sample. Even had such a 
list existed, it would have been extremely difficult to reach 
the persons to be interviewed because neither did the streets 
carry any signs nor did dwellings bear identification numbers 
or names. The only available option was to select the sample 
in the actual place of residence. 
The settlement consisted of eight residential wards with 
an estimated 24,000 dwellings distributed in the following 
way: 
Total Dwellings in the Settlement, Distributed by Wards 
Wards Official Estimate of Dwellings~ 
Ward ll 2,600 
Ward 12 2,100 
Ward 13 2,200 
Ward 14 10,400 
Ward 15 700 
Ward 16 1,600 
Ward 17 600 
Ward 18 4,000 
Total 24,800 
Sources: Records of the Committee of New Omdurman 
Housing Project, the Unity Settlement, 1982. 
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Within the constraint of time, money and the available 
information, we decided to conduct a sample survey in one 
of the eight wards, after ensuring that there was a degree 
of homogeneity in the socio-economic attributes of the 
population in the eight wards. We then chose randomly 
Ward 16. 
While the official record accounted for only 1,600 
dwellings in the Ward the local Party organisation put the 
number at 2,500. During our preliminary investigations 
we came to know that a strip of dwellings located on the 
western edge of Ward 16 was demolished in 1981 but most 
of its residents (about 500 households) had continued to 
live on it. Neither the official record nor the local 
party unit included the demolished area as part of Ward 16. 
We decided to treat the demolished strip as part of Ward 16, 
thus putting the number of dwellings in the Ward at 3,000. 
We then selected 300 dwellings as the size of the sample. 
We divided the Ward into ten blocks. Nine field investigators 
were used and each was assigned one block and instructed to 
choose every third dwelling in the block. 
We used a structured interview schedule to collect 
information from heads of the households in the selected 
sample (see Appendix 6.3). An interview to fill in the 
schedule took on average 30 minutes. The interviewing was 
conducted during the period 11th to 21st of December 1982. 
Interviews usually took place in the afternoons between 
3.00 and 5.30 pm when the heads of households returned from 
work. Completed schedules were reviewed and checked on the 
same day of the interview and provision was made to complete 
unfinished ones the following day. 
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Appendix 6 • 3 The Interview Schedule 
(a) Basic Information on the Socio-Economic Status of 
Respondents: 
1. Sex 
2. Marital Status 
3. Family Size 
4. Place of Origin 
5. Length of Stay in the Capital 
6. Education 
7. Occupation 
8. Monthly Income 
9. Number of Working Members in the Family 
10. Monthly Rent 
11. Property Ownership 
(b) Information on Housing Conditions: 
12. Place of Last Residence 
13. Type of Last Residence 
14. Incidence of Change of Residence 
15. Reasons for Changing Last Residence 
16. Length of Stay in Present Residence 
17. Type of Present Accommodation 
18. Number of Rooms 
19. Number of Available Conveniences 
20. Use of Conveniences 
21. Method of Building Residence 
22. Method of Financing the Construction 
23. Place where Respondents' Children Receive Education 
24. Place where Respondents' Families Receive Medical Treatment 
25. Most Urgently Needed Services in the Settlement 
(c) Information on Housing Programmes: 
26. Previous Applications for Residential Land 
27. Result of Previous Applications for Land 
28. Location and Use Made of Land Previously Allocated to 
Respondents 
29. Reasons for Having Not Been Allocated a Plot in Previous 
Land Allocations 
30. Reasons for Not Applying in Previous Land Programmes 
31. Opinion about the Present Upgrading Programme 
32. Whether Respondent is Included in the Upgrading Programme 
33. Method of Completing the Land Form 
34. Problems Faced in Obtaining or in Completing or in 
Returning the Land Form 
35. Whether Applicant Met the Interview Committee 
36. Number of the Committee's Members Present 
37. Applicant's Opinion of the Committee's Procedure 
38. Whether Applicant Swore the Oath 
39. Reasons for not Seeing the Interview Committee 
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40. Whether Applicant Thinks that there are Other Ways 
for Obtaining Land Without Having to See the Committee 
41. Applicants' Opinion about the Price that Government 
Set for Land in the Settlement 
42. How Would Applicants Provide the Money to Pay for His / 
Her Plot? 
(d) Information on Local Organisations in the Settlement 
43. Membership in Local Party and Other Organisations 
44. Whether and How Local Organisations Help in Solving 
Housing Problems in the Settlement 
45. The Role of the Party's Local Unit in the Present 
Upgrading Programme 
46. Whether Respondents Participated in Elections Prior 
to the Inception of the May Regime in 1969 
47. Party Affiliations of Respondents Under the Previous 
Parliamentary Regime 
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Appendix 6. 4 A SaitJ?le of the Land Fonn Used in the Upgrading Project 
(1982)* 
~istl:y of Construction and Public Works 
Do you have a previous Land Form? ••....•. 
~o. of Land Fonn ...•..•..• Date of Application .•...... 
Place of forwarding application ...•.. Other remarks concerning a previous 
application .•....... 
The Unit of Cati:>a.tting Sp:?ntaneous Housing 
A Land Fonn for the Entitled, and Affected Persons 
The follCNJing staterrents are to be canpleted by the applicant accanpanied 
by certified supporting documents for Sections A(2,3,4,5,9,10,12,13), 
B,C,D. Any application which is incanplete or dres not arrive at the 
specified tirre will be excluded. 
(A) 
1. Narre • . . . 2. Place and date of birth • . . 3. Place of Origin 
4. Occupation • . • 5. Place of Work • . . 6. Annual income 
7. Address . • . . 8. Next of Kin: Narre and Address ..... 
9. No. and date of issue of the Identity Card ..•.. 
10. No., date, and place of issue of the Nationality Certificate ..... . 
11. Town(s) where you lived during the last 10 years •... 
12 . Where and hav do you live nON, and when have you Iroved into your 
present acoarnmodation? 
13. Give naroos and addresses of your previous landlord(s) ..... 
14. Have you built rcx:ms or structures or seized governmental land 
which was not legally allocated to you? .... State place .•••.• date 
neighbours •.••• witnesses ...•• and how you obtained it (land) .... 
If those buildings were demolished, state the circumstances and 
relevant infonmation which can be referred to. 
(B) Social Condition 
1. Married . . • • 2. Bachelor • • • • 3. Widaw/Wido:.ver . . . . . 4 . Female head 
of a family 5. Divorced .... 6. Other cases 
(C) Family of the Applicant 
Name of wife/wives Age Children De pen dents Relationship 
(D) Other exceptional and social cases whim may be consi<Ered ...... . 
(E) Do you or your wife or a J:l'Eil"ber of your family CMn a house or a 
part of a house (carplete or otherwise) or a plot of land, 
registered or unregistered, in Khartoum Provin02 or in any other 
province? ..•. 
1. State its location •.. 2 .Plot No. • .•. 3. Block, ward and area ..... . 
4. Registered or unregistered . • . . 5. Cc:rnplete or partially built ... . 
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5. .Methcxi of acquiring it:- a closed auction ...• , a housing plan .•.. , 
inheritance .... , purchase .•.. , a gift .••. 
6. Have you applied for housing in the Housing Plan (or for 
departmental housing}? .•..... 
Ccmnents of the Plarming and Settle.nent Ccmnittees in the area .... . . 
Ccmrents of the People's Council concerning the validity of 
information, follCMing the investigation, evaluation and displaying 
of the application in the public noticeboard for 15 days ..... . 
(F) State in the order of preference town and class of land where you 
prefer to live: Khartoum - Qndurma.n - Khartoum North - third class 
- fourth class with basic services: First choice • . . • . . Second 
choice .... Third choice ..•.• 
Signature of the Administrative Officers . . . . . Date •..•. 
(G) Following oath-taking of applicant before the ccmn.ittee, it may 
decide: 
l. Points obtained 
2 . Endorse the application 
3. Reccmrend the referral of application to the Camni ttee on exceptional 
cases ...••. 
4. Reccrrm:md granting applicant a suitable plot of land in the fourth 
class ...•. 
5. Recarmend rejecting the application ..... 
6. Rea:mrrend criminal prosecution, and state offence 
Signature of head of the carmittee . . . . (magistrate status). 
Signature of representatives (2) of the District Comcil ..... 
Signature of representative of the Directorate of Lands ••••• 
Signature of representative of the Depart:rrent of Housing and 
Physical P larming. 
(H) I, the undersigned, declare that the above inforr.-tation is correct, and 
if it turns out, at anyti.Ire, to be othexwise ... I will be liable to 
prosecution mder Article 154 of the Sudan Penal Code, the violation 
of which may expose offender to the penality of imprisonment for a 
maximum of six months and fine; and also Article 408 (forgery); and 
the application will be cancelled~ also I declare that if it turns 
out, at any tiroo in the future, that I have obtained land on false 
infonnation, the Government will have the right in retaking it, (and) 
in protecting its rights by any available legal procedure. 
Also I declare not to disr:ose of land by sale, grant or mortgage 
except to Government or the institution in which I work ... 
Date . • . • Place .••.•.• 
I , the rmdersigned, according to my personal knowledge of the 
applicant, testify that the information provided is correct, and 
if it turns out to be otherwise I will be liable to legal penalties 
under Article 109. 
Signature of witness . . . . . . Address .•.... Identity Card No ....... . 
Issued in . . . . . . . Date ..... . 
(I) 
(J) 
(K) 
* 
- 408 -
CcmrEnts of the technical ccmnittee on the r:ossibility of planning 
and allocating land of a suitable class without encumbrances ..... . 
Signature of representative of the Depa.rtm:?nt of Housing and 
Physical Planning ...• 
Signature of representative of the Directorate of Lands 
Recarrnendations of the General Director of Lands 
Decision of the Minister (or his proxy) ••••• 
There are four other paragraphs for office use which I excluded. 
Certain parts of the original Arabic version were vague, and for 
the sake of clarity I had to reformulate them. 
A dam, F. , 19 7 7 
Adams, M. , and 
Howell, J., 
Africa Guide, 1982 
Ahmed, M., 
Ake, c., 1981 
A1avi, H., 1972 
Al-Battahani, A., 
1976 
Albrow, M., 1970 
Almond, G., and 
Powell., 1966 
Awad, M.H., 1971 
Bakheit, G., 1974 
Bakheit, G., 1971 
Bakheit, G., 1969 
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